The appellant feels sieved of the order dated 24-12-1992 of the learned Commissioner (henceforth to be referred to as the `Commissioner') functioning under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, whereby he dismissed its application for impleading the State Life Corporation as party in the execution proceedings and has therefore, approached this Tribunal to get the said order reversed.
2. The relevant background leading to the litigation between the parties is that Musa Muhammad, respondent No. 2, was employed as Security Guard by the establishment of the appellant on 16-9- 1984 but was retired from service on 28-1-1987 on medical ground as he was found suffering from certain heart disease. Respondent No. 2 filed an application before the Commissioner in terms of Order 10-B of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, for payment of Rs.42,000 as insurance compensation. This application was resisted by the appellant but by order dated 31-7-1989 the Commissioner while accepting the application directed the respondents to deposit the disputed amount as insurance compensation for payment to the petitioner. It was also ordered that "this amount, however, may be adjusted against . The premium payable to the State Life Insurance Corporation with whom the Respondent has a valid policy as per certificates issued by the corporation vide Exh.RW-1/1". The matter was agitated by the appellant in writ petition before this Court but with no avail. This time the State Life Insurance Corporation (hereinafter to be referred to as the `Corporation') approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court with a petition for leave to appeal against the orders of the Commissioner and the High Court which was dismissed with these observations. "The petitioner was not a party to the proceedings. The observations made are not determinative of the controversy. The question as to what is the scope and specification of disabilities against which the workman was in fact insured has not been looked in....The exercise has still to be undertaken as between the petitioner and the employer and it would have been premature to determine that question at the stage when the petitioner was not a party to the proceedings. Except for making these observations we do not consider that any ground exists for further examination of the matter at our level. Leave to appeal is, therefore, refused." Thereafter, the respondent No.2 approached the Commissioner for execution of the order against the appellant. In these subsequent proceedings the appellant filed an application for impleading the Corporation as party to the execution proceedings. The said Corporation was issued notice for appearance who submitted reply to the application. However, ultimately the application for joining the Corporation as party was dismissed by the impugned order dated 24-12-1992.
3. Before the learned counsel appearing for the appellant could make his submissions, the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 objected to the maintainability of the appeal. He was of the view that the impugned order refusing to implead a certain party as respondent in execution proceedings is not appealable as it is not covered by any of the clauses of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In order to counter this argument the learned counsel for the appellant relied on 1993 SCM R 322. The authority referred to proceed on entirely different factual and legal aspect and can, therefore, not be applied to the circumstances of this case. The order under appeal has been passed during the execution proceedings for the recovery of compensation which was earlier awarded in the first round of litigation by order dated 31-7-1989 and which order is still operative.
The relief prayed for in the application was for the impleadment of a party to the execution proceedings which obviously is not covered by any of the clauses of section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is, therefore, held that the appeal is not maintainable and is liable to dismissal on this score alone. In any case even on merits the appellant has no case as respondent No.2 has bee found entitled to the insurance compensation and, therefore, he has rightly initiated proceedings for execution in the light of the earlier order of the Commissioner granting him the relief prayed for. So far as respondent No.2. He does not need the presence of the Corporation for the redressal of his grievances and if the appellant has got some grievances against the Corporation then he can settle his score with it in separate proceedings in a competent Court of law.
This appeal is, therefore, dismissed but with no order as to costs.