SYED HAIDER ALI PIRZADA, J.---The petitioner through this petition has claimed the following reliefs:- -- "(i)declare that the impugned order dated 18-11-1991 passed in Suit No.735/90 directing transfer of the case to the Banking Tribunal, Sindh, Karachi as illegal, contrary to law and the proceedings taken in furtherance thereto are to no legal effect; .
(ii)declare that the alleged amalgamation and/or take-over of the Respondent No.3 by the Respondent No.4 is illegal and of no legal effect; (iii)declare that the proceedings being continued by the learned Respondent No.2 in Suit No.184/92 previously registered in the High Court as Suit No.735/90 titled as M/s. B.C.C.I. Ltd. v.. Sindh Glass Industries Ltd. And 2 others are without jurisdiction, and contrary to law; (iv)direct that no further proceedings be continued in the referred Suit No.184/92 in the absence of grant of leave to proceed with the said matter by the learned Company Judge of the Hon'ble High Court of Sindh, Karachi.
(v) make such further orders as may be deemed appropriate and in the interest of justice, in the circumstances of the case, and
(vi) award costs."
2. The facts leading to the filing of the above petition are that petitioner had, for many years, established business in North America. He, according to the policies of the Government of Pakistan was persuaded to make major investment in Pakistan. Accordingly he decided to set up number of Industries at Nooriabad, Deh Kalu Kohar, District Dadu (Sindh).
3. It is the case of the petitioner that M/s. Sindh Glass Industries Ltd., presently under order of liquidation, is one of the industries sponsored by him. M/s. N.D.F.C. Filed a petition for winding up in this Court. The Respondent No.3 joined the proceedings and subsequently also filed a petition. For winding up. The Respondent No.3, in the meantime, also filed a suit, in this Court respecting the amount alleged to be the basis for submission of winding up petition. It is alleged that the amount claimed as due was said to be based under a non-interest bearing system, the Banking Tribunal, Sindh established under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 had exclusive jurisdiction. The Respondent No.2 filed a suit being Suit No.735 of 1990 in this Court. By a common judgment and order dated 14-1-1991 the petition for winding up was granted. M/s. Sindh Glass Industries Ltd. Was ordered to be wound up. The Official Assignee was appointed as the Official Liquidator. The Suit No.735/90 was adjourned in view of the provisions of Section 316 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984.
4. The Respondent No.2 resumed its office in or about July 1991 as the Chairman of the Banking Tribunal, Sindh under the provisions of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984. The office of the Court submitted a reference for transfer of the abovesaid suit to the Banking Tribunal, Sindh for disposal in accordance with the provisions of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984. The suit was transferred vide orders dated 18-11-1991. The Respondent No.2 required appearance on behalf bf the defendants in the said suit on 2-3-1992 vide notice dated 22-2-1992.
5. It is the further case of the petitioner that on 10-3-1992 two applications were filed on behalf of the defendants. The petitioner through Miscellaneous Application under Section 151, C.P.C. Prayed for dismissal of the suit for non-prosecution. Another application was filed praying that the proceedings may be stayed as no leave had been obtained by the plaintiffs (Respondent No.3 herein) for proceeding with the suit as required under section 316 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984. Respondent No.2 filed objections to the Misc. Application.
6. It is his further case that on 18-3-1992 preliminary issues were submitted and it was prayed that the learned Tribunal may determine the referred issues as preliminary issues after recording such evidence or summoning such record as may be necessary for determination of the preliminary issues. The learned Tribunal dismissed the Misc. Application and even did not grant the prayer for determination of preliminary issues pertaining to the jurisdiction of learned Tribunal and required the case to be proceeded with on its merits.
7. We have heard Mr. Akhtar Ali Mahmud, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Sajid Zahid Advocate for the Respondent No. 4.
8 Mr. Sajid Zahid, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the Constitution petition.
9. A special law, namely, Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 (Ordinance No.LVIII of 1984) was enacted for the purposes of providing a machinery for recovery of finance provided by Banking Companies under a system of financing which is not based on interest. Section 5 of the Ordinance provides powers of Banking Tribunals. Subsection (3) of Section 5 provides that no Court other than a Banking Tribunal shall have or exercise any jurisdiction with respect to any matter to which the jurisdiction of a Banking Tribunal extends under this Ordinance, including a decision as to the existence or otherwise of finance and the execution of a decree passed by a Banking Tribunal.
10. Section 9 of the Ordinance provides for an appeal against any order of Banking Tribunal under subsection (4) or subsection (5) or Section 6 or a decree or sentence passed under this Ordinance may, within thirty days of such order, decree or sentence, prefer an appeal to the High Court. It further provides that no appeal filed by the defendant against a decree shall be entertained unless the defendant has deposited with the Banking Tribunal the amount claimed in the suit under subsection (6) of Section 6 or a decretal amount. It appears that there is no provision for a revision or any other remedy against an interlocutory order. The intention of the Legislature, therefore, seems to be against any interference during the trial until the matter has been finally decided. This arrangement accords with the objective of the law, for, an interference during the pendency of the suit is bound to delay the conclusion of the trial.
11. The question, therefore, arises if when the law has barred an appeal or other remedy from an interlocutory order, should the party be permitted to circumvent that law by recourse to the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court. This question has now been settled by a catena of decisions.
In Muhammad Saeed v. Mst. Saratul Fatima and another PLD 1978 Lah. 1459, a High Court held as under:--- "It, therefore, follows that what the Legislature held to be an interlocutory order not by itself fit to be appealable, should not by such a device be held fit enough to attract the more important, and at a higher level, the Constitutional jurisdiction:"
12. In Mumtaz Hussain alias Bhutta v. Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab, Lahore and another 1976 SCMR 450, the Supreme Court observed; "As the said Ordinance has taken away the right of the petitioner to interim relief, learned counsel submitted that this was a ground which entitled the petitioner to prosecute a writ petition despite the pendency of the proceedings in the District Court.
The argument is misconceived because the writ Jurisdiction of the superior Courts cannot be invoked in aid of injustice and in order to defeat the express provisions of the statutory law. That was also the view taken by this Court in Sayyed Muhammad Ali Shah Bokhari v. The 'Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab, Lahore and others 1972 SCMR 297 and we respectfully agree with it."
13. It is well-recognized principle of law that in a case where a statute provides a procedure for doing a thing in a particular manner that thing should be done in that manner and in no other way or it should not be done at all. E Indeed such statute provides doing of thing in any other manner particularly when this procedure is laid down for filing of appeals against the final order, judgment or sentence.
14. It is thus clear from the legal position noted above that the Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked where it should have the effect of IC defeating or deflecting the Legislative intent.
15. It can hardly be denied that the learned Tribunal was possessed of the jurisdiction to hear the arguments on the Misc. Applications. The orders do not suffer from any illegality much less a jurisdictional error, to justify invocation of Constitutional jurisdiction.
16. It is not necessary to go into the merits of the learned Tribunal's orders. Learned counsel for petitioner wanted us to look into the application and the preliminary issues. We do not propose to examine these contentions and we do not express any opinion on these points but we feel that these preliminary issues must be examined by the learned Tribunal.
17. In the result, the petition is dismissed in limine.
18. The above are the reasons for the short order dated 14-12-1992 dismissing the petition on conclusion of the arguments. Consequently, the application is dismissed as having become infructuous.