ABDUL RAZZAQ A. THAHIM (CHAIRMAN).---Appellant Mr. Pir Muhammad Qureshi is working as General Manager (BPS-19) in the Pakistan Ordnance Factories. He filed Appeal No. 224(R)/89 before this Tribunal against his supersession for promotion to BPS-20. His grievance is that he had been working as General Manager (BPS-19) since 31st May, 1978 and his overall record remained `good' for continuous eight years till he was transferred to Inspection Department, Wah, in May, 1986, and his record was impaired purposely by recording certain adverse remarks in the year 1986 and 1987 and again in 1988 which resulted in his supersession and consequently his junior Mr. Abdul Quddus Khan was promoted. His appeal was allowed by the Tribunal vide judgment dated 29-7-1991 with the following observations: "For the reasons recorded above that there was no justification for superseding the appellant in his promotion to BPS-20, we allow the appeal and direct that the appellant shall be deemed to have been promoted on the day his next junior Mr. Abdul Quddus Khan was promoted, and he shall be given all the monetary benefits. No order is made for costs."
2. The Federation of Pakistan and others filed Civil Appeal No, 326 of 1992 against the judgment of the Tribunal and the Supreme Court by its judgment dated 6-2-1994 set aside the judgment of the Tribunal and remanded the case to the Tribunal with the following observations: "6. Since we are inclined to remand the case to the Tribunal, we would not like to express our views on the merits of the above contentions. We have noticed that the respondent in his above service appeal had not impleaded the two incumbents who were actually promoted against the above two technical posts. In this view of the matter, the impugned judgment in the absence of the persons who were going to be affected could not have been passed. We would, therefore, allow the above appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and would remand the case to the Tribunal with the direction to rehear the appeal after I impleading the two incumbents who have been actually promoted against the above two technical posts. However, there will be no order as to cost."
3. On remand, the notices were issued to the parties. Mr. M.S. Siddiqi, the learned counsel for the appellant filed amended appeal to which objections were invited and appeal was heard afresh on 27-4-1994. It may be noted that after remand of the case, the appellant impleaded Mr. Abdul Quddus Khan, Managing Director, POF, Gadwal, Mr. Ehsanul Haq, Managing Director, Wah Industries Ltd., Wah Cantt. And Mr. Muhammad Yousaf Goraya, Managing Director, Explosives Factory, Wah Cantt. Private respondents and officials.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for all the parties at length. Earlier in appeal No.224(R)/89, Mr. Abdul Quddus Khan, now respondent No. 4 in the amended memo of appeal, was not impleaded as party though appellant in clear terms stated in the prayer clause of that appeal that the appellant be promoted to BPS-20 with effect from the date his junior Mr. Abdul Quddus Khan was promoted and to set aside the proceedings .Of Selection/Promotion Board whereby he was superseded. The appellant while filing amended appeal has claimed some different reliefs beyond the pleadings of his earlier appeal. For the sake of convenience, the last paragraph 24 is reproduced below: "24. It is accordingly prayed that the record of the case including ACR's on the appellant and the minutes of the Selection/Promotion Board may be summoned and
(1) the proceedings of the Selection/Promotion Board in so far as they relate to the appellant, being based on gross violation of the law, may be set aside as of no legal effect.
(2) the overall assessm ent in the revised ACRs be upgraded at least to "Good" category consistent with the tenor of the revised ACR and yardsticks laid down in Establishment Division Promotion Policy.
(3) the case of the appellant for promotion to Grade 20 with effect from the date of promotion of A.
Quddus Khan may kindly be reconsidered on the basis of authentic documents/record and the appellant's seniority and merits and in strict conformity with the law and the rules, and
(4) if considered fit, the appellant may not only be promoted to BPS-20 with effect from the date on which his junior Mr. Abdul Quddus Khan was actually promoted, but he may also be allowed seniority and arrears of pay and other financial benefits consequent on such readjustment of his career:--- Paras. 1 and 2 relates to the setting aside of the proceedings of the Selection/Promotion Board and para. 3 relates to promotion of the appellant to BPS-20 from the date of promotion of Mr. Abdul Quddus Khan. He has not sought any relief against respondents M/s. Ehsanul Haq and Muhammad Yousaf Goraya. The additional relief he has sought as given in para. 2 of the prayer clause is that the overall assessm ent in the revised ACRs be upgraded at least to `Good` category consistent with the tenor of the revised ACR and yardsticks laid down in Establishment Division Promotion Policy.
5. The Supreme Court has remanded the appeal to extent that two persons who were promoted earlier be impleaded as party. The appellant has now impleaded three persons as respondents in the appeal contrary to the observations of the Supreme Court. During the arguments when it was pointed out to the learned counsel that the appellant has not yet filed any departmental appeal against Mr. Muhammad Yousaf Goraya, to which he replied in affirmative therefore in our view the appeal against Mr. Muhammad Yousaf Goraya respondent is incompetent in view of case reported in 1986 SCM R 680 (Muhammad Iqbal Rafi v. Province of Punjab) and Rule 7 of the Service Tribunals (Procedure Rules, 1974. After the remand, we could have disallowed the revised memo of appeal, deviating from earlier pleadings but in the interest of justice we have considered all the points raised in the revised appeal. Even in this appeal, the appellant has not claimed any relief against Mr. Ehsanul Haq, therefore, we will confine to the dispute between appellant and Mr. Abdul Quddus Khan.
6. The legal objection while hearing the appeal from the respondents side was that the Tribunal cannot go into detail with regard to promotion of the civil servant as laid down in proviso (b) to section 4 (1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, therefore; we would like to dispose of this objection of the respondents with regard to jurisdiction of Tribunal first. This point was also taken care of in the earlier judgment of the Tribunal and the relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as under: "4. Dealing with the objection of the respondents to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the determination by the competent authority of fitness or otherwise of a candidate for promotion is sacrosanct of any judicious scrutiny is relevant to the extent that the determination has been made in accordance with the relevant rules and orders but in case there is deviation, the jurisdiction of the judicial forum does not stand ousted. This is the case where there has been flagrant violation of rules, as discussed above, and the Tribunal does have jurisdiction to give verdict in respect of the relief sought by the appellant."
It was on this account that the Tribunal directed that the appellant shall be deemed to have been promoted on the day his next junior Mr. Abdul Quddus Khan was promoted. The same point was taken before the Supreme Court also but their Lordships did not touch this point and there too reference was made to a case reported in 1984 SCM R 684 (H.M. Ashrafullah v. Secretary, Ministry of Communications and others). However, since this point is being agitated from tune to time in so many appeals, we would like to deal with this point m detail. Reliance is always placed on proviso
(b) to section 4 (1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 placing an embargo on the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. This proviso (b) reads as under: "(b) no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal against an order or decision of a departmental authority determining the fitness or otherwise of a person to be appointed to or hold a particular post or to be promoted to a higher grade."
No doubt, this proviso places a bar of the jurisdiction on the Tribunal but this section cannot be read isolated but has to be read in juxtaposition with section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 which provides: "5. Powers of Tribunals.--(1) A Tribunal may, on appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against.
(2) A Tribunal shall, for the purpose of deciding any appeal, be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), including the powers of--
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) compelling the production of documents; and
(c) issuing commission for the examination of witnesses and documents."
Civil Servants Act, 1973 has been enacted to regulate the appointment of persons to, and the terms and conditions of service of persons in the Service of Pakistan, and section 3 of the Act provides: "3.Terms and conditions.--(1) The terms and conditions of service of a civil servant shall be as provided in this Act and the rules.
(2)The terms and conditions of service of any person to whom this Act applies shall not be varied to his disadvantage."
This subsection (2) has been added vide Ordinance No. XXXVIII of 1993 dated 18th October 1993 (Civil Servants (Amendment) Ordinance, 1993).
From amongst other terms and conditions of service, promotion is one of the terms and conditions and has been provided as such under section 9 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, which lays down: "9. Promotion.--(1) A civil servant possessing such minimum qualifications as may be prescribed shall be eligible for promotion to a higher post for the time being reserved under the ruled for departmental promotion in the service or cadre to which he belongs.
