Vide Ministry of Interior Notification No. S.R.O. 806(1)/79, dated 10-9-1979, all classes of employment in Oil and Gas Orgasnisations were declared as essential services under the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952 (LIII of 1952), hereinafter called the Act. After expiry of the period mentioned in the Notification, another Notification No. SRO--280(1)/80, dated the 8th March, 1980, was issued whereby the Act was made applicable to the said Organisation for a further period of six months commencing from 10th March, 1980.
2. Respondent No. 3 was an employee of Pakistan State Oil Company Limited. His services were terminated on 7-11-1979, therefore, at the relevant time his employment was covered under the Act.
He filed a grievance petition in June, 1980 under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), before' the Punjab Labour Court No. 6, Rawalpindi, for his reinstatement. On the said date as well, the Act was applicable. The grievance petition was resisted by the petitioner Company inter alia on the ground that at the relevant time the petitioner's establishment was covered under the Act. It was only the specified Authority under the Act which could exercise jurisdiction in the matter and that. Labour Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the grievance petition filed by respondent No. 3. It was also stated that respondent No. 3 did not file any appeal or review before the Martial Law Authority against his conviction and sentence awarded in 1979 by the Special Military Court under MLR No. 3, in that, he was involved in notorious Pir Hotel's case. He was administered lashes and was also sentenced to one year's R.I. The submission was that respondent No. 3 could not claim reinstatement in service on the basis of pardon granted to him by the Martial Law Administrator Zone-A, Punjab, on 7th April, 1981, on the mercy petition filed by him against his conviction and sentence vide order dated 31-8-1981. The pardon was granted by the Martial Law Administrator Zone `A' (Punjab) under the authority vested in him by the CMLA and in accordance with CMLO 4 read with section 143 of Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The relevant portion of the order reads thus:-- "The order of `pardon' is a waiver of conviction and Mr. Iftikhar Hussain son of Muhammad Safdar is to be treated as if he was never convicted for all purposes including Government or any other employment wherein convicted persons cannot be employed or reinstated. His conviction prior to the grant of pardon will not be provable against him even if he is again tried for any other offence afterwards as per law.
Any order contrary to the above interpretation of law will be derogatory to the judicial order passed by the Competent Authority i.e. Martial Law Administrator Zone `A' (Punjab) and thereby sot tenable".
3.The Labour Court vide its decision dated 27th February, 1982, reinstated the respondent purely on the basis of pardon. The Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal vide its order dated 12th April, 1983, dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner as well as that of the respondent claiming back benefits. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of their Appeal No.RI-196/82-Punjab, this writ petition has been filed by the petitioner.
4. The petition was admitted to a regular hearing on the ground that in view of the decision given in Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. National Industrial Relations Commission and another (PLD 1982 SC 113), the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a petition under section 25-A of the Ordinance where the employment of an applicant was covered by the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1952.
5. Mr. Habibullah Chaudhry, Advocate, appearing on behalf of learned counsel for the respondent No.3, placed reliance on Pakistan Television Corporation v. M. Babar Zaman and others (1989 SCM R 1549), in which the Supreme Court, after discussing the scope of its earlier decision in Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. (supra) and provisions of the Act and the Ordinance held:-- "Keeping in view these provisions it is clear that it is a servant of any Government in Pakistan authorized by the Federal Government who alone is competent to administer the law by taking note of breaches and violations within the scope of its authorization and by filing complaints in respect of them at his discretion. The remedy provided is of a criminal prosecution. The parties directly affected, whether employers or the employees, have been conferred no right or benefit to seek redress or to obtain it within the purview of the Act-----"
The provisions of the Act and their examination in K.E.S.C.'s case establish a distinction between the regulatory powers (exercisable by the Federal Government or an authority specified by it under section 6 of the Act) punitive powers (exercisable by a servant of the Government empowered to file a criminal complaint in. Writing under section 7 of the Act) and the adjudicatory powers in other respects left untouched by the Act. The regulatory power was held in that decision not to extend, encroach upon or affect in any manner the adjudicatory set-up. When it is provided in section 7-A of the Act that "the provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) or any other law" the impact is created only to the extent of contrariety and not in the domain where there is no contrariety.
Section 3 applies the Act to every employment under the Federal Government and in spite of the Act there is an established adjudicatory system of Service Tribunals for civil servants. Similarly, those who fall in the category of workmen and are not exempted from application of Industrial Relations Ordinance can have recourse to the Labour Courts: Those who are excluded from the Labour Courts also can resort to Constitutional jurisdiction if the rules governing them happen to be statutory as recognised in the case of the Principal, Cadet College, Kohat and another v.
Muhammad Shoaib Qureshi (PLD 1984 SC 170).
It is clear to us that the provisions of the Act supersede every other provision only to the extent of contrariety and not beyond. For matters not covered by the provisions of the Act, the ordinary law will have application particularly in the matter of adjudication''.
6. The controversy raised in this petition is thus concluded by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Pakistan Television Corporation (supra). The mere fact that the provisions of the Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act were applicable to a particular establishment, would not ipso facto oust jurisdiction of the Labour Court in respect of grievance petitions under section 25-A of the Ordinance. In the instant case the Labour Court was vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the grievance petition of respondent No.3, therefore, assumption of jurisdiction by the Labour Court cannot be interfered with in these proceedings.
In view of the above, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs.