1. The Additional Registrar (0.S.) of this Court has made this Reference for consideration of the following question:-- "Whether, by virtue of the enactment of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment)
2. Act, 1992 (Act XVII of 1992) whereby the words "ten million" have been substituted for the words "one million" in section 2(f) (as substituted by Ordinance II of 1983) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, the High Court has ceased to have jurisdiction to hear and decide the suits and execution applications between banks and borrowers in which "the outstanding amount of the loan does not exceed ten million rupees" and which were pending when the aforesaid Act was enacted.
3. Such suits and execution applications are these--
(a) which were instituted prior to the promulgation of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans)
4. Ordinance (Ordinance XIX of 1979);
(b) which were instituted after the promulgation of Ordinance XIX of 1979 but before the promulgation of Ordinance II of 1983; and
(c) which were instituted or received on transfer after Ordinance II of 1983 was promulgated."
5. The President of Pakistan, in order to provide for a summary procedure for recovery of loans given by banking companies, promulgated the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance (Ordinance XXIII of 1978). That Ordinance was repealed and re-enacted on the 27th March, 1979 by the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 (Ordinance XIX of 1979) which came into force on the 1st April, 1979. The relevant provisions of the Ordinance of 1979 were sections 2(f), 5, 6(1)(a), 6(2)(a), 6(4), and 13(a) which are reproduced below for facility of reference:-- Section 2(f) . "Special Court" means a Special Court established under section 5."
6. Section 5.---(1) The Federal Government may by notification in the official Gazette, establish as many Special Courts as it considers necessary, and where it establishes more than one Special Court, shall specify in the, notification the territorial limits within which each one of them shall exercise jurisdiction under this Ordinance.
(2) A Special Court shall consist of a person who is a District Judge.
7. Section 6(1)(a).---"A Special Court shall in exercise of its civil jurisdiction, have, in respect of a claim filed by a banking company against a borrower or by a borrower against a banking company in respect of, or arising out of, a loan all powers vested in a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908).
8. Section 6(2)(a).---"Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), a Special Court shall have no civil jurisdiction in a case in which the outstanding amount of loan does not exceed one lac rupees.
9. Section 6(4).---"No Court other than a Special Court shall have or exercise any jurisdiction with respect to any matter to which the jurisdiction of a Special Court extends under this Ordinance, including a decision as to the existence or otherwise of a loan and the execution of a decree passed by a Special Court; and all proceedings, including proceedings following the filing of an arbitration award and proceedings for the execution of a decree within the jurisdiction of a Special Court, by whatever Court passed, which may be pending in any Court immediately before the commencing day shall stand transferred to the Special Court.
10. Section 13(a).---"Notwithstanding anything contained in section 12 any case pending at the commencement of this Ordinance before a High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall continue to be heard, and shall be decided, by the High Court."
11. The Scheme of the Ordinance of 1979, as will be seen from the provisions cited above, was that Special Courts established thereunder shall have jurisdiction in respect of a claim filed by a banking company against a borrower, and vice versa, in respect of, or arising out of a loan where the outstanding amount of such loan exceeds one lac rupees; that such jurisdiction was exclusive; and that all proceedings in respect of which jurisdiction was conferred upon Special Courts and which, on commencing day, were pending, in any Court, except High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall stand transferred to Special Court. Thus, except for the cases in which the outstanding amount of the loan did not exceed one lac rupees and cases pending before the High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction in respect of cases between banking companies and borrowers in respect of loans was conferred on Special Courts.
12. The Ordinance of 1979 was amended by the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans)
13. (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 (Ordinance II of 1983) whereby the following provision was substituted for section 2(f):-- "Special Court" means--
(i) in respect of a case in which the outstanding amount of the loan does not exceed one million rupees, or the trial of offences under this Ordinance, a person who is or has been a District Judge or an Additional District Judge and is appointed by the Federal Government, by notification in the official Gazette, to be a Special Court to exercise jurisdiction within such territorial limits as may be specified in the notification, and, in the absence of such appointment, the District Court; and
(ii) in respect of any other case, the High Court in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction."
14. Further, sections 5 and 6(2)(a) of the Ordinance 'of 1979 were omitted and section 8 of the Ordinance of 1983 provided, by subsection (1) thereof:- "Any case which, immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance, was pending before a Special Court established under section 5 of the said Ordinance shall, on such commencement, stand transferred to the Special Court which would have had jurisdiction in the case had it been instituted after such commencement."
15. Section 2(f), as substituted by the 1983 Ordinance, has now been amended by the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment) Act, 1992 (Act XVII of 1992) whereby, for the words "one million", the words "ten millions" have been substituted, with the result that the Special Court constituted under clause (i) of section 2(f) now has jurisdiction in cases where the amount of loan does not exceed ten million rupees whereas the High Court, as a Special Court, will have jurisdiction in cases where such amount exceeds ten million rupees.
16. The question that has arisen is whether, in consequence of the amendment of 1992, this Court continues to have jurisdiction in cases where the amount of loan is below ten million rupees and which were pending when the amendment came into force.
17. It will be convenient to deal first with the cases which had been instituted prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance, 1979 and where pending when the Ordinance was promulgated. Section 6(4) of the Ordinance, no doubt, provided that all cases in respect of which jurisdiction was conferred on the Special Court and which were pending in any Court on the commencing day stood transferred to Special Court; but the cases pending before the High Court were expressly saved by section 13(a) which provides that any case pending at the commencement of the Ordinance 1979 before a High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall continue to be heard and decided by the High Court. Section 13(a) has not been repealed or amended by either of the subsequent amendments in the Ordinance of 1979 and continues in force. It is, therefore, clear that the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide cases which were pending when the Ordinance 1979 came into force remains unaffected. The effect of section 13(a) was considered by Nasir Aslam Zahid, J. (as he then was) in the case of National Bank of Pakistan v. Bawany Industries Ltd. PLD 1983 Karachi 300 wherein he held, at page 303:- "According to my interpretation of section 6(4) and section 13 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance of 1979, an execution application for execution of a decree passed by a High Court in a suit of the valuation of over rupees one lac filed by a banking company against a borrower or vice versa in respect of or arising out of a "loan", can only be filed in the concerned Special Court established under section 5 of the 1979 Ordinance. If an execution application were pending in the High Court when the 1979 Ordinance was enacted, such execution application would continue to be heard and then decided by the High Court by virtue of section 13(a) of the 1979 Ordinance. In the instant case this is not so. No execution application was pending in this Court when the 1979 Ordinance was enacted. No doubt the suit was pending when the Ordinance came into effect and it is for this reason that the suit was decided by this Court in view of section 13(a) of the 1979 Ordinance. However, as observed earlier, the value of the suit being more than rupees one lac, an execution application to execute the decree in such a suit cannot be entertained by this Court and can only be entertained by the Special Court."
18. In spite of the above judgment, the office made a Reference to decide "whether execution application filed after 1-4-1979 in respect of a decree passed by the High Court relating to the subject-matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court be returned for presentation to the proper Court?" The arguments in that Reference were heard on the 23rd January, 1983, and the order was made on the 13th March, 1983, as indicated by the report of the case of United Bank Ltd. v.
19. Mst. Rehana Raza PLD 1983 Karachi 467. In the meantime Ordinance II of 1983 was promulgated; and the order on the Reference is obviously based on the provisions of the 1979 Ordinance as amended by Ordinance II of 1983. In that case it was held, inter alia, that the "pending execution application filed before 3-5-1979 in respect of matters to which the jurisdiction of Special Court extends shall stand transferred to the Special Court." The reason for the decision is stated thus:-- "The question now arises is whether in view of section 13(a) the High Court can proceed with the pending execution application relating to the matter to which the jurisdiction of a Special Court extends. In this regard reference is made to section 6(4) which provides that such execution application shall stand transferred to Special Court. Attempt has been made to argue that there is a conflict between section 6(4) and section 13(a) which provides that the cases pending before the High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be tried by the High Court. Section 6(4) contemplates transfer of pending execution applications to a Special Court whereas section 13(a) provides that the cases pending before the High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be tried by the High Court. It is a well-settled rule of interpretation that a harmonious construction has to be placed to different provisions of the same enactment. Therefore the pending execution applications, by operation of law, stand transferred to the Special Court, but the suits and other proceedings which are pending before the High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction shall continue to be heard and decided by the High Court."
20. There can be no cavil with the proposition that in terms of section 6(4) all proceedings, including proceedings for execution of a decree within the jurisdiction of a Special Court, by whatever Court passed, which were pending before any Court on the commencing day stood transferred to Special Court; but "cases" pending on that day before the High Court have been expressly saved by section 13(a) which is in the nature of an exception to section 6(4). The word "cases" in section 13(a) surely includes execution applications as well as suits and if the suits are considered to have been saved by that section, there appears to be no reason why execution application cannot be similarly considered. Further, on the hypothesis that there is a conflict between section 6(4) and section 13(a) then to hold that execution applications stood transferred by virtue of section 6(4), far from harmonizing the two provisions, would appear to render section 13(a) redundant to the extent of execution applications. The two provisions, in fact, appear to be reconcilable on the view that section 6(4) applies to proceedings in all Courts except the High Court whereas section 13(a) applies only to cases in High Court.
21. In consequence of Ordinance II of 1983, cases in which the amount of loan exceeded one million rupees and which were pending before the Special Court established under section 5 of the 1979 Ordinance were transferred to this Court; and fresh cases involving similar amount were filed in this Court. Such of those cases in which the amount of loan exceeds ten million rupees are not affected by the Act of 1992 and will, therefore, continue to be heard and decided by High Courts, as Special Courts, in their original civil jurisdiction. With regard to the remaining cases i,e, the cases in which the amount of loan does not exceed ten million rupees it has been contended, on the one hand, that the amendment made by the Act of 1992 is merely procedural in nature and, therefore, retrospective, so that all such cases stand transferred to the Special Court constituted under section 2(f) (i), and, on the other hand, that since there is no provisions for transfer in the Act of 1992, it cannot be applied retrospectively and the cases pending in this Court would continue to be tried by this Court.
22. A retrospective or retroactive law, according to Crawford on statutory construction (1940 Edition, page 109), "is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates new obligations and imposes new duties, or attaches new disabilities in respect of transactions already past". But before a statute will be construed as retrospective, its language must imperatively and clearly require such constructions. As stated in Crawford, p.562.
23. "Retroactive legislation is looked upon with dis favour, as a general rule, and probably so because of its tendency to be injust and oppressive ... Statutes, with but few exceptions, should, if possible, be construed so that they will have only prospective operation. Indeed there is a presumption that the legislature intended its enactments to have this effect -- to be effective only in future. This is true because of the basic presumption that the legislature does not intend to enact legislation which operates oppressively or unreasonably; and retrospective laws will generally have such operation.
24. To similar effect is Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition, page 215) wherein it is stated:- "Upon the presumption that the legislature does not intend what is unjust rests the leaning against giving certain statutes a retrospective operation. They are construed as operating only in cases or on facts which come into existence after the statutes were passed unless a retrospective effect is clearly intended. It is a fundamental rule of English Law that no Statute shall be construed to have retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication."
25. The origin of the presumption, in the words of Qadeeruddin Ahmed, J. In Nabi Ahmed v. Secretary, Government of West Pakistan PLD 1969 SC 599 at p.609, "is to be found in the concientious abhorrence that all just men have for the injustice that is inherent in changing the legal implications of a situation to the disadvantage of those who would otherwise benefit by a right which existed at the time of the change The purpose or the object of the presumption is to protect the vested or existing rights and since no one has any vested right in procedure the presumption does not apply to an enactment concerned merely with procedure. As stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition, page 222:-- "The presumption against retrospective construction has no application to enactments which affect only the procedure and practice of the Courts. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure, but only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being, by or for the Court in which he sues, and if an Act of Parliament alters that procedure, he can only proceed according to the altered mode: The principle has been enunciated by Crawford on Statutory Construction (at page 581) as follows:-- "As a general rule, legislation which relates solely to procedure or to legal remedies will not be subject to the rule that statutes should not be given retroactive operation. Similarly the presumption against retrospective construction is inapplicable. In other words, such statutes constitute an exception to the rule pertaining to statutes generally. Therefore, in the absence of a contrary legislative intention, statutes pertaining solely to procedure or legal remedy may affect a right of action no matter whether it came into existence prior to, or after the commencement of the statute. Similarly, they may be held applicable to proceedings pending or subsequently commenced. In any event, they will, at least presumptively apply to accrued and pending as well as to future actions."
26. And has been cited with approval in Adnan Afzal v. Sher Afzal PLD 1969 SC 187.
27. Thus, a statute which relates solely to matters of procedure or legal remedy without affecting any substantive right may, in the absence of contrary legislative intent apply to pending proceedings.
28. However, even such a statute may not be given retrospective effect if to do so would result in inconvenience or injustice.
29. The question for consideration then, is whether the Act of 1992 relates solely to procedure or legal remedy and, if so, whether there is any indication in the language of that Act that it is not to apply to pending proceedings or whether injustice or inconvenience would result if the Act is applied to pending proceedings.
30. In the case Adnan Afzal v. Sher Afzal, Hamoodur Rahman, C.J. Observed:-- "It is obvious that matters relating to the remedy, the mode of trial, the manner of taking evidence and forms of action are all matters relating to procedure. Crawford too takes the view that questions relating to jurisdiction over a cause of action, venue, parties, pleading and rules of evidence also pertain to procedure, provided the burden of proof is not shifted. Thus a statute purporting to transfer jurisdiction over certain causes of action may operate retroactively. This is what is meant by saying that a change of forum by law is retrospective being a matter of procedure only."
31. In that case, while an application for maintenance, under section 488, Cr.P.C. Was pending before a Magistrate, Family Courts Act, 1964, was enacted providing, inter alia, that the Family Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon matters relating to maintenance.
32. Upon analysis of the provisions of the Family Courts Act and in the light of the principles quoted above, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that:-- "Looking at the provisions as a whole we are of the view that all that the Family Courts Act has done is that it has changed the forum, altered the method of trial and empowered the Court to grant better remedies. It has, thus, in every sense of the term, brought about only procedural changes and nor affected any substantive right. According to the general rule of interpretation, therefore, a procedural statute is to be given retrospective effect unless the law contains a contrary indication.
33. There is no such contrary indication in the West Pakistan Family Courts Act. We would, therefore, hold that the Act affected also pending proceedings and the District Magistrate was right in holding that the Courts of Magistrates had no longer any jurisdiction to either entertain, hear or adjudicate upon a matter relating to maintenance."
34. In the case of Yasmeen Nighat v. National Bank of Pakistan PLD 1988 SC 391 the question for consideration was whether the suits of the value of Rs, one lac or below in respect of recovery of loans from banking companies which were then pending in Civil Courts, stood transferred to the Special Courts on the promulgation of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment)
35. Ordinance, 1983. It was held that the situation there was similar to the case of Adnan Afzal and that, as there was no contrary indication in the Ordinance of 1983, that Ordinance would affect the pending cases and all suits would have to be tried by Special Court. The relevant provisions of the Ordinance were examined and Nasim Masan Shah, J. (as he then was), speaking for the Court, observed:-- "It may be added that an examination of the provisions of Ordinance XIX of 1979 in juxtaposition with those of Ordinance II of 1983 shows that the legislature by enacting section 6(4) of Ordinance XIX of 1979 intended to oust the jurisdiction of all other Courts in the, matter of banking loans and to confer exclusive jurisdiction on Special Courts in respect of the matters which were made triable by the said Courts, under the terms of the said Ordinance and all such proceedings pending in any Court immediately before the commencing day of Ordinance XIX of 1979 stood transferred to the Special Court concerned. Under the provisions of the said Ordinance XIX of 1979 (under section 6(2)
36. (a)) the jurisdiction of the Special Court was expressly excluded in relation to cases involving a sum of Rs, one lac or less. But by Ordinance II of 1983 the definition of the Special Court having been amended and subsection (2)(a) of section 6 of Ordinance XIX of 1979 having been omitted, the Special Court established under section 5(1) of the Ordinance became vested with the jurisdiction to try those cases which were specially excluded from its jurisdiction under section 6(2)(a) of Ordinance XIX of 1979. As a result of this extension. The Special Court was conferred the sole jurisdiction in such matters (the jurisdiction of all other Courts having been ousted in respect of such cases). The intendment of the law-maker which appears from the changes made by him, is that he intended that even such cases which under section 6(4) of the Ordinance were to be tried by the Civil Courts earlier were also to become triable by the Special Courts. This intention is also decipherable from the circumstance that with the omission of clause (a) of subsection (2) of section 6 of Ordinance XIX of 1979 the forum of the Civil Courts for the trial of such cases ceased altogether. Hence it will not be reasonable to infer that the suits pending in the Civil Courts can continue to be tried by them when their jurisdiction in respect of these cases has been completely taken away." (emphasis added).
37. ' The above finding is conclusive of the present matter. It is obvious that all that the Act of 1992 has done is to change the forum in respect of cases where the amount of loan does not exceed ten million rupees. It does not affect any substantive right of the parties and there is nothing in the Act to indicate that it is not to apply to pending proceedings or that any injustice or inconvenience would be caused to any of the parties by transfer of such cases to Special Courts constituted under section 2(f)(i) of the Ordinance. At any rate, no possible inconvenience or injustice which may be caused has been brought to my attention; and, as observed by Maxwell (p. 208) "the possibility of injustice which leads the Court to adopt a particular construction must be a real one: if the injustices suggested in argument are purely hypothetical, and may never or only really occur in practice, the Court will remain unmoved." It may, in this context be noted under the Ordinance of 1979, as amended, this Court, while trying cases under the Ordinance acts as a Special Court; and, therefore, the procedure prescribed by the Ordinance applies to those cases. The same procedure will apply to the cases when they are transferred to the Special Court constituted under section 2(f)
38. (i). No prejudice will, therefore be caused by such transfer.
39. My attention has been drawn to the order dated the 25th April, 1993, passed in Suit No, 153 of 1975 (The Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Arag, Ltd.) holding that the Act of 1992 has not taken away the jurisdiction of this Court to try that suit. That suit is for recovery of Rs,2,967,573.59 i,e, exceeding one million rupees but below ten million rupees and was pending in the original jurisdiction of this Court when the Ordinance of 1979, was enacted. It continued to be tried by this Court after 1979 in view of the provisions of the 1979 Ordinance. It has been observed in the order that after 1983 the suit was being tried by this Court as a Special Court as the amount of loan therein exceeded one million rupees. However, as indicated above, section 13(a) was not affected by Ordinance II of 1983 and continued to be a part of the Ordinance as amended. Therefore, even after 1983 the suit continued to be tried by this Court by virtue of section 13(a); and, for the same reason, would continue to be tried by this Court even after the enactment of the Act of 1992.
40. It has further been held in the order in Suit No,153 of 1975 that the case of Adnan Afzal is distinguishable because the Act of 1992 has not brought about any procedural change. In that case the Court of Magistrate was divested, by Family Courts Act, of jurisdiction in matters relating to maintenance and such jurisdiction was vested in the Family Court; and it was held that the statute had the effect only of changing the forum and was thus related solely to procedure.
41. Similarly, the Act of 1992 has done nothing more than to divest the Special Court constituted under section 2(1)(u) of the jurisdiction in cases where the amount of loan does not exceed ten million rupees. The case is, therefore, similar to Adnan Afzal's case. The case of Yasmeen Nighat has also been distinguished on the ground that there is material difference between the Ordinance of 1983 and the Act of 1992 because:-- "The Ordinance of 1983 in its section 8 provided for automatic transfer of pending suits from Civil Courts to Special Courts consequent upon vesting of Special Courts with jurisdiction to deal with cases where outstanding amount of loan was rupees one million. Act 1992 did not provide for automatic transfer of cases from a Special Court defined by section .2(f)(ii) to Special Court defined by section 2(f)(i) of the Ordinance, 1979."
42. As to this it is only necessary to observe that section 8 of the 1983 Ordinance did not provide for transfer of cases from Civil Courts but from Special Courts established under section 5 of the 1979 Ordinance and that the decision in Yasmeen Nighat's case was arrived at notwithstanding that there was no provision in the 1983 Ordinance for transfer of cases from Civil Courts, such provision being obviously considered unnecessary.
43. The answer to the Reference, with reference to the several categories of cases, both suits and execution applications, mentioned therein is therefore, as follows:--
(1) The cases which were pending in this Court at the commencement of the 1979 Ordinance will continue to be heard and decided by this Court
(2) The cases filed in this Court after promulgation of the 1979 Ordinance but before promulgation of Ordinance II of 1983. The amount of loan in these cases is below one lac rupees because during this period jurisdiction in cases where loan exceeded one lac rupees vested in the Special Court established under section 5 of the 1979 Ordinance. Mr. Mansoorul Ara submitted that in view of Yasmeen Nighat's case these cases should have been transferred to Special Court constituted under section 2(1)(i) because the jurisdiction of High Court in respect of those cases had been taken away by section 6(4) and they were not saved by section 13(a) which applies only to the cases which were pending when the 1979 Ordinance came into force. However, those cases were not transferred apparently because section 8 of the 1983 Ordinance which provided for transfer of cases from Special Courts established under section 5 of the 1979 Ordinance did not provide for transfer of cases which were pending in the High Court, which, by implication, were saved. Be that as it may, in view of the Act of 1992, these cases shall now be transferred to the Special Court constituted under section 2(f)(i).
