Pakistan Case Law← Search
1994 PLC (C.S.) 460

RIAZ AHMAD KHAN. vs SECRETARY, IRRIGATION AND POWER DEPARTMENT,

Citation1994 PLC (C.S.) 460
CourtPunjab Service Tribunal
Judge(s)Akhtar Hassan, Abdul Hameed Khan
ResultAppeal allowed

AKHTAR HASSAN (CHAIRMAN): --This judgment shall also decide Appeals Nos. 109/90, 110/90, 111/90, 618/90, 619/90, 620/90, 621/90, 652/90, 653/90, 733/90, 734/90, 735/90 and 736/90 as practically the same questions of fact and law arise in all of them.

2. Basically the point in issue was of seniority of the Engineers of the Punjab Irrigation Department. It has a long history but briefly speaking the matter was taken in the previous round of litigation to the Supreme Court where it was disposed of in the judgment reported in 1986 SCMR 1 directing the department to prepare seniority list after encadierising in it those officers, who were not till then "Members of the Service", that is the West Pak. Irrigation Engineers Service (Class I) Rules, 1967. The Department accordingly issued a seniority list vide Notification dated 15-9-1986, of course, subject to determination of the points reserved in its Foot Notes. The appellant (Riaz Ahmed) objected to it by filing representation to the Governor (Annex C) but without waiting for its decision, the department started promoting the officers shown junior to him in the process of encaderisation either as Superintending Engineers or assigned them -- duties of the Chief Engineers. Aggrieved by those orders, he brought the instant appeal.

3. His case was that he joined the West Pakistan Irrigation Engineers Service (Class I) with effect from 1-12-1969 on initial recruitment against a permanent post obtaining the 5th position in the order of merit after competing with some of the respondents who were placed junior to him. He was confirmed w.e.f. 1-12-1969, was later promoted as Executive Engineer on 17-7-1974 and still later as Superintending Engineer on 31-5-1983 in substantive capacity. Seniority lists of the Assistant Executive Engineers and the Offg. Executive Engineers were issued on 14-10-1972, 19-8-1975 and 16- 2-1982. Those were assailed by his batch-mates M/s. Tahir Ahmed Malik and Ehsanullah Sardar before this Tribunal successfully vide our judgment dated 18-5-1982 (1984 PLC (C.S.) 1282) holding that the officers senior in the lower grade will continue to be senior in the higher grade unless superseded in terms of Explanations I and III appearing under Rule 15 of the West Pakistan Irrigation Engineers Service (Class I) Rules, 1967. The said judgment was challenged before the Supreme Court by Mr. Muhammad Iqbal, Offg. Executive Engineer. It was ruled in the judgment reported in 1986 SCMR 1 that the seniority lists had not been drawn in accordance with 1967 Class I Rules; that the Class II/Temporary Engineers had not become members of Class I service by mere upgrading their status to that of Class I Officers; and that in order to become Members of the Service they had to be encaderised in accordance with the 1967 Rules against the permanent vacancies falling vacant in the cadre itself at the specified times. Accordingly a direction was made by the Court to work out such vacancies and to absorb those officers against them relate-ably. Consequently, the Department issued two seniority lists dated 15-9-1986. One of them (Annex. B) related to Class-I Officers (XENs. And above) wherein the appellant was shown at No. 139. However, a Foot Note was added to it to the effect that final fixation of the appellant's seniority will be worked out after encaderisation of Class II/Temporary Engineers. He was not satisfied with it as he thought he should have been placed above Mr. Muhammad Iqbal at serial No. 20 and likewise seniority assigned to the contesting respondents Nos. 2 to 112 was equally not correct.

4. His main assertion was that the directions of the Supreme Court for classifying the vacant posts as required by rule 6 for the purposes of absorbing Class II/Temporary Engineers against them under Rules 7, 8 and 9 were not complied with and further that while rule 7 had no application to his case, it was instead covered by rule 8 which dealt with filling the posts falling vacant during the period 14-10-1955 to 16-4-1963 at the ratio of 80% by absorption of the aforesaid Engineers even by going to their regional sub-cadres (rule 9(b)) and 20% by initial recruitment. He claimed that since the 17 posts against one of which he was selected were advertised on 14-2-1967, that is before the 1967 Rules were enforced on 20-3-1967, he fell within the ambit of rule 8 and further that Class II/temporary Engineers who could not be absorbed in Class I Service under rules 7, 8 and 9 had to be of necessity absorbed in the first instance in Class II service and then promoted to Class I under rule 10 as Assistant Executive Engineer against their quota of 40%. He drew pointed attention to the provision of rule 11 dealing with promotion to the post of Executive Engineers and above, as it was here that his interest was jeopardized allegedly by giving a tailored interpretation to it. He emphasised that for promotion to this post, two prerequisites were required to exist simultaneously, namely; (i)"on the basis of seniority"

(ii)"with at least 10 years--- service" or as the case may be "12 years service". but respondent No.1 ignored it altogether while preparing the impugned seniority list and instead devised, adopted and applied in its preparation a self-- styled rule of "date of eligibility for promotion as Executive Engineer". He strongly criticised its efficacy inasmuch as it was not warranted by any interpretation, nor was it competent for respondent No. I to substitute it in place of a statutory rule duly made by a rule-making authority. He asserted strenuously that the rule of "eligibility" was entirely different from the rule of "seniority" and that the two could not be either confused or taken to be synonymous.

5. An elaborate detail was given how he was senior to respondents Nos.2--111 and how he was wrongly shown to be junior to them in the impugned seniority list. He claimed to be senior to respondents 2-5 as they were admittedly placed much junior to him in the merit list by the Punjab Public Service Commission and also to respondents 6--111 who firstly, were too junior to be absorbed in Class I; secondly all the 90 posts falling vacant under rules 7, 8 and 9 were filled by officers comparatively senior to them; thirdly, they were instead absorbed in Class II under the Class II Rules, 1967; fourthly, thereafter they could be absorbed in Class I only on promotion under rule 10 against their 40% quota; fifthly, they had no chance of getting such promotion before he was appointed substantively on 28-10-1969; sixthly, they were in fact inducted in Class I Service as Assistant Executive Engineers by the Notification dated 2-10-1987 (Annex. I) w.e.f. Dates much after his own rendering them junior to him under rule 15(4); seventhly, they did not find mention as such Class I Officers even in Notification dated 31-12-1971 (Annex. J) where contrarily he was so mentioned; eightly, their seniority as Offg. XEN was not counted from the dates when they were actually so promoted, but notionally from the dates of their eligibility which was not a valid or legal ground or principle as held by the Supreme Court in CA. No. 162/82; ninthly, these officers were wrongly treated as "Officiating Executive Engineers" as in terms of the Supreme Court judgment in CA. 77/82 only those could be so treated as might have been absorbed under rules 7, 8 and '); and lastly, respondent 97--111 were promoted as Offg. Executive Engineers later than him while respondent No.37 rendered surplus on dissolution of the 'T.D.A. Was at best absorbed here in Class I w.e.f. 17-3-1972 and therefore, could not take seniority here from any earlier date.

6. He maintained that above all as a sitting Member of the Service, he was senior to all the respondents in the lower rank, would always be senior to them even in the higher rank, unless of course, superseded and that that was the rule of thumb which the Supreme Court in its sagacity did not dilute or modify in any manner in their erudite judgment. He reiterated that he was relegated in seniority vis-a-vis the respondents only on an imaginary, hypothetical and self-styled rule of the "date of eligibility" which indeed was tantamount to virtual sabotage of the order of seniority, assigned by the Punjab Public Service Commission under rule 15. He prayed for redrawing of the seniority list in strict conformity with the Supreme Court judgment and the rules ibid.

7. Respondents Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 filed each separate written objections while Nos. 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70, 71, 77, 81, 83, 86, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 105, 106, 109, 110 and 111 filed jointly. They all opposed the appeal for one reason or the other. Of course, they supported the seniority list dated 15-9-1986 maintaining that it had been finalised in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court as also the 1967 Rules. It wits admitted by the Secretary/respondent No. 1 as also respondents 2, 4 and 5 that 1 he appellant in the present appeal and also those in Appeals Nos. 110/90 and 111/90 "were recruited through the Public Service Commission " but added that they were not eligible to be promoted as XENs under Rule 11 of the 1967 Rules because they had not yet completed 10 years service and that for this reason they were promoted as XEN on------------ad hoc basis, giving them no right to claim seniority from the date of their promotion as such. His contention was that those respondents could get seniority as XEN from the date they would be eligible for promotion to this rank.

8. Respondent No. 2 among other things claimed that the appeal was barred by time; that the appellant was estopped from bringing it; that he was correctly shown senior to the appellant in the impugned seniority list and that though the Public Service Commission had assigned him seniority below the appellant in the competition, yet it had no relevance in his case because he had joined the Irrigation Department as Class II Officer much earlier than the appellant and that for this reason he was rightly given seniority from the date of officiation as Executive Engineer. He emphasised that the appellant stood "superseded" because of his ineligibility arising out of less than 10 years service as required by Rule 11 ibid and that he had no case against him.

9. Likewise respondent No. 4 not specifically denying that the Public Service Commission placed him lower than the appellant, urged that no combined seniority list based upon the aforesaid merit was issued by the Department and that instead he and seven others in-service candidates appearing in the competition, were separately shown in a notification while 12 new entrants like the appellant were as a class included in yet another notification issued by the Department. He claimed that since he was on the top of the in-service candidates, there was no question of reducing him junior to the appellant and additionally that the date of eligibility for promotion to the post of XEN would determine seniority irrespective of the merit assigned by the Public Service Commission. He urged that there was no concept of regaining seniority anywhere in the Rules and that the same if once lost due to ineligibility, could not be regained on removal thereof subsequently. He referred to the dictum laid down in 1985 SCMR 699 observing that the question of fitness and suitability could arise amongst eligibles, and not amongst eligibles and ineligibles and further that as per PLD 1990 SC 725 if the very eligibility of an officer to be so considered did not exist, there was no question of his being considered or benefiting from Explanation III to Rule 15 because an ineligible person stood at a greater disadvantage than a person who was eligible but could not match his suitability for the job. Similarly he asserted that the question. Of his seniority vis-a-vis the appellant stood decided by applying the dictum of PLD 1990 SC 725 and that the seniority list dated 31-12-1971 was rightly amended subsequently under Rule 15(4)(b) in-order to place him above the appellant.

10. No different were the averments of respondent No. 5 who equally agitated that the merit list of the Public Service Commission worked, if at all, up to the level of Assistant Executive Engineers and that it lost relevance for promotion to the post of XEN which was governed by rule il; that there was no comparison of seniority between a fresh entrant like the appellant, and the departmental candidates of his type who had entered service much earlier and were either already promoted as XENs or were eligibility-wise quite mature to be promoted soon after encaderisation. He strongly pressed the view that the next eligible officer would become senior in the higher rank, meaning thereby that the erstwhile senior in the lower rank would be deemed to have been superseded. .

11. We have had the advantage particularly of going through the Supreme Court judgment (1986 SCMR 1) rendered between the parties in the earlier round. This Tribunal's view that upgradation of status to Class I service of the Graduate Engineers hitherto holding posts of Class II Officers or Temporary Engineers, was held not enough by itself to treat them Members of the Punjab Irrigation Engineers Service (Class I). Instead it was ruled that they had to be absorbed/encaderised into it .As per ratio; proportion fixed under rules 7, 8 and 9 of the 1967 Rules against vacancies to be classified under rule 6. Accordingly the Department prepared the seniority list dated 15-9-1986 in question, ostensibly in conformity with the aforesaid judgment, but serious objections were raised to its correctness.

12. The basic question confronting the parties is of seniority which according to the appellant was unnecessarily confused with eligibility for promotion as Executive Engineer under rule 11. The contention was not without force inasmuch as eligibility might be a ground to consider one's right to promotion but his seniority was some thing independent which had to be determined at its own place under rule 15 and once determined, it could not be lost by any device except on supersession as defined in Explanation III appearing therein. Reliance can be aptly placed upon a recent judgment dated 14-5-1991, of the Supreme Court passed in Civil Appeals Nos. 452 to 457 of 1986 (Rao Shamsher Ali Khan and others cases) 1993 SCMR 1692(1) = 1993 PLC (C.S.) 1561 where promotion and seniority were held to be two distinct matters so that promotion of a junior officer out of turn (in preference to a senior officer) was regarded no ground for the loss of seniority of the latter and further that he would regain his original seniority if he was also subsequently able to overtake him by getting promotion on his turn to the same next higher grade. Considering again the rule expounded in the case of Naseer Mahmood Akhtar v. Mahmood Ali Malik (PLD 1990 SC 725), it was observed: "There is no reason why those officers who were not considered when the respondents were promoted should not be granted the benefit of the protective provision of Explanation III and allowed seniority in Grade-18 on their promotion to the said grade which they would have ordinarily enjoyed if they had been permitted to compete for promotion:"

Applying this dicta, it was not permissible for the respondents to claim that since they had acquired eligibility for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer earlier in time than the appellant, they had become senior to him.

