This is an application under section 38(5) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), for initiating contempt of Court proceedings against the respondents and to punish them for contempt of the authority of the Labour Court, which ordered the respondents to call off the strike. The facts, giving rise to the present application, briefly put are these.
2. The applicants are Private Limited Company carrying on the business of manufacture of Cotton Textile. The respondent No. 1, is a Workers' Union of the Mill, while respondents No's. 2 to 11, are workmen and the Members of the Managing Committee of respondent No. 1 (Union). The workmen of the applicant-Company, including respon--dents Nos. 2 to 11, had gone on strike from 18th February 1970. On 16th March 1930, the Company made an application before the Second West Pakistan Labour Court, Karachi, under section 34 of the Ordinance, for a declaration that the strike was in contravention of the rights guaranteed to the Company under two settlements in operation.
Along with the application under section 34 of the Ordinance, the applicants also made an application under section 45 of the Ordinance for prohibiting the continuance of the strike. The learned Court granted the application by its order dated 1st April 1970, under section 45 of the Ordinance. The respondents in spite of being told that they could not continue the strike after the order of the Court have continued the strike. That in spite of the efforts of the, Company through its Directors and Personnel Officer to impress upon the respondents not to carry on the strike, they have failed to obey the order of the Court. In these circumstances, the Company prays that this Court may punish the respondents for contempt of Court under section 38(5) o-f the Ordinance.
Under section 45 of the Ordinance a Labour Court has power to prohibit the continuance of the strike. Section 46 of the Ordinance states as to when a strike becomes illegal. In this connection, reference may be made to section 46(1)(c) of the Ordinance. It reads as under:----
(1) A strike or lock-out shall be illegal if :
(a) --- --- --- --- --- ---
(b) --- --- --- --- --- ---
(c) it is continued in contravention of an order made under section 32 or section 45 ; or,
(d) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
3. On the face of it, if the respondents have disobeyed the Star propitiatory order of the Labour Court, the strike has become illegal under section 46(1)(c) of the Ordinance. Mr. Dawood v. Khan, respondent No. 2, is present in Court. I enquired, from if he was on strike. He stated that he was on strike. He further stated that all the workers are continuing the strike. On the face of this, admission, the strike would Khan, amount to an illegal strike within the meaning of section 46 APPS of the Ordinance. The question, however, would be as to whether this Court should proceed for contempt of Court under section 38(5) of the Ordinance.. Section 38(5) of the Ordinance reads as under:- (1)------------------------ (2)------------------------
(3) ---------------------..
(4)---------------------..
(5) The Tribunal shall have authority to punish for contempt---s of its authority, or that of any Labour Court subject to its appellate jurisdiction, as if it were a High Court.
(6)---------------------.
4. The power of the Tribunal to punish for contempt of Court for disobedience of the order of the Labour Court cannot be doubted. The question, however, is as to whether this Court should exercise its extraordinary power for punishing the respondents for contempt of Court in the face of a specific remedy provided under the Ordinance. In this connection, reference may be made to section 57 of the Ordinance. It reads as under:- ---Penalty for illegal strike or lock-out.----(1) Any workman who commences, continues or otherwise acts in furtherance of an illegal strike shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both.
(2) Any employer who commences; continues or otherwise acts in furtherance of, an illegal lock- out shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which' may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both, and, in the case of a continuing offence, with a further fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, for every day after the first during which the offence continues.--- 5, Section 57 of the Ordinance reproduced above makes provision for punishment for those workmen who continue the illegal strike. In this connection, reference may be made two section 58 of the Ordinance also. The provision is for punishment of those persons who instigate or incite others to take part in an illegal strike or an illegal lock-out. It appears that the Ordinance has made ample provision for taking proceeding against those persons, who go on illegal strike of those who instigate or incite others to continue an illegal strike.
6. Mr. M. A. Khan, the learned Representative appearing for the applicants, relied on the case of Ali Mahomed, Adamalli v. Emperor (1) in support of his contention that an alternative remedy is no bar for contempt of Court proceedings under section 3r(5) of the Ordinance. Lord Porter, who delivered the -judgment of the Court, while considering the contention of the appellant, that the existence of another remedy precluded the application for contempt of Court, observed as under:-- "No doubt the fact that there is another remedy available is a matter for the Court to consider when exercising its discretion whether to commit or not to commit, but on the other hand the desirability of speed and the necessity of ensuring that the orders of the Court should be obeyed are also matters of importance. The Court may, therefore, consider that after two years of disobedience a heavier fine than that permitted by the Wakf Act should be imposed, or in a proper case that imprisonment should be awarded."
7. Two things clearly follow from the observation of Lord Porter, namely, (AIR 1945 P C 147) that it is in the discretion of the Court, which is to take action for contempt, whether it should proceed under -the extraordinary proceedings of contempt of Court or should leave the applicant to follow the alternative remedy, and (2) that while considering the question of alternative remedy the Court may take into account the fact that contempt of Court proceedings would be more speedy and the necessity of ensuring that the orders of the Court are obeyed. Mr. Khan, the learned Representative for the Company laid great stress on the fact that the proceedings before this Court are much more speedy than it would be before the Labour Court. I do not agree with this contention. The disposal of the application before the Labour Court under section 57 or section 58 of the Ordinance, would, in the circumstances of the present case, take only as much time as this Court would ordinarily take. The contention of the learned Representative that this Court must see that the order of the Labour Court is obeyed by punishing the respondents for contempt of Court is also not of much significance in the face of the provisions made by the Legislature for punishing workmen who disobey the order of the Court by prohibiting them to continue the strike. Sections 57 and 58 of the Ordinance make ample and. adequate provision for punishment for those guilty for contempt of Court. It cannot be said that the punishment provