1. ' This application for execution of the decree passed on the 10th May, 1988, was filed on the 8th August, 1993, and the office called upon the counsel for the decree-holder to explain how it is in time when the period of limitation for filing such an application is, in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in PLD 1990 SC 778 and PLD 1991 SC 985, 3 years. The counsel for the decree-holder filed his reply to the objections contending that the execution application having been filed within 6 years from the date of the decree is within time because, as held in the case of State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Wajihuddin and others (1991 CLC Note 81) (at page 64), the application is governed by section 48, C.P.C. And not by Article 183 of the Limitation Act. As for the judgment reported in PLD 1991 SC 985, it was contended in the reply that case was concerned with the law as it stood before its amendment by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, and that the effect of the amendment of section 48 was not considered.
2. ' In consequence of the above reply of the counsel for the decree-holder, the office has made this Reference. When the Reference came up for hearing on the 13th February, 1994, the hearing was adjourned because the counsel for the decree-holder was reported to be unwell. Thereafter, the Reference came up for hearing again on the 6th March, 1994, and the 27th March, 1994, but the counsel for the decree-holder remained absent. He is absent again today.
3. The contention of the counsel in his reply that the execution application is governed by section 48, C.P.C. Is not correct. As held in the case of Mahboob Khan v. Hassan Khan Durrani (PLD 1990 SC 778), the result of the change brought out by the Law Reforms Ordinance is that the only effect of section 48, C.P.C. Would be to provide a period of limitation for subsequent execution applications after the first one and that if no application at all is made within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act, the execution application made thereafter would be barred by limitation and as such there would be no occasion to avail of the benefits of the extended time provided by section 48, C.P.C. The result of the above decision is that the first application for execution must be made within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act and that section 48, C.P.C. Would apply only to any subsequent application for execution.
4. ' In the case of Mian Akbar Hussain v. Mst. Aishabai and others (PLD 1991 SC 985), the suit was decreed on the 19th January, 1966, by this Court and the application for execution of the decree was filed in October, 1970. Since the execution application was filed before the piomulgation of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, the law prevailing before the amendment was applied and it was held that either Article 181 or 182 applied so that the execution application having been filed beyond the period of 3. Years was barred by limitation. It was further held, following the case of Firdous Trading Corporation and others v. Japan Cotton and General Trading Co. Ltd. (PLD 1961 Karachi 565) and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Province of Sindh v. Haji Razzak and another (1991 SCM R 920) that Article 183 of the Schedule to the Limitation At is not applicable to applications for execution of the decree passed by this Court because while entertaining and trying civil suits, this Court is exercising District Court jurisdiction in contradistinction to the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court. Article 182 has since been repealed by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972.
5. Since Article 183 has been held not to apply to an application for execution of a decree of this Court and since Article 182 has been repealed by the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, the only Article applicable to the present case is Article 181 which prescribes a period of 3 years. Section 48, C.P.C., as stated above, is not applicable because this is not a fresh application but a first application for execution of the decree. The execution application is, therefore, clearly barred by limitation and is, therefore, hereby dismissed.