KADIR NAWAZ S. AWAN, J.-This is a Letter Patent Appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge, who by his order dated 1-6-63 had dismissed the objections filed by the contesting defendants in the execution proceedings.
2. Facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal are that Abdul Wahid (plaintiff-decree-holder) had filed his suit (No. 235/55) for rending of accounts, separation and delivery of his shares. His claim was disputed by the contesting defendants but ultimately the suit resulted into consent decree on 16-2-61. Two sums of Rs. 20 lacs each were paid by them to the plaintiff in terms of the consent decree but they refused to pay him the last instalment of Rs. 10 lacs for the only reason that he had failed to sign the income-tax returns and applications for renewal of firm's registration as provided under clause 12 of this consent decree. After long correspon--dence had ensued between the parties as the plaintiff had insisted upon the statement of accounts and balance-sheets be shown to him before he signed the above-stated returns and applications, the contesting defendants filed an applications on 6-10-61 under sections 47 and 151, C. P. C. Praying that the plaintiff be called upon by this Court to sign these income-tax returns and the applications for renewal of registration of this firm relating to the years 1958-59 to 1962-63 immediately. Objections raised by the plaintiff to the grant of this request are mentioned by him in his counter-affidavit dated 14-10-61. No rejoinder was filed by the contesting defendants. Record shows that another similar application was filed by the contesting defendants on 14-11-61; praying that the plaintiff "was not entitled to claim payment of Rs. 10 lacs then due for payment on 16-11-61, and if he filed any application for execution or of any other nature a notice thereof may be given to these defendants in the first instance." On the same day they are said to have addressed a letter to the plaintiff but had made no specific reply to the objections raised by plaintiff in his counter-affidavit dated 14-10-61. In view of this position the first execution application was filed by the plaintiff on 13-1-62 and it was dismissed by an order dated 10-12-62, as it was not in accordance with law. Second execution petition was filed by him on 2-1-63. Objections supported by affidavit were filed by these contesting defendants on 18-2-63 and the counter-affidavit was filed by the plaintiff on 29-4-63. The learned Single Judge did not agree with these objections which were consequently dismissed by the impugned order dated 1-6-63.
3. It is apparent from these facts that both the parties have relied upon the provisions of clause 12 of this consent decree. Its latter part appears relevant for our purpose and therefore it is reproduced below:- "------..The plaintiff do sign any form or returns or applications that may require to be made in connection with the registration of the firm or renewal or assessment of income-tax or refund or for any other purpose as may by required from time to time."
The perusal of this passage in clause 12 shows that the plaintiff had agreed to sign such documents whenever he was required to do so. His signatures were found necessary after he attained majority in 1955. It is common ground that the contesting defendants approached him to sign these returns as well as applications which were for the years 1958-59 to 1951-63 regarding his income as a partner. Stand taken by these defendants is that plaintiff had deliberately refused to sign these documents in order to put them to heavy losses. It is further clear that the plaintiff for the reasons stated above had declined to sign these documents. Therefore his failure to sign these documents is a matter relevant to the execution of the consent decree. When a decree grants certain rights to both the parties there could be no doubt that parties can enforce such rights in the execution proceedings an d not by separate suits.
4. Stand taken by the contesting defendants is that this consent decree granted certain rights to both the parties and one of such rights (clause 12) clearly places an obligation on the plaintiff to sign applications and returns referred to above. According to them this right was in the nature of a consideration for their agreeing to pay a lump sum of Rs. 50 lacs in lieu of his profits etc. They had, therefore urged before us that the plaintiff is not entitled to Rs. 10 lacs as he has refused to sign these documents and further that he was liable to pay compensation to them for the losses suffered by them. This view is vehemently opposed by the plaintiff. According to him clause 12 of this consent decree is independent of its other terms, secondly his refusal to sign these documents was for reasonable and sufficient cause i. e. Failure of these defendants to show statement of accounts and balance-- sheets for his satisfaction about the correctness as required under section 52 of the Income-tax Act. Lastly even if the view taken by the contesting defendants is correct then his remedy lies under Order XXI, rule 34, C. P. C. And not his refusal to pay the last balance of Rs. 10 lacs.
5. In support of his contentions Mr. Dingomal the learned counsel for the contesting defendants had urged before us that the plaintiff could not ask for the balance-sheets as well as statements of accounts for two reasons, viz. : (1) it would amount to adding to or varying the terms of clause 12 of the consent decree, and (2) he had already sent such statements when the disputes between the parties were settled and he was allowed a lump sum of Rs. 50 lacs. We agree with Mr. Dingomal in respect of the two] principles for the interpretation of deejs enunciated by him, namely, (1) when words of the documents are clear natural meaning should be given to such A words, (2) all words in a deed must be taken into consideration. "If the words of an agreement are clear and definite then they must be construed according to their natural meaning, this is a principle that calls for rigid adherence to it." (17 S L R 110). View taken by the Privy Council as reported in AIR 1930 P C 217 is: "that the deed must be construed and given effect to as it stood even if the result be that the document is found to embody a bargain intended by neither of the parties to it."
We were also referred to another case reported in AIR 1936 P C 281 where it was held that: "The cardinal rule of interpretation for deeds as well as for other instruments is to gather the intention from the words of the document, and for that purpose the language of the entire deed should be taken into consideration. The interpretation to be adopted should be one which gives effect, if possible, to all the parts, and does not reject any of them."
Similar view is expressed in other cases reported in AIR 1943 P C 115, AIR 1933 PC 49, AIR 1948PC 150andPLD1960Dacca555: "The purpose of the interpretation of a document is to ascertain the true intent and purpose of the parties creating the document. For this purpose the entire document must be taken into account.
No particular importance or weight to any particular portion or words in a document. Is to be given unless and until it appears from the context of the words used in the other parts of the document as well that that particular word or that particular phrase was intended to be of such vital importance."
This view is expressed by the Dacca High Court referred to above. Mr. Dingomal had therefore urged before us that plaintiff could not argue or urge that he would sign the forms and applications provided these were in accor--dance with law. Apparently the forms and applications which were sent to the plaintiff for his signatures were incomplete, certain columns were blank, and lastly, a few entries were made in some columns only. He had therefore urged that there was the risk of a prosecution against him under section 52 of the Income-tax Act if the statements made in those returns were found false to his knowledge. Mr. Naimuddin, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, had urged before us that if the consideration for the payment of Rs. 50 lacs by the contesting defendants to the plaintiff was that he would sign these documents then such consideration must be lawful, within the meaning of section 23, Contract Act and that it should not be forbidden by law. This argument is not without merit. The undertaking given by the plaintiff as stated in clause 1 2 of the consent decree is that he would sign any form or return or any application "as may be required from time to time". These returns and applications were to be filed under different sections of the Income-tax Act. There could be no doubt that what these sections require is that the returns and applications must be laid down under the Income-tax Act and not that false or incorrect information be contained in these documents. In order to avoid the risk of prosecution under section 52 of Income-tax Act and also to verify the correctness of certain entries made in those applications and returns we feel that the plaintiff was justified in asking for balance- sheets and statements of accounts before he could sign these documents. His refusal to sign these documents was therefore for reason--able and sufficient cause. We therefore do not agree with Mr. Dingomal that such request on the part of the plaintiff would amount to adding to or varying the terms contained in clause 12 of the consent decree. A sum of Rs. 50 lacs, as per this consent decree, was allowed not only to the plaintiff but defendants Nos. 20 and 22 to 26 as consolidated sum "in full and final settlement of their claims in suit including all the moneys or assets that were transferred to Pakistan before or after the Partition of India from time to time and whether belonging to Messrs Ahmed Abdul Karim Brothers ...... That the aforesaid sum of rupees fifty lacs includes, cover and satisfy in full all the claims of the plaintiff as well as of defendants 20, and 22 to 26 against the firm of Ahmed Abdul Ghani in respect of all their accounts or claim whatsoever including all the profits of the said firm up to the date of this application viz. 16-2-61 and all the transactions holding of shares and securities, investments of any kind, as well as in respect of the goodwill of the said firm and all assets, accretions and advantages or benefits of the said firm,..."
(vide clause 2 of this consent decree). It was therefore urged before us on behalf of the plaintiff that this sum o: Rs. 50 lacs was allowed to him and some defendants who were not partners in this firm, and there--fore the figures shown in these returns, as his profits, had to be verified and checked by him by referring to the documents asked for by him viz. Balance--sheets and statements of accounts. It is further evident from clause 2 of this consent decree that plaintiff's share in the profits has not been specifically mentioned. It was further brought to our notice that previous applications filed by the contesting defendants were rejected by the Income-tax authorities. Our attention was drawn to paragraph 6 (page 57 of the paper-- book) which refers to certain disputes between the partners and the Income--tax Officer. Mr. Naimuddin had also referred to long correspondence which had ensued between the parties to prove the hostile attitude and unreasonable conduct of the contesting defendants as well as the anxiety shown by the plaintiff to sign such documents after the required statements of accounts were shown to him.
