DECISION The appellant was working as a Fitter with the respondents since 10-2-1952. It appears that the employees of the respondent-Corporation are medically examined yearly after reaching the age of 35 years. He was, therefore, examined a number of times thereafter, but the first protest about the wrong entry of his age came some time in 1988, when he had made an application requesting that his date of birth be rectified as 1-9-1935 as against 3-2-1930. However it was after the receipt of the letter, informing him that he would be retired on 6-12-1989 on completing sixty years, that he stirred into activity. He had filed a suit and on maturer advice had sent a grievance notice to the respondents and filed the petition under section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969. In-between the civil suit is stated to have been withdrawn.
2. The petition came to be dismissed resulting in this appeal.
3. The contention before the Labour Court was that his passport, which he had had got issued in 1984, the National Identity Card and School Certificate, which he had of late obtained from India, all mentioned his date of birth as 1-9-1935. He also referred to his Service Identity Card issued by the respondent-Company according to which his date of birth was 1936.
4. The discrepancy in the Service Identity Card has remained unexplained. As for the National Identity Card and the entry in the Passport, the party can give any date of his or her choice without any questioning or fear of counter-check. The School Certificate, which was obtained from India, admittedly had not been authenticated by the Pakistan High Commission. So nothing will turn on that either.
5. As against this there is the evidence of Muhammad Afsar Khan according to which the minimum age for entry into respondent's service is 18 years. If his correct age, as being stressed now was 1-9- 1935 he would not have been qualified to be considered for the job. Then there is the service certificate, according to which his date of birth was 10-2-1930. It is true that his application has not been produced on the record. But the record has been computerized. There appears to be no reason to suspect that the record maintained by the respondent-Corporation does not reflect the true position.
6. I am clearly of the opinion that the appeal is devoid of any merit. I will, therefore, uphold the impugned order and dismiss the appeal.