CH. HASAN NAWAZ (MEMBER).---The appeal goes with .The prayer 11 that the respondents may be ordered to pay the appellant's emoluments for the period of his suspension from 27-12-1982 to 16- 6-1990, because he had been acquitted of the charge by the learned Special Judge (Central) Anti- - Corruption, Faisalabad in the case under section 161, P.P.C. Read with section 5(2), PCA, 1947 registered against him on a charge of having accepted illegal gratification for doing some favour ' to the complainant in the performance of his official functions.
2. The appellant's claim to the dues of the period of suspension is based on the provisions of Fundamental Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules which provides that "when the suspension of a Government servant is held to have been unjustifiable or not wholly justifiable; or when a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or suspended is reinstated, the revising or appellate authority may grant to him for the period of his absence from duty (a) if he is honourably acquitted, the full pay to which he would have been entitled if he had not been dismissed, removed or suspended and, by an order to be separately recorded, any allowance of which he was in receipt prior to his dismissal, removal or suspension; or (b) if otherwise, such portion of the pay and allowances as the revising or appellate authority may prescribe." It is contended that he was entitled to full pay of the period of suspension because he was honourably acquitted by the Court concerned.
3. The respondents comments in writing show that the criminal proceedings apart, disciplinary proceedings were also initiated against the appellant after he was arrested by the Anti-Corruption raiding party on 27-12-1982 under the supervision of a Magistrate. He was placed under suspension by order dated 28-12-1982 on a charge of having accepted illegal gratification from a consumer.
He was served with a charge-sheet accompanied by a statement of allegations on 19-8-1985. An inquiry was held against him and he was given personal hearing on 27-9-1988. He was then served with final show-cause notice dated 13-10-1988. He acknowledged its receipt on 5-11-1988 and submitted an explanation in writing on 10-11-1988. After he had been given a personal hearing on 29-12-1988, penalty of censure was finally awarded against him by order dated 27-4-1989.
3.Under the circumstances, it is not possible to hold that appellant had been acquitted of the charge against him. We are of the view that honourable acquittal mentioned in F.R. 54 should not only be in the criminal case but also in the disciplinary proceedings. Since a penalty of censure was awarded against him,. The appellant cannot be deemed to have been acquitted of the charge within the meaning of F.R. 54 of the rules.
5. Merits apart, the appeal is otherwise liable to dismissal on the ground of limitation. The record shows that the order of censure was passed on 27-4-1989. The order regarding forfeiture of dues was passed on 24-2-1993. The appellant was informed by letter dated 21-4-1993 that his appeal had been rejected by the competent authority after due consideration. Thereafter, he filed the present appeal on 13-9-1993 evidently after the expiry of the period of limitation. The reason given in the application for condonation of delay is that he had been pursuing his remedy in the Civil Court. It is settled law that his grievance could be redressed only in an appeal before the Service Tribunal and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. Prosecution of the case before another forum under wrong legal advice is no ground for condonation of delay.
6. For these. Reasons, the appeal is therefore dismissed in limine as time-- barred and being without any substance. No order as to costs. Parties to be informed.