NAZIM HUSSAIN SIDDIQUL J.- This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 31-5-1981, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, in Suit No.80/62, whereby he rejected the objections against the award in question and made it rule of the Court. The facts relevant for decision of this appeal are as follows:-
2. The respondents had invited tender for supply of 950 Bren Gun Chests. The tender of appellants was accepted on 8-3-1956. Initially, 8 months time was granted for the supply of those chests from the date of approval of advance sample and material test report, or 31st October, 1956, whichever was earlier. Though the time for delivery of the goods was extended several times, but the appellants failed to supply the same. Confronted with such situation, the respondents on 26-4- 1958, cancelled the contract and informed the appellants of their intention to purchase the balance quantity of 926 Chests at the expenses and cost of the appellants and to recover the difference of price, if any. Thereafter, it appears the appellants invoked the arbitration clause in the agreement and lodged their claim. The appellants nominated their arbitrator in the dispute and since the respondents had failed to nominate their arbitrator, the arbitrator appointed by the appellants started proceedings of the matter as the sole arbitrator. The respondents then applied to this Court and they were allowed to nominate their arbitrator. Accordingly, the respondents nominated their arbitrator and the board of arbitrators, so appointed, first appointed an Umpire and then proceeded with the arbitration proceedings. On 18-2-1961, the appellants filed their claim before the arbitrators, claiming a sum of Rs. 89,546 as damages. On 9-3-1961, the respondents filed their statement in the case, and on 16-3-1961 moved an application before the arbitrators seeking to amend their statement so as to include a counter-claim. The respondents filed their counter- claim in the sum of Rs.21,642/. So happened, the two arbitrators did not agree with each other and gave their separate award. The arbitrator appointed by the appellants awarded a sum of Rs.
59,802 to the appellants against the respondents and did not consider at all the counter-claim lodged by the respondents. The respondents arbitrator rejected the claim of the appellants for damages and allowed the counter-claim of the respondents at the rate of Rs. 21 /- per Chest for the un-supplied quantity of Chests. Due to conflicting views of the arbitrators, the dispute was referred to the Umpire, who after hearing the parties, awarded a sum of Rs. 17, 326/- to the respondents against the appellants. The claim of appellants for damages was rejected. The award of the Umpire was impugned before the learned Single Judge. The main part of controversy is about the interpretation of Section 14 of the Arbitration Act 1940, hereinafter called the Act, said Section is as follows:- SECTION 14 AWARD TO BE SIGNED AND FILED:
(1) When the arbitrator or umpire have made their award, they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration and award.
(2) The arbitrator or umpire shall, at the request of any party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming under such party or if so directed by the court and upon payment of the fees and charges due in respect of the arbitration and award and of the costs and charges filing the award, cause the award, or signed copy of it, together with any depositions and document which may have been taken and proved before them, to be filed in court, and the court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the award.
(3) Where the arbitrators or umpire state a special case under clause (b) of Section 13, the court, after giving notice to the parties and hearing them, shall pronounce its opinion thereon and such opinion shall be added to, and shall form part of, the award."
3. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that learned Single Judge, as a whole, misinterpreted the provisions of Section 14 and particularly its subsection (2) and as such reached the conclusion, which is contrary to the material available on record. He also argued that Article 158 of the Limitation Act has also not been correctly interpreted. It is also urged that though, ex facie, the umpire misconducted himself, yet, the learned Single Judge ignored this aspect of the matter altogether.
4. As regards misinterpretation of Section 14(2) of the Act, it is noted that learned Single Judge, while interpreting above provisions has taken into consideration the conflicting views expressed by the various High Courts. One view is that knowledge of filing of an award acquired in a way other than that laid down by Section 14 cannot be deemed to be proper service of a notice of the M/s. Shaft Corp. Ltd. V. Govt, of Pakistan (Nazim Hussain Siddiqui, J) award and the statutory provisions relating to service, as contained in Section 14(2), cannot be dispensed with and nor the statutory rights of a party to be served personally can be ignored. Above view is found in the cases reported in (1) Holar Ram Verhomal Vs. Governor General. Of India A.I.R. (34) 1947 Sindh P-145
(2) Punoo Ram Vs. Nebhraj A.I.R. 1930, Lahore P-228 (3) Ranjit Chandra Talukdar and Others Vs. Bissav Ram Mandal another, A.I.R. 1926 Culcutta, P-1018
(4) C. Das Vs. Ganesh Ram I.L.R. 20, All-474 (5) Rangasami Vs. Muthusami I. L.R.
11. Mad-144 (6) Udit Singh and Others Vs. Ram Lakhan Singh and Others A.I.R. 1933, All-313 (7) Thukar Singh Vs. Kandhai A.I.R. 1935 All-852 (8) Sh. Din Muhammad Vs. Jan Muhammad P.L.D. 1971 Quetta 30. The other view is that if a party had knowledge of filing the award in court it is not necessary that a further notice be issued to him by the court informing about the filing of award. This view has been expressed in the cases reported in (1) Bhola Nath Mailick Vs. Mahadav Mallick A.I.R. 1952. Calcutta P-226 (2) Kawal Singh Akbar Vs. Baldeo Singh Akbar A.I.R. 1957 Nag Pur P-57 (3) Bolla Ram George Vs. Kadpaklingiah A.I.R. 1961, Andhra Pradesh P-457.
5. Learned Single Judge concurred with the latter view noted above and in doing so relied on A.I.R.
1961 Andhra Pradesh P-457, wherein some authorities expressing the first view were also taken into consideration, and also placed reliance on the case of Nilkantha Sidramapa Nigashette Vs. Kashinath Somanma Ningashetti reported in A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 666 in which the following was observed:- "Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Act X of 1940) requires the arbitrators or umpire to give notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing of the award. Sub-section
(2) of that section requires the Court, after the filing of the award, to give notice to the parties of the filing of the award. The difference in the provisions of the two sub-sections with respect to the giving of notice is significant and indicates clearly that the notice which the Court is to give to the parties of the filing of the award need not be a notice in writing. The notice can be given orally. No question of the service of the notice in the formal way of delivering the notice or tendering it to the party can arise in the case of a notice given orally. The communication of the information that an award has been filed is sufficient compliance with the requirements of sub-section (2) of section 14 with respect to the giving of the notice to the parties concerned about the filing of the award.
'Notice' does not necessarily mean 'communication in writing: 'Notice' according to the Oxford Concise Dictionary means 'intimation, intelligence, warning and has this meaning in expressions like 'give notice, have notice' and it also means 'formal intimation of something or instructions to do something' and has such a meaning in expressions like 'notice to quit, till further notice'. Yv e are of opinion that the expression 'give notice' in Sub-section (2) of Section 14, simply means giving intimation of the filing of the award, which certainly was given to the- parties through their pleaders on February 21, 1948. Notice to the pleader is notice to the party, in view of R.5, of O.III, Civil Procedure Code, which provides that any process served on the pleader of any party shall be presumed to be duly communicated and made known to the party whom the pleader represents and, unless the Court otherwise directs, shall be as effectual for all purposes as if the same had been given to or served on the party in person."
6. Having reached the conclusion that notice could be constructive also, learned Single Judge held that limitation against the appellants under Article 158 of the Limitation Act, which provides a period of 30 days, started running from 28-1-1974 and since the objections against the award were filed on 4-4-1975 the same were beyond time.
7. Looking to the fact that the object of arbitration, which, in fact, is a domestic tribunal, is to decide speedily disputes by quasi-judicial means by avoiding, formalities, technicalities, delay, expenses, and ordeal of litigation, and also the fact that the legislature deliberately used the expression in section 14 (1) "notice in writing" and in section 14(2) the expression "thereupon give notice to the party" and both these expressions being not synonymous, we are also of the same view which has been taken by learned Single Judge on the point of notice with reference to section 14(2) of the Act.
It being so, we hold that the objections submitted by the appellants were time-barred.
8. Besides, as above, the matter has also been decided, on merits by the learned Single Judge.
Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the umpire misconducted himself in as much as the counter claim of the respondents was taken into consideration, which as per circumstances of the case, should have been rejected outrightly. The expression 'misconduct' appearing in Clause
(a) of Section 30 of the Act is not defined in the Act. It is used in technical sense and with reference to arbitration proceedings it points out towards irregularity. Normally, it does not refer to moral turpitude or anything akin to it. It is now settled proposition of law that an award of the arbitrator is binding upon the parties and the same cannot be set aside, unless it suffers from any error of law apparent on the face of record, or is inviolation of principles of natural justice, which is not the case here. As regards counter-claim, it is noted that counter-claim is on better footing than additional work. There are series of decisions on th point that additional work can be taken to be a part of the principal work and same arbitration clause would apply to disputes relating to such extra work. In counter-claim the nature of work/dispute is known to the parties from the beginning, but they assert their alleged infringed rights by perceiving it on a parameter of their own logic. In the case in hand, the appellants filed objections against the counter-claim and those objections were considered on merits. It being so, no illegality was committed and nor on that account any prejudice was caused to the appellants.
8. On 10-2-1993, after hearing the arguments, the appeal was dismissed and these are the reasons for the same.