13. There is yet another aspect of the problem relating to promotion to the post of XEN. Rule 11 insists on concurrence of two ingredients viz. (i)"on the basis of seniority" and

(ii) "10 years" or as the case may be "12 years service".

It is to be noticed that unless these two pre-conditions exist simultaneously, there could be no promotion. In other words, if any one of these is missing, the right to promotion shall be held in abeyance. It does not give a ride-over to the junior merely because he happens to enjoy "eligibility" by having rendered the requisite number of years of service whereas the senior had yet not. As against the senior, he nonetheless remains junior and in order to get promotion, his claim essentially has to rest "on the basis of seniority" which due to the presence of a senior officer over his head, would be lost to him, and after so losing it, he would not be entitled to ask for promotion.

Eventually it would turn out to be a case where "eligibility" would be available but not the "seniority" or the vice versa, and indeed both officers should not be entitled to get promotion as of right.

Simultaneous possession of both the attributes, or so to say concurrent 'existence thereof in relation to tire officer concerned is indispensable and for this reason the junior officer, dwelling merely on "eligibility" would not get seniority over the senior by superseding him, much less the promotion.

14. We are aware of the difficulty involved in such a situation. It may wel--l lead to keeping the posts of XENs unfilled till at least the officer placed senior acquires eligibility. Obviously it may not be in the public interest to keep promotion posts vacant, and exactly to cater for such a situation, Explanation I to Rule 15 addresses itself. It reads: "If a junior officer in lower -grade, is promoted to a higher grade temporarily in the public interest, even though continuing later permanently in the higher grade, it would not adversely affect the interest of his seniors in the fixation of his seniority in the higher grade."

This part of rule 15 appears for all intents and purposes to be entirely independent. It contains quite a pragmatic provision designed to achieve certain objects. It guards against leaving higher posts unfilled; allows junior officers to be promoted to fill them, although temporarily; and envisages continuance of such promotion even permanently but "it would not adversely affect the interest of his seniors in the fixation of his seniority in the higher grade". The focal point is to appreciate how jealously this provision protects seniority, which once determined, could not be upset by promotion of a junior officer even if it is "continuing later permanently" for howsoever long a period. In simple words, whenever the question of "fixation" of seniority would come up for consideration, such promotion of a junior will not confer seniority upon him, nor would it operate to cause corresponding loss to the senior. It is something sacrosanct. Exactly similar is the provision of Explanation I to Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974. It would tend to establish that protection afforded to seniority in any structure of rules, was a formidable right and that the same, could not be eroded merely because of the senior officer's "ineligibility".

15. Mr. S.M. Zaffar, Advocate, and of course other counsel placed heavy reliance upon the ratio of PLD 1990 SC 725 (730) dilating upon Explanation III to Rule 15 and claimed that "if the very eligibility of such an officer to be so considered does not exist, there is no question of his being considered or benefiting from this clause because a person who is ineligible for promotion has to stand at a greater disadvantage than a person who is eligible for promotion but cannot match his suitability for the job". We have considered the implications of the above observations in some depth, but do not find if it permitted to upset the seniority. It has a pointed reference to Explanation III which quite manifestly refers to supersession as defined therein. It was clearly spelt out that supersession would take place only if both the officers were considered in a competition for promotion and the junior was preferred to the senior on the basis of comparative merits. It was in this context that the advantage enjoyed by the junior eligible for being considered was much more than the senior ineligible as he was excluded from consideration as also competition for promotion owing to a technical reason like his ineligibility. If the senior is not considered in terms of Explanation III ibid, how could he be deemed to have had competed or been superseded Rather excluding him from consideration helps him save his seniority which could have conversely been lost only if he was considered and found unsuitable. In any case ethos of the ratio of the precedent case have been toned down in the cases of Rao Shamsher Ali Khan and others referred to earlier. Mr. S.M. Zafar in his written notes conceded that the appellant and his batch-mates joining as Class I Officers on initial recruitment were not superseded. Indeed the precedent case itself reveals that " seniority of two such promotees cannot be matched with the direct recruits at all" as the one could not depress seniority of the other.