(2) A post referred to in subsection (1) may either be a selection post or a non selection post to which promotions 'shall be made as may be prescribed:--
(a) in the case of selection post on the basis of selection on merits; and
(b) in the case of a non-selection post on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness.
Thus, it is clear that promotion is one of the terms and conditions of a civil servant as guaranteed and provided in the Civil Servants Act, 1973. To safeguard the interest of the civil servants with regard to their terms and conditions of service, Service Tribunal has been established. The embargo laid down in proviso (b) to section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 is only to the extent of determination of fitness pr otherwise of a person to be appointed to or hold a particular post or to be promoted to a higher grade but it has never been he intention of legislature to deprive a person of his legitimate right and terms and conditions of service as provided in the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and consideration for promotion is a legal right of every civil servant and that exercise has to be taken by the departmental authorities and under section S of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, that decision is subject to judicial scrutiny by the Tribunal, as in all fairness and in the interest of justice, there must be some forum for the aggrieved persons wherefrom they could seek their redress, and in my humble view, that is the Service Tribunal having exclusive jurisdiction in the service matters. There are a number of cases in which determination of fitness if wrongly made with mala fide intention or malice and ignore a person eligible and qualified that may be due to quantification of marks or service record etc. And a civil servant is superseded on whatever grounds, in our view, the Tribunal has got powers to record its findings on facts to the effect that the Departmental Promotion Committee was not constituted in accordance with Rules and the decision taken by it was or was not legal and on this point reliance is placed on PLD 1990 SC 612 (Mrs. M.N. Arshad and others v. Miss Naeema Khan and others) and the relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as under:- "8. It was next contended that in view of clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, no appeal lies against an order or decision of a departmental authority determining the fitness or otherwise 9f a person to be appointed to or hold a particular post to be promoted to a higher post or grade. We may observe that in the present case, the. Tribunal has not held that respondent No. 1 is entitled to hold or to be promoted to a particular post. The Tribunal has recorded findings of facts to the effect that the Departmental Promotion Committee was not constituted in accordance with the Rules and, therefore, the decision taken by it was not legal and that respondent No.1's case was not properly considered. In our view, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to go into the above questions. We may observe that the Tribunal cannot decide the question of fitness referred to in the above provision of the Service Tribunals Act, but it has jurisdiction, to examine the questions, whether the Departmental Promotion committee was constituted in accordance with the relevant rules and whether the cases of the civil servants concerned were properly considered in terms thereof."
On the same proposition we also refer to 1991 SCM R 1129 (Mien Abdul Malik v. Dr. Sabir Zamir Siddiqi and others) and Tribunal can go into the question of eligibility for promotion. The relevant para is as under:- "2. What is barred from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is the question of fitness of a civil servant for promotion the determination of his eligibility is a question on which jurisdiction of the Tribunal has not been barred. The question of eligibility relates primarily to the terms and conditions of service and their applicability to the civil servant concerned. Fitness introduces an element of subjective evaluation on the basis of objectives criteria where substitution for an opinion of the competent authority is not possible by that of a Tribunal or a Court. It is in this background that the question of fitness or suitability for promotion has always been considered to the exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent Authority not shared by the Court or Tribunal exercising supervisory jurisdiction in respect of eligibility and qualification. On the question of eligibility and qualification no such bar exist either on express words of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act or even by implication. The petitioner had approached the Civil Court for determination of his eligibility and also for being declared as the only one eligible to be promoted. Such an exercise could not be undertaken by the Civil Court with the limited number of parties arrayed before it nor could it have jurisdiction as the matter related to be terms and conditions of the service."
