MIR HAZAR KHAN KHOSO, C.J.---The learned counsel for the petitioners in Criminal Revision No.5/P of .1993 and Criminal Revision No.6/P of 1993 has claimed that he had filed appeals against the two orders passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Tangi on 23-9-1990 but the office had wrongly treated the same to be Revision Petitions. Thus the only point involved would be whether acquittal judgment can be challenged in appeal by a complainant or by the State under the provisions of section 417, Cr.P.C. The learned counsel for the appellants claimed that under Chapter 3, Rule 17 of the Federal Shariat Court Rules, 1981, a complainant can file an appeal without aid of the Provincial Government as envisaged in the provisions of section 417, Cr.P.C. It may be pertinent to observe that under section 24 of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood)
Ordinance, 1979, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 in mutatis mutandis were applied in p, respect of cases falling under the Ordinance. The learned counsel for the appellants failed to convince us that in presence of the abovesaid provisions of law how a complainant can file appeal directly before this Court in violation of the provisions of section 417, Cr.P.C. Indeed the rules framed by this Court are appurtenent to the provisions of section 24 of the Ordinance and section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but not independent one.
2. In such view of the fact, we are clear in our minds that only the State can file appeals against acquittal judgments in cases challaned by police. However, in direct complaint cases, complainant can file appeal with the permission of the Court. Both the appeals being incompetent are dismissed.' However, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that his appeals might be treated as Revision Petitions. It may be pertinent to observe that the same Magistrate on 23-9-1990 already acquitted the respondents in the abovesaid two appeals. A Division Bench of this Court on 19-5-1992 had set aside the acquittal orders and remanded the case for judgments. The learned Magistrate after hearing the parties again acquitted the respondents. We had the opportunity to go through the judgment passed by the learned Magistrate.
We do not see any defect therein. Thus on merits also we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgments in the Revisional jurisdiction.