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1994 PLC (C.S.) 9

Syed ASGHAR ABBAS RIZVI vs CHAIRMAN, INVESTMENT PROMOTION BUREAU,

Citation1994 PLC (C.S.) 9
CourtFederal Service Tribunal
Judge(s)Abdul Razzaq A. Thaim, Muhammad Ismail
ResultAppeal dismissed

ABDUL RAZZAQ A. THAHIM (CHAIRMAN): --Appellant M. Syed Asghar Abbas Rizvi was appointed as Staff Officer in Grade-17 in the National Development Volunteer Programme (hereinafter referred to as NDVP) with effect from 30-9-1973. According to terms of appointment, he was purely temporary and his services were liable to termination on a fortnight's notice, and further he had no claim for permanent employment to this or equivalent post. In the meantime the NDVP was abolished and the appellant was nominated by the Establishment Division by memorandum dated 10-4-1980 for appointment against a temporary post of Assistant Director (Grade-17), in the Investment Promotion Bureau, Karachi. This appointment was temporary and the appellant was placed on probation for a period of one year extendable by a further period not exceeding six months. The appellant, after the pronouncement of judgment by this Tribunal in Appeal No. 68(R) of 1989 filed by Miss Mehar Jamal which was allowed by this Tribunal, made a departmental appeal for grant of seniority retrospectively from the date of his appointment in NDVP but his departmental appeal addressed to the Prime Minister on' 19-7-1990 was withheld 'being time-barred. The appellant filed another appeal to the Prime Minister on 18-5-1992, which was replied to vide Office Memorandum dated 15-7-1992 and rejected as being not tenable. He then preferred this appeal before the Tribunal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973.

2. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that in similar circumstances, one Miss Mehar Jamal in Appeal No. 68(R)/89 was allowed seniority and that decision was upheld by the Supreme Court and both the decisions are binding on the Government.

Therefore, the appellant is also entitled to the same relief. .

3. The respondents have not filed comments. However, Mr. Niaz Ahmed Khan, learned Standing Counsel who is incidentally present, argued with the assistance of departmental representative Mr. Rafiullah, that the appellant was not a regular employee of NDVP, but was on ad hoc basis, and therefore, his claim for seniority cannot be considered. He also submitted that the appellant has not impleaded necessary parties in the appeal. Therefore, no relief could be granted to the appellant. He also raised the question of limitation and submitted that the appeal is hopelessly time-barred.

4. The appellant claims seniority in Grade-17 with effect from 30-9-1973. From the perusal of his appointment order in the Ministry of Industries, it is clear that he was allowed basic pay scale of Grade-17 and fresh 'order of appointment was issued. He was neither transferred nor absorbed in the manner as claimed by the appellant. The appellant on becoming surplus from NDVP where his appointment was on ad hoc basis was, as grace of the Government, appointed afresh in the Investment Promotion Bureau. He has not been given benefit of previous service. The facts of the case of Miss Mehar Jamal, referred to above, are different and are not attracted in the appellant's case, and every case has to be decided on its own merit. The appellant was appointed in the Investment Promotion Bureau in the year 1980 and for the last 13 years he did not care to ask for seniority over his colleague Mr. Gul Muhammad Mehar, Deputy Director, and even now he has not been made a party in this appeal. -Not only this but amendment has now been sought by making an application, in which too Mr. Gul Muhammad Mehar has not been impleaded as a party. He made a departmental appeal for grant of seniority after the judgment of Miss Mehar Jamal, but that appeal was rightly rejected as being time-barred. He made another appeal dated 18-5-1992 which too was rejected as being not tenable. This appeal filed there after cannot be treated as in time, because under the rules there is only one appeal provided and according to the appellant that was made on 17-9-1990 which was duly considered and rejected as time-barred. The second appeal filed on 18-5-1992, which was not provided under the rules, having been replied cannot be treated as final rejected as to enlarge period of limitation. The appeal is patently time---barred.

The appellant has not filed any application for condonation of delay, and therefore, question of condonation of delay does not arise, and the appeal is liable to be dismissed on this score alone.

5. Furthermore, the appeal surfers from non-joinder of necessary parties, as in case of acceptance of appeal there will be so many persons whose seniority will be affected by order of the Tribunal and those persons cannot be condemned unheard, and therefore, this lacuna is fatal.

6. For the reasons recorded above, the appeal fails on merits as well as on legal objections, and is consequently dismissed.

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