It thus follows that the intention of legislature is not to give arbitrary powers to discard a person from promotion who otherwise qualifies, eligible in all respects and fit but in the opinion of the Selection Board he is superseded or deferred, and such as opinion is not absolute and above judicial review as such in light of case-law, the Tribunal has got jurisdiction so that justice be done to an aggrieved person. It is a well-known fact that this Tribunal is the only forum constituted under Article 212 of the Constitution for seeking their legal remedy guaranteed by law. This point was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the case of M. Yamin Qureshi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (PLD 1980 SC 22). For the sake of convenience, we reproduce the following observations of the Supreme Court: "The Courts in this country have, as pointed out in the case of Zia-ur---Rehman and Saeed Ahmed Khan, mentioned above, taken care to ensure that validity, and immunity from judicial review, shall be enjoyed by only those proceedings, orders and acts, which have been duly taken under these instruments, and that such immunity will not be extended to those acts and actions etc. Which are without jurisdiction, coram non judice or mala fide. The superior Courts of the country continue to have the power to declare such acts to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect, notwithstanding the provisions contained in clause (4) of Article 270. In other Words, the Supreme Court has endeavoured, by means of these judgments, to preserve a balance between the need for the continuity of the fabric of legal and social rights, and for protecting the individuals adversely affected by acts and actions which could not properly be taken even under the laws promulgated by the illegitimate Ruler. It goes without saying that it lies within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and, indeed, it is its obligation, to decide all questions of law and fact sought to be raised by the appellant to challenge the order of his dismissal, including his contention that no evidence was heard in his presence, nor was he given any opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment. The appellant would be entitled not only to a full opportunity to present his case before the Tribunal but also to inspect all relevant records which might have been taken into consideration by the competent authority for the purpose of passing the impugned order. As we see the legal position, the Tribunal has wide powers under section 5 of the Act, as it may on appeal confirm set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against. Under subsection (2) of the same section, the Tribunal, for the purpose of deciding any appeal, is to be deemed to be a Civil Court, and to have all the powers as are vested in such Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, including the power of enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; compelling the production of documents; and issuing Commission for the examination of witnesses and documents. We have no doubt that the Service Tribunal, presided over generally by a serving or a retired judge of the High Court, would be able to do full justice to the appellant."
Subsequently, such objections were taken care of by the Supreme Court in several cases and reference is made to 1984 SCM R 684 (H.M. Ashrafullah v. Secretary, Ministry of Communication) and the observations of the Supreme Court are reproduced below:- "4. Leave was granted to consider:- "(i) Whether the order of the Service Tribunal could be sustained because it had taken into consideration some material which was presented to it behind the back of the petitioner, which was neither shown to him nor about which he was asked to comment and to decide the case entirely on the basis of such material?
(ii) Whether the Service Tribunal could refuse the relief merely on its opinion that the selection authorities would not select the petitioner, even if the case were sent back to them for this purpose?
5. After hearing learned counsel on both sides, we feel that all that the appellant could claim is a reconsideration of his case for promotion as Section Officer as if he had been a Superintendent at the relevant time in 1959. The fact remains that he had been considered for the promotion at that time though as an Assistant but had not been found acceptable. The contention that he would have had a better chance of promotion had he been a Superintendent and not an Assistant, is rather hypothetical. In any case that claim was examined but not accepted by the Tribunal, which held that "Efficiency wise, he was much below the category eligible for entry into Section Officers Scheme. In regard to the objection to the Tribunal itself having decided the question of suitability of the appellant for promotion instead of referring the matter to the competent authority, we find that this Court had in M. Yamin Qureshi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1), held that the Tribunal, for the purpose of deciding any appeal, was fully competent, and it was its duty, to examine on merits all questions of law and fact sought to be raised before it. Again, in Province of Punjab v. Ramzan Ali Khan (2), it had been held that "the Service Tribunal being an appellate authority, before which, on the preferment of an appeal against an order of a departmental authority, the whole matter gets re-opened becomes empowered to confirm, set aside vary, modify or substitute its opinion for that of the departmental authority." The Tribunal thus being fully competent to examine all questions raised before it, could decide the matter and was not bound to refer the same to the departmental authority if such reference, in its opinion, would serve no purpose. As held by this Court in Secretary, Government of Punjab v. Ahmad Kamaluddin (3) "The limitations or the restraints exercised in giving relief in Constitutional jurisdiction do not extend to Tribunals and authorities which are enjoined to hear appeals and determine questions of fact as well as of law."
