The brief background of the matter is that the respondent No. 3 was employed as a worker by the petitioner in 1965 and he was promoted as Checker in 1972. But in the re-organisation process started in 1981 all the three posts of checker were abolished. As a result of this the services of respondent No.3 were terminated on 31-12-1981. The employee challenged this order through a petition under section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969 before respondent No.2, who partially accepted this petition vide order dated 14-12-1982. The result was that the respondent No. 3 was ordered to be reinstated without back benefits. Both the parties filed separate appeals against this order. The appeal of respondent No. 3 was accepted while the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed vide order dated 14-3-1984. Hence present writ petition.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that the respondent retired on attaining the age of 58 years on 1-3-1989. He was paid retirement benefits. Therefore, now the petitioner's interest in this petition is only to the extent of back benefits from 31-12-1981 to 14-12-1982. It is argued that the respondent No.3 was appointed as Checker in 1972 and his services were dispensed with in December, 1981 as all the three posts of the Checkers were abolished in the re-organisation process. It is submitted that the order of termination was unexceptional and respondent was not entitled to back benefits in any case. In this behalf, the reliance is placed on the case reported as Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others (PLD 1987 SC 447).
3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent No. 3 argued that according to clause 2(a) of Schedule to the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, all the orders as to promotion, appointment etc. Are to be made in writing. The petitioner has failed to prove any such order. It is added that the story has been coined by the petitioner to get rid of the respondent No. 3. In this behalf, reference is made to termination order Annexure `G', where there is no mention of his designation but as against this the designation of other two Checkers is clearly mentioned in their letters of termination, which have been placed on record as Annexures `E' and `F. It is argued that the petitioner's case was that the respondent No. 3 was appointed as Checker and not that he was promoted as Checker.
4. I have given my anxious considerations to the arguments on both sides. The bare fact that the petitioner has failed to produce the order of promotion or appointment of the respondent No. 3 as Checker is sufficient to dismiss this petition. The case of the petitioner throughout was that it was a fresh appointment but it failed to prove its contention. Moreover, the designation of Muhammad Saeed and Muhammad Hanif is clearly mentioned as Checker in their termination orders appended as Annexures `E & F respectively. On the other hand, the word Checker is conspicuously missing from the termination order of respondent No. 3, therefore, it is not possible to believe the plea of the petitioner.
5. The controversy which remained for consideration is all factual, therefore, cannot be gone into by this Court. The matter has been decided by Courts of competent jurisdiction. There is nothing to interfere in this Constitutional jurisdiction.
6. The upshot of this discussion is that there is no merit in this petition. The same is dismissed.
However, there is no order as to costs.