This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, calls in question an order of the Punjab Labour Court No. 2, Lahore dated 19-4-1986 and the revisional judgment of the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 26-5-1986 whereby grievance petition filed by respondent No. 3 has been held to be within time.
2. Facts giving rise to this petition, briefly stated, are that the services of Mst. Nighat Seameen respondent No. 3 herein who at the relevant time was working as a Confidential Secretary to the Marketing Manager of the petitioner-company were terminated on 16-10-1984. After serving the usual grievance notice, she filed a petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before the Punjab Labour Court No. 2, Lahore on 24-1-1985. It appears that during the pendency of the grievance petition, a Division Bench of this Court ruled that a grievance petition not presented in person by the aggrieved workman was not maintainable. As the respondent's grievance petition was shown to have been filed/presented through her counsel, an objection was raised on behalf of the petitioner-company regarding its maintainability. With a view to meet this objection, respondent No. 3 moved an application under Order XXIII, Rule 1, C.P.C. On 5-1-1986 for withdrawal of the grievance petition with permission to file a fresh one. She stated. In the application that in view of the recent ruling reported as 1985 PLC 413 "technical defect regarding improper presentation of the grievance petition has occurred because of which the grievance petition might fail and in the interest of justice that the case be tried on merits, the petitioner may be allowed to file a fresh grievance petition". This application was allowed and respondent No. 3 was permitted to file a fresh petition "subject to all available objections and exceptions by the other party". Respondent No. 3 filed the fresh grievance petition on the same day i.e. 5-1-1986 and along- with the petition, she moved an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in filing the fresh petition. Precise prayer made was that the time spent in pursuing the earlier grievance petition from 24-1-1985 to 5-1-1986 "may kindly be condoned and the grievance petition may kindly be treated as having been filed within time". Petitioner took a preliminary objection that the fresh grievance petition was barred by time as it was filed 10 months after the service of the grievance notice. Learned trial Court after hearing the arguments on the preliminary objection took the view that the respondent has been pursuing her cause diligently.
She had served the grievance notice in time and also filed the earlier grievance petition within time. If she had instructed her counsel to file the petition in Court, it was with bona fide belief that such a course was permissible. Thus, the Labour Court by order dated 19-4-1986 condoned the time spent in adjudicating the earlier grievance petition of the respondent and consequently held that the fresh petition was within time.
3. Feeling aggrieved with the aforementioned order of the Labour Court, petitioner preferred a revision petition which has been dismissed by the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal by order dated 26-5-1986 holding that the time spent in prosecuting the earlier grievance petition was rightly excluded by the learned Labour Court. Petitioner has now challenged the orders of the learned Labour Court and the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal in the present Constitutional petition.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at considerable length. He has argued that section 14 of the Limitation Act which has been invoked by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal for excluding the time spent in the hearing of the earlier grievance petition was not made applicable to the proceedings before the Labour Court. His further submission was that the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act were not applicable to the fresh petition filed after withdrawing the earlier grievance petition and in any case, respondent No. 3 gave no explanation for the period from 14-12-1985 (on which date copy of the preliminary objection taken by the petitioner to the maintainability of the grievance petition was given to respondent No. 3) up to 5-1-1986 (when the fresh grievance petition was filed).
5. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel but we do not feel persuaded that any interference in Constitutional jurisdiction is called for at this stage. The order impugned in the present petition is clearly of an interlocutory nature. By this order, only a preliminary objection raised by the petitioner regarding limitation has been rejected. Main grievance petition is still pending before the Labour Court and has yet to be decided on merits. It has been cautioned in more than one cases that fragmentary decisions on preliminary points should not be permitted to be called in question as it tends to delay the administration of justice.
Reference for this may be made to PLD 1975 SC 457, PLD 1983 SC 21 and PLD 1985 SC 429. Relevant observations made in the last-mentioned case may be usefully reproduced hereunder:-- "In our view, the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court should not normally be exercised in cases where the entire case will not be completely. Disposed of. This Court and even the Privy Council, has not favoured piecemeal and fragmentary decisions of causes."
6. It may also be observed that the Constitutional jurisdiction can be invoked and made available only in cases of imminent and grave threat to valuable personal and property rights and that, too, subject to the condition that no other adequate remedy is available. In the instant case, no such threat is caused to the petitioner as by the impugned orders, only a preliminary objection raised by the petitioner has been repelled and the main grievance petition has yet to be decided on merits.
As and when the grievance petition is finally decided and if the decision goes against the petitioner, it shall have a right of appeal and in case it fails in appeal also, it can approach this Court in Constitutional jurisdiction and at that time, it shall, of course, be open to it to agitate the question of limitation. Viewed in this context, there is no imminent grievance caused to the petitioner by the impugned orders justifying, the invocation of extraordinary writ jurisdiction. For this reason also, case is not fit to be entertained in writ jurisdiction.
In the aforesaid view of the matter, we hold that this petition is premature which is accordingly dismissed in limine.