Apparently there appeared no reason for the contesting defendants to refuse to show these statements of accounts to the plaintiff even if these were shown to him at an earlier stage. Plaintiff has denied to have seen these statements of accounts when the disputes were settled between the parties. He had not asked for the account books. In the result we find very little merit in this argument advanced on behalf of the contesting defendants.
6. Another argument advanced by Mr. Dingomal was that on his failure to sign these returns and applications plaintiff was not entitled to the last instalment of Rs. 10 lacs. In support of this contention he had urged before us that this consent decree was a contract with reciprocity and further that the plaintiff was obliged to sign thege documents, View taken by the plaintiff is that if it is held that the plaintiff had no reasonable excuse to sign these documents then the remedy of the contesting defendants lies under Order XXI, rule 34 and not in their refusal to pay the last instalment of Rs. 10 lacs. This argument i. e. The contesting defendant cannot refuse to pay this amount on plaintiff's refusal to sign these documents, is not without merit. The perusal of the consent decree shows that all these terms are independent of each other. Clause 2, as already pointed out, provides that plaintiff and certain defendants would be paid a consolidated sum of Rs.
50 lacs in full and final settlement of their claims by the contesting defendants. Clause 3 providesthe manner of payment of this amount, while clause 4 lays down that this amount would be paid in 3 instalments, .Clause 5 refers to default clause, and lastly, clause 6 refers to the guarantee for the payment of this amount. Similarly no provision is made in clause 12 of .The consent decree in case plaintiff refused to sign for any reason the documents referred to in that clause. This latter part of clause 12, already reproduced above, must be interpreted in a reasonable manner. But Mr. Dingomal' -in support of his contention had urged before us that the executing Court is bound to execute the decree in spite of the fact that the decree is contrary to law or is erroneous on facts. He referred several reported cases to us and these are AIR 1960 Pb. 601, AIR 1958 Andh. Pra. 417, AIR 1940 Lah. , AIR 1940 Cal. 82, AIR 1956 SC 359, AIR 1956 All. 555, AIR 1935 Pat. 59, AIR 1959 Pat. 17, I L R 31 Bom. 15, I L R 35 Mad. 560, I L R 28 4 Cal. 353, and I L R 20 All. 397. It is correct that this Court has to execute .And not to render it. It was held in AIR 1956 SC 359 that: "There may of course be decrees where the obligations imposed on each side are distinct and severable and in such a case each party might well be left to its own execution. But when the obligations are reciprocal and are inter-linked so that they can not be separated, any attempt to enforce performance unilaterally would be to defeat the directions in the decree and to go behind them which, of course, an executing Court cannot co."
It was further held that: "When a decree imposes obligations on both sides which are so condi--mentioned that performance by one is conditioned on performance by the other, execution will not be ordered unless the party seeking execution not only offers to perform his side but, when objection is raised, satisfies the execution Court that he is in a position to do so."
In this particular case reference has already been made to relevant clauses in the consent decree.
We have already pointed out that all these clauses ,are distinct and severable. If the contesting defendants default in payment of any instalment to the plaintiff provision is laid down in this decree. There is no such provision when plaintiff refuses to sign the returns and applications as laid down in clause 12. It was therefore rightly urged before us that in such default the contesting defendants must seek appropriate ..Remedy and they cannot refuse to pay the balance of Rs. 10 lacs to the plaintiff. In these proceedings we do not propose to express our views about the remedy suggested by the plaintiff under Order XXI, rule 34, C. P. C. As this question is not before us in this appeal. In support of his view that risk was involved if the plaintiff signed these documents without verifying the statement Mr. Naimuddin had relied upon a case reported in PLD 1956 SC 316. He had further urged before us that when a decree is ambiguous in its terms the condition to be put upon it must be such as to make it. Where it is possible, 9n accordance with law and within the jurisdiction of the Court passing it. This view is expressed in AIR 1952 Trav.-Co. 547. Lastly Mr. Naimuddin bad urged that the contesting defendants had refused $o show the statements of accounts and balance-sheet, in order to evade payment of Rs. 10 lacs.
7. Result of all this discussion is that the plaintiff had a reasonable cause for refusing to sign these documents and further that the remedy of the contesting defendants does not lie in refusing payment of Rs. 10 ,lacs to the plaintiff. Appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.