Reference is also made to 1985 SCM R 699 (Government of Pakistan v. Muhammad Sadiq) and the relevant paragraphs of the judgment are reproduced below:- "The two contestants, namely Fazal Ahmad and Mushtaq Hussain have filed a separate appeal challenging the decision of the Service Tribunal and the Government of Pakistan has filed a separate appeal challenging the same decision of the Tribunal. It was contended by the appellants that the Service Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction as it has determined the suitability and fitness of a Civil. Servants for promotion to a higher post. The recommendation made by the Departmental Promotion Committee on 7-7-1973 with regard to the suitability and fitness of the two appellants have been interfered with and substituted. It was not within the competence of the Service Tribunal in view of proviso (b) to subsection (1) of section 4 of the Tribunals Act to give such a decision. It is a fact that at no stage disputed that the two appellants when considered and approved for promotion or even when appointed to the upgraded posts were not eligible to be promoted. Hence their consideration, recommendation and appointment was all against the law, in excess of the powers conferred on the Departmental Promotion Committee and the Competent Authority. It had nothing to do with their fitness or suitability. The question of fitness and suitability arises amongst eligibles and not amongst eligibles and ineligibles. The bar, contained in proviso
(b) to subsection (1) of section 4 of the Tribunals Act is inapplicable."
The question of jurisdiction of the Tribunal as regards its powers has been subject-matter of the Supreme Court from time to time and it has been held in so many cases by the Supreme Court that the Service Tribunal is the only forum having exclusive jurisdiction relating to the terms and conditions of the civil servant and it can examine the question of facts and law. Reliance is placed on 1981 SCM R 392 (Secretary, Government of Punjab v. Ahmad Kamaluddin)
"5. The recording of the annual confidential remarks, their communication to the officer concerned, entertainment of representation against adverse remarks and their expunction are all matters governed by detailed instructions of the Government. They can be made the basis for departmental and disciplinary action against an official. These reports make up the service record of the officer concerned. Such record is consulted and heavily relied upon for determining the suitability for promotion, posting and disciplinary action. The Civil Servants Act while enumerating the terms and conditions by subsection (2) of section 23 provides that "any rules, orders or instructions in respect of any terms and conditions of civil servants duly made or issued by an authority competent to make them and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall, in so far as such rules, orders or instructions are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to be rules made under this Act". On the strength of this provision the instructions with regard to the recording of the remarks, their communication and expunction would have the status of rules made under the Civil Servants Act and would be determinative of the terms and conditions of service. The recording of the remarks is indeed within the exclusive competence of the superior officers but to say that such a record is immune from review or reconsideration would defeat the very provisions made which provide for representation and their expunction in certain situations. These remarks are review able under the rules applicable to their recording and an appeal to the Service Tribunal will lie in appropriate cases."
References is also made on PLD 1982 SC 349 (Province of Punjab v. Ramzan Ali), wherein it has been held as under:- "We have given our earnest consideration to the pleas raised by the two sides. Taking the last submission of Ch. Hamiduddin first we may observe that Article 212(3) of the Constitution of 1973 lays down that an appeal against the order of a Service Tribunal is competent only if the Supreme Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law of general public importance.
The question, therefore, is whether the finding of the Tribunal that the respondents too are covered by the terms of the Circular issued by the Punjab Government on 15-1-1981 does, indeed, raise a substantial question of law of general public importance. The Tribunal has held that "the Private Secretary available to the High Court Judge is nothing but a glorified Judgment-Writer-cum- Personal Assistant, glorified by the fact of being in NPS-16. Otherwise, in the nature of his duties, as well as in the quantum of such duties he is no different from the Judgment --Writer. "It has further observed "in fact, these Private Secretaries are characterized by their capability and skill as Stenographers and have no time from the load of daily stenographic work to be asked to do anything else. "Thus, on a consideration of the actual duties being performed by the Private Secretaries in the High Court, a finding has been recorded that a Private Secretary attached to a Judge of the Lahore High Court is nothing more than glorified Judgment-Writer-- cum-Personal Assistant. This is a finding of fact and such a finding could have been recorded by it as an appellate authority in preference to that of the departmental authority in the relevant regard, as held by this Court in M. Yamin Qureshi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Wherein, it has been observed that "it was the duty of the Service Tribunal to examine on merits to be raised by the appellant to challenge the order of his dismissal." It was also observed that "the Tribunal has wide powers under section 5 of the Act, as it may on appeal confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against. Under subsection (2) of the same section, the Tribunal for the purpose of deciding any appeal is to be deemed to be a Civil Court, and to have all the powers as are vested in such Court under the C.P.C. 1903.. "Thus, the Service Tribunal being an appellate authority, before which, on the preferment of an appeal against an order of a departmental authority, the whole matter gets reopened becomes empowered to confirm, set aside, vary modify or substitute its opinion for that of the departmental authority."