(3) With regard to the cases filed in this Court and received by this Court on transfer after the promulgation of Ordinance II of 1983 and before the enactment of Act XVII of 1992, such of those cases in which the amount of loan does not exceed ten million rupees shall be transferred to the Special Court constituted under section 2(0(i) of the Ordinance, while the remaining case, i,e, where the amount of loan exceeds ten million rupees will continue to be tried by this Court.
44. Consequently, the cases mentioned in category (A) of the Schedule hereto shall continue to be heard and decided by this Court and the cases mentioned in categories (B) and (C) of the Schedule shall be transferred to Special Courts constituted under section 2(0(i) having jurisdiction in the matter. If there are any other cases which are not included in the Schedule but which fall within any of the categories therein, they shall be similarly dealt with.
45. SCHEUDLES Suits and Execution Applications between Bankers and borrowers, in which "the outstanding amount of the loan does not exceed ten million rupees" and which were pending when the Act XVII of 1992 was enacted.
46. Such Suits and Execution applications are as under:-
(A) WHICH WERE INSTITUTED PRIOR TO THE PROMULGATION OF THE BANKING COMPANIES (RECOVERY OF LOANS)
47. ORDINANCE, 1979 (ORDINANCE XIX OF 1979)
48. 1971 1975 1977 19781978 322 478 411 6+9 1067 323 526 415 569 1098 327 571 466 607 1104 1972 571 466 607 1104 279 1976 779 622 1181 313 40 804 625 1979 336 71 1978 654 03 1973 141 01 674 50 257 142 07 692 102 1974 261 29 730 123 259 291 50 764 167 284 289 124 815 169 285 519 125 831 189 286 611 186 831 189 286 611 186 832 300 445 615 284 841 301 310 617 290 912 313 618 315 927 318 718 334 1001 451 1977 348 1039 1975 466 153 359 1042 11 166 386 1055 171 410 477 1064 B) WHICH WERE INSTITUTED AFTER THE PROMULGATION OF ORDINANCE XIX OF 1979 BUT BEFORE THE PROMULGATION OF ORDINANCE II OF 1983 1979 1979 1980 19801981 349 571 a/w 17 542 71 359 230/73 103 546 176 431 593 104 557 566 566 a/w 596 106 561 719 1736/73 607 175 879 772 567 a/w 699 288 904 1982 2198/73 706 289 924 122 568 a/w 851 343 1107406 771/73 853 344 1116407 569 a/w 1004 346 1981Ex.12/1982 2197 a/w 1980 357 10 570 a/w 15 392 58 2199/72 16 454 69
(C) WHICH WERE INSTITUTED OR RECEIVED ON TRANSFER FROM SPECIAL COURT AFTER ORDINANCE II OF 1983 WAS PROMULGATED DM 1983 1983 1983 1983 1988 1989 1989 1990 S.No,290/83 570 1210 854 824 617 1211 959 896 700 1300 1007 1022 761 1301 1008 1038 804 1367 1014 1040 806 1377 1029 1989 810 1433 1073 49 965 Ex.32 1990 50 966 Ex.63 Execution Appeals.
49. 87 972 Ex.104 3 150 985 Ex. 109 17 167 991 1990 23 196 998 J.M.68 a/w 34 220 1002 S.No, 342 40 263 1003 77 41 318 1064 110 46 351 a/w 1065 198 58 J.M. 47 1073 289 72 361 1076 366 83 364 1079 396 91 433 1102 434 93 448 1105 475 100 469 1107 598 104 493 1115 634 124 501 1130 704 139 502 1182 705 564 1205 773 1991 1991 1992 111 Ex. Applns. Ex. Applns.
50. 185 103 8 857 112 28 858 1992 44 859 03 52 965 15 54 1027 57 66 1057 119 68 1069 180 88 1077 183 1993 1088 258 Ex. Applns.
51. 1133 299 5 1135 323 10 1137 324 18 1255 325 1991 331 Ex.Applns. 342 07 344 13 378 28 474 41 486 55 487 57 495 62 510 67 1992 68 Ex. Applns.
52. 99 4 revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.