1. ' SYED HAIDER ALI PIRZADA, J.---The petitioner has challenged the order made by respondent No,5 (Evacuee Trust Property Board) and conveyed by the respondent No,1 (Assistant Administrator, Evacuee Property, Hyderabad Region) as having been passed without lawful authority and thus of no legal effect.
2. ' The facts leading to the filing of the above petition are that the petitioner was in possession of the property No,C/1520, ,Khata Chowk, Hyderabad since a very long time. It is the case of the petitioner that he made efforts to get the said property transferred from the Settlement Authorities and fmally succeeded in getting the transfer order dated 25-1-1979. The original Transfer Order is annexed to the petition as Annexure 'A'. It is the further case of the petitioner that he, on the basis of the aforesaid entitlement, constructed the huge building consisting of sixteen shops and spent over rupees three lass on the said construction through Dada Bhai Contractor vide agreement dated 10-6-1979. The original agreement is annexed to the petition as Annexure 'B'. It is the further case of the petitioner that some interested persons started creating hurdles in the way of the petitioner and on their mala fide initiative the respondent No,1 challenged the entitlement of the petitioner before the respondent No,3. The respondent No,3 by his order dated 25-6-1980 declared the transfer as invalid and cancelled its transfer order: The respondent by his order, dated 20-10- 1983 held that the validation was not possible as property was evacuee trust property and in his concluding para. Made the following observations:--- "The question, however, arises as to whether the respondent is entitled to any compensation for the reconstruction done by him on this site and if so, how much. This is a matter which should be dealt with on the administrative side in consultation with the Board. I, therefore, direct that a copy of this order should be sent to the property branch for placing it before the Board in one of its forthcoming meetings."
3. ' The petitioner being aggrieved against the orders, dated 25-6-1980 and 20-10-1983 of the respondent No,3, preferred revision before respondent No,4.
4. ' The respondent No,4 taking into consideration the arguments advanced by the parties, dismissed the appeal by order, dated 29-1-1984. The respondent No,4, while dismissing the appeal made the following observations in paragraph 10 of the order: "However, in view of the investment already made by the petitioner in the site his case for this property as a lessee, may be considered favourably."
5. ' The respondent No,5, in its meeting held on 19-8-1984 decided that "the management of the building is being taken over by the Board and the occupants of the building will be treated tenants of the Board". This decision, as stated in earlier part of this judgment, was conveyed by the respondent No,1 by his letter No,ETP/Hyd/AA/3401, dated 30-10-1984. The petitioner being aggrieved against the order, dated 19-8-1984 has filed the present petition.
6. ' In support of the above petition, it has been urged by Mr. Mirza Ghiasuddin Baig that the petitioner was not afforded opportunity of hearing before the respondent No,5 who passed an order against him and depriving him of his investment. His submission is that the principles of natural justice were violated.
7. ' On the other hand Mr. Syed Jahangir Hussain Shah learned counsel for respondent No,1 has submitted that the principles of natural justice were not violated by the respondent No,5.
8. 'It need not be reiterated that the right of hearing is not necessarily to be incorporated in a Statute of whatever nature and description it may be but by virtue of the settled legal position, it has to be read into every Statute and all authorities, whether Executive or Judicial, are bound to pass orders after due hearing of the persons likely to be affected adversely by their order.
9. ' We have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the various orders passed by the respondents 3, 4 and 5. As has been already pointed out the petitioner has a grievance against the respondent No,5. So far as the order dated 19-8-1984 is concerned, that cannot be regarded as a valid order because that was passed without hearing the petitioner. The rights of the transferee by the Settlement Authorities who had constructed sixteen shops and spent more than rupees three lacs on this construction, the respondent No,3 recommended that the matter should be considered and the respondent No,4 directed the respondent No,5 that the petitioner's case for retaining this property as a lessee may be considered favorably, had not, at all, been adverted to. An order which does not deal with the merits of the case after affording an opportunity to the petitioner and does not indicate that it was passed after applying mind to the relevant facts and merits of the case in the light of the recommendation of respondent No,3 and directions of the respondent No,4, cannot be termed as a valid order, at all. Such an order, being contrary to the norms of justice, would be deemed to be without jurisdiction. An order, whether it is passed by a judicial Tribunal or quasi-judicial Tribunal or even by an executive authority, must indicate that it was passed after affording opportunity of hearing and after considering all the relevant facts and respective claims of the parties. An arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction in flagrant disregard of law and principles of natural justice, is tantamount to denial of justice. Therefore, the impugned order, dated 19-8-1984 is void and of no legal consequence.
10. For the aforesaid reasons, we allowed the petition by a short order dated 27-2-1989 passed on conclusion of the arguments and held that the impugned order, dated 19-8-1984 passed by the respondent No,5 is void as being violate of principle of natural justice and utter disregard of the direction of the respondent No,4. We direct the respondent No,5 to decide afresh after giving the parties an opportunity of hearing. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.