7. The upshot of the above decision is that the Tribunal can go into the question of eligibility for promotion of an aggrieved civil servant, as the consideration for promotion is his legal right. It is pertinent to mention here that on these points of jurisdiction about fitness for promotion the matter was under consideration by the Pakistan Law Commission and it was recommended that this embargo in the Act be deleted. In this context, the Establishment Division made a reference to this Tribunal to propose a draft Act vide U.O. Letter No.4/1/93-R.M., dated 14-6-1993 and the compliance was made and it was proposed as under:- "2. Amendment of section 4, Act LXX of 1973: In the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (LXX of 1973), section 4 in subsection (1), in the Proviso, in clause (b), the words "or to be promoted to a higher grade" shall be omitted."
But law has not yet been enacted and in my humble view this clog under proviso (b) to section 4(1) cannot be interpreted narrowly but it could be interpreted liberally in view of provision of Constitution and principle of I natural justice.
8. Reverting to the merits of the case it may be observed that the appellant in the amended memo of appeal in paragraph 21 has stated that since the adverse ACRs of 1986, 1987 and 1988 have been improved, therefore, the overall assessment should have been upgraded which factor could have raised the quantification of the appellant for conferring eligibility for his promotion to BPS-20 in relation to the respondents Mr. Abdul Quddus Khan. This contention of the appellant has no force, as he never requested for upgradation of his ACR departmentally, nor he filed appeal before the Tribunal for this purpose, therefore, his belated request for upgradation is not tenable. We have gone through the ACRs of the appellant and the minutes of the Selection Board. According to ACR grading and quantification the appellant secured 58.48 while Mr. Abdul Quddus Khan secured 64.80 marks and the Board observed as under: "4. The Promotion Board observed that due to very stiff standard of reporting adopted in POFs quantification of ACRs did not reflect the true picture in regard to merit of the officers of POFs. This stiff standard of reporting was prevalent in POFs prior to the promulgation of new Promotion Policy contained in Establishment Division's letter No. 10(3)/81-CP-1(Pt), dated 31-10-1982 and revised Promotion Policy issued vide Establishment Division's letter No. 10(3)/81-CP-1, dated 30-4-1984 and as such did not match with the quantification process. Moreover, it was considered that the promotion of Technical Officers of POFs and Doctors came within the purview of Para. IV of the revised Promotion Policy, which provided that Parts II and III of the policy will not be strictly applicable to civil servants, who are incumbents of purely technical/professional post within their own lines of specialization. The criteria for promotion in their case would continue to be taken through their own professional qualifications and experience etc. Relevant to their specialization.
5. The Promotion Board in the light of the above position and taking into account the ACRs for the period ending 31-12-1987 considered the cases of the following BPS-19 POFs officers and took decisions as noted against their names:
(f) Mr. Pir Muhammad Qureshi, Superintendent Inspection (980417).
An officer of average ability who is not yet ripe to shoulder higher responsibilities. UNFIT (g). Mr. Abdul Quddus Khan, General Manager, POF Gadwal. (980433)
His grading of ACRs for the last 5 years is "Good". Fit for promotion to B-20 post. FIT
9. In the above circumstances, we are of the view that there is no illegality in the proceedings of the Selection Board and the appellant was found unfit for promotion to B-20 on the basis of quantification while the respondent Mr. Abdul Quddus Khan was found fit to be given promotion Grade-20 and the recommendations of the Board were approved by the competent authority's and the order so passed does not call for interference. Accordingly the appeal having no merit is dismissed.