NOOR MUHAMMAD MAGSI (MEMBER): --Appellant Mr. Nasir Ali joined service under the respondent as M.T. Civil Driver in July, 1983. He was served with a charge-sheet on 10th March, 1991, containing the following charge: "On 25th February, 1991 at about 02-55 hours, you were caught red-- handed by Mr. Fida Hussain, PIAC Security Staff, while stealing kerosene oil from a drum, PIAC property lying near Bay No. 9, Karachi Airport and stolen 6 litres kerosene oil was confiscated by Security Officer Khan Muhammad Pario`D'Coy Commander ASF, Karachi Airport."
The appellant submitted his reply on 11-9-1991 in which he admitted the charge and requested for pardon. Inquiry was conducted into the charge and the appellant was held guilty of the charge, whereafter the competent authority passed the impugned order dated 25th March, 1991 where under the services of the appellant were terminated under the provisions of Government Servants (E&D) Rules, 1973. Being aggrieved, he filed appeal on 28th March, 1991 to the Force Commander, Airport Security Force, which remained un responded. The appellant filed a grievance notice under section 25 of IRO, 1969 before the Sindh Labour Court No. IV on 16-7-1991 but the same was returned for want of jurisdiction by order-dated 13-8-1991. The appellant then preferred this appeal before the Tribunal on 22-12-1991.
2. The appeal came up for preliminary hearing on 31-5-1992 and it was dismissed in limine by order dated 31-5-1992 in view of the Airport Security Force (Amendment) Ordinance, 1984 whereby the employees of the ASF had ceased to be civil servants. The appellant challenged the decision of the Tribunal before the Supreme Court by filing Civil Appeal No. 683/92, and the Supreme Court in view of its judgment in the case of Faseehuddin v. Khawar Latif Butt and others, set aside the judgment of this Tribunal and remanded the case to the Tribunal with the direction to decide the appeal on merits. On remand from the Supreme Court, the appeal was fixed for regular hearing on 7-7-1994.
3. Mr. S. Riaz Haider, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that the charge-sheet served on the appellant was not accompanied with the statement of allegations; and that the Chief Security Officer was not the authorised officer in this case and further that the penalty of termination from service is not provided under the E & D Rules, and as such the order is illegal. On merits, he submitted that no doubt the appellant was caught red-handed but it was not a grave offence, which could entail major punishment of termination from service.
4. The respondents have filed objections. Mr. Javed Akhtar, Security Officer (Legal) appearing for the respondents submitted that the appellant admitted his guilt and inquiry was conducted and the appellant was found guilty of the charge. According to him, the Chief Security Officer was the authorised officer under the Rules who issued the charge-sheet and the order was passed by the Force Commander. He also submitted that ASF is a disciplined Force and the conduct of the appellant was not tolerable in the Force and he was punished by appropriate punishment.
5. We have heard the arguments and perused the record. The charge as it stands has been admitted by the appellant in his reply submitted to the charge-sheet that he had stolen 6 litres kerosene oil from the Airport area and he was apprehended by the PIAC Security Staff where he was caught red-- handed. This charge was also inquired into at regular inquiry conducted by Mr. Muhammad Ilyas, Security officer, who examined the appellant and other witnesses and the charge against the appellant was proved. It is a settled law that when there are admitted facts and there is clear admission of the charge by the accused official, therefore, there is no necessity of holding regular inquiry and summary procedure can be resorted to in such cases, and any legal infirmity in the inquiry proceedings does not absolve the accused official of the charge. On this we rely on Civil Appeals Nos. 312/1993 and 313/1993 filed by Nawab Khan and Abdul Hafeez, respectively, decided on 15th November, 193 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The only contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that it was a small matter for which the appellant has been removed from service. We are conscious of this fact, but the fact cannot be that the Airport Security Force where the appellant was employed, is charged with the responsibility of safeguarding the lives and property of the public as well as the Government and if the Custodians are themselves are involved in such nefarious activities, we are sure, nobody will allow such black- sheep to remain in the service of a discipline Force. It is immaterial whether it was a matter of penny or thousands of rupees, but it was a case of theft and the appellant was caught red- handed. Therefore, the appellant is not entitled to any concession in the quantum of punishment.
As regards the words `termination of service' mentioned in the impugned order, it is a misnomer and the superior Courts in such cases have also taken cognizance of the fact that where the words termination or discharge from service have been used while removing a civil servant from service the Courts have rectified such omissions by interpreting it as removal or dismissal from service, and such lacuna do not vitiate the action so taken against a civil servant. In this case, since the services of the appellant have been terminated under the E&D Rules and there is no such penalty in these rules, therefore, it shall be deemed that he stood removed from service and we order accordingly. As regards the objection of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Chief Security Officer was not the authorised officer, the respondents have placed on record a copy of Gazette Notification of SRO.217(KE)/93, dated 9th December, 1993 and it clearly indicates that in respect of Government servants in BPS-1 to 16, the Chief Security Officer is the authorised officer and the Force Commander is the Authority and as such the objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is without substance.
6. The merits of the case apart, the appeal also falls on the point of limitation. The impugned order was passed on 25th March, 1991. Instead of` coming to the Tribunal, the appellant approached the Labour Court by filing a grievance petition under section 25-A of IRO which was returned to the appellant on 13-8-1991 for presentation before an appropriate forum. The appellant preferred this appeal before this Tribunal on 22-12-1991. The appellant has filed an application for condonation of delay wherein it has been, inter alia, stated that the appellant filed this appeal before the Tribunal but it was not accepted by the office due to lack of jurisdiction, but in support of this contention, the appellant has not produced any documentary evidence that his appeal was not accepted by the office of the Tribunal, and the fact is that it was filed before the Tribunal only on 22-12-1991. The delay between the periods from 14-8-1--91 to 21-12-1991 remains unexplained and there are no good grounds for condonation of delay and accordingly the application is rejected and the appeal is held to be time-barred.
7. Both on merits as well as on point of limitation, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.