16. The only provision in the entire gamut of rules whether of 1941 or of 1967 under discussion, or the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 making room for loss of seniority, is the incidence of supersession, and that was admittedly not available in this case. The corollary was that eligibility alone could not partake the shape of supersession. No authority was cited to support the view that eligibility could be used as a tool to supersede the senior and indeed the Supreme Court's latest view that promotion (eligibility) was different from seniority completely knocks out the respondents' contention. It has to be remembered that out of turn promotion allowed under the statute (section 8-A) was held no ground for the loss of seniority of .The senior later getting the same promotion.

Now we come to see what precise rule of seniority was applicable to the parties. Rule 15 gives a complete answer to it. It speaks of inter se seniority of members of service:

(i) appointed by initial recruitment;

(ii) appointed otherwise;

(iii) initial recruits vis-a-vis those appointed otherwise.

As for the initial recruits sub-rule (1), clause (a) provides that their seniority shall be "in. Accordance with the order of merits assigned by the Commission" while clause (b) fixed it for the "members appointed otherwise from the date of their continuous appointment"; sub-rule (2) specifically enacts that the seniority of the XENs belonging to Class II service or the Temporary Engineers" shall be determined with reference to their continuous officiation", and then comes sub-rule (4) which in the peculiar combination of officers drawn from various groups for the purposes of absorption in the service, had considerable pre-eminence. It shows how the initial recruits would get seniority vis-a-vis those appointed otherwise. And really this was the most heated question confronting the parties in these appeals. Clause (a) thereof provides that if both the officers, that is appointed by initial recruitment and the officers appointed otherwise, have been appointed against substantive vacancies or both have been appointed against temporary vacancies, their seniority shall be determined with reference to the date of appointment to such vacancies in the case of the initial recruit and to the date of continuous appointment in the case of officers appointed otherwise. It will be appreciated that this clause is applicable to both types of officers appointed against the same type of vacancies, that is, either substantive or temporary. Clause (b), on the other hand, covers the case where the initial recruit is appointed against a substantive vacancy whereas the officer appointed otherwise is so appointed against a temporary vacancy. In such an event the Officer appointed by initial recruitment shall rank senior to the other one. Lastly comes the third situation where the initial recruit is appointed against a temporary vacancy while the officer appointed otherwise is employed against a substantive one. In this case the officer appointed otherwise shall rank senior to the initial recruit.

18. A careful perusal of these provisions hardly leaves any room whatsoever for entertaining doubt in regard to the determination of seniority of the officers drawn from various groups for the purposes of absorption in the cadre. A reference was made to PLD 1990 SC 672 (Nek Muhammad Ropaal v. Government of the Punjab) by Mr. Minto counsel for some of the respondents to claim that junior eligible will score out the senior ineligible, meaning thereby that the junior will become senior on promotion. The view adopted in it was the same as was pronounced in Dr. Naseer Mahmood Akhtar's case (PLD 1991 SC 725) about which we have already given our thought in para. 15 ante. It did not clearly lay down a flat rule that an ineligible senior will lose seniority at the hand of an eligible junior. Rather the pivotal point therein was of applying Explanation No. III which in turn defines supersession, that is excluding the senior in a comparison or competition with the junior on their respective merits. The pith of the dictum, as already discussed, was that "promotees cannot be matched with the direct recruits at all because either the seniority of both the promotees against the direct recruits will be depressed or the seniority of the direct recruits would get depressed by a junior ineligible, unqualified officer------------:' The dictates were (i) that the seniority could not be depressed and (ii) that "junior ineligible, unqualified officer" could not be allowed to gain "seniority from, the date when he was not so qualified or eligible". The point worth noting is that it was a case where the junior was ineligible and unqualified. It was he who was thought to be not entitled, and rightly, to gain seniority over the senior. In other words, the seniority of the senior was not thought to have been lost to him. A pointed reference was made to this aspect by the Court in the following words: "Promotion---seniority---simply because a civil servant was promoted to Grade-19 does not mean that he necessarily became senior in Grade-18---Grade-18 seniority had to be fixed on its own principles and not on the basis of subsequent attainments of the civil servant:"

It is clear from this excerpt that the seniority had to be fixed on its own principles and not on the basis of subsequent attainment of the civil servant. It leads to an assumption that the seniority originally fixed on the strength of its own rule would not be lost on the basis of subsequent attainment, say in this case, the so-called eligibility of the respondents to be promoted as XEN. Etc. Vis-a-vis the appellant. This portion unmistakably cuts across the argument of Mr. Minto. Further, if we could repeat, the proposition of regaining seniority has been unambiguously upheld in Rao Shamsher Ali's case. Exactly this was the question before the Supreme Court also in 1990 SCMR 1321 (Government of N.-W.F.P. v. Dr. Muzaffar Iqbal) and the ratio was: "Appointment --- Held, after the ineligibility in the rules, unless relaxation took place. There was no question of a person not having acquired qualification, being considered for appointment irrespective of the fact whether persons with higher qualifications were available or not:"

The intent was that irrespective of the fact whether a person with higher qualifications was available, one could not be deemed to have been considered for the appointment if he suffers ineligibility in the rules. Applying this rule, if the appellant suffered the so-called ineligibility, there was no question of considering him alongwith the person with higher qualifications, say the qualification of eligibility. The genesis was to hold a competition for the purposes of considering the two. If the ineligibility did not permit such competition, there was no question of scoring him out for the purposes of seniority.

Lastly, support was sought from Mr. Raqib's case (1989 SCMR 1879) who statedly being a co- competitioner with the appellant Riaz Ahmed, was held junior to some of Class II officers or the Temporary Engineers who had competed with them but had failed. Drawing an analogy, counsel claimed that Riaz Ahmed unjustifiably insisted upon his entry as an initial recruit and that the respondents having already rendered more that 12 years service in the Department would be rated senior to him.

We have carefully gone through the judgment and find, with respect, that there were reasons to distinguish the two cases. Firstly, in para. 5 of the judgment the Governor had relaxed the rule by appointing the officers having longer service in preference to Mr. Raqib; and secondly, the N.W.F.P.

Had its own rules (Rules of 1973) which fixed the seniority by giving concession to Mr. Raqib to ante- date his seniority by a period of 2 years and no more. No such parallel appears in the 1967 Rules under discussion here. Instead Rule 15 seems to be the-only rule fixing seniority in the first instance inter se of each group, and then by merging them together. This difference of the rules would differentiate that case. It was argued that the relaxation of the rules by the Governor was held to be "uncalled for and totally out of place" and hence the appellant could not seek assistance therefrom. One could say, with utmost respect, that the relaxation was held uncalled for in view of the Governor's order dated 17-5-1972 which ipso facto placed Graduate Engineers in Class I without making any reference to the Public Service Commission, or even making an exercise of encaderising them formally in Class 1, as had been directed in the present case. Consequently the order was uncalled for to that extent, but it did not touch upon, the seniority, for which entirely different rules of 1973 applied -- and it was thereunder that Mr. Raqib's opponent was placed senior to him. Thus there is no similarity between the two cases.

From the above discussion we conclude that the appellant Riaz Ahmed and the competitioners like him viz. Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 in this appeal having been recruited initially against the substantive vacancies will be governed by the order of seniority determined by the Commission under sub---rule (i), clause (a) of Rule 15 ibid. This shall happen no matter the aforesaid respondents being already in service were even promoted as XENs by the time when they chose to appear in the competition held by the Punjab Public Service Commission. They had indeed lost right of claiming seniority on the basis of that service. They competed to enter Class .I service because perhaps they were not content with their previous status of a Class II Officer or Temporary Engineer, and were, therefore, bound by the seniority determined by the Commission. This was affirmed in 1990 PLC (C.S.) 655. They would even remain junior to him until he was formally superseded in terms of Explanation III and since no such event took place so far, there was no question of his losing seniority qua them. Nor could the fact detract from applying this rule that the Department did not issue a single notification in relation to common seniority of these officers.

Fixation of their seniority inter se was the job of the Public Service Commission and they had done it nicely.

Overall seniority of all officers will have to be computed entirely within the ambit of rule 15 and not rule 11. Other sundry objections including one of res judicata were raised by some of the parties to these appeals. It would suffice to draw attention to the observation of the Supreme Court in the judgment to the effect that examination of all such questions of law was open for reconsideration especially when the seniority list has to be re-drawn taking into account many factors.

The instant appeal is allowed accordingly and the impugned seniority list dated 15-9-1986 in so far as it does not conform to the rule ibid is set aside and it shall be re-drawn in accordance therewith.

The other connected appeals shall also stand disposed of in terms of this judgment.

Parties to bear their own costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.

For educational and research use only — not legal advice. Verify against the official report before relying on it. See our Disclaimer.
Disclaimer·Privacy·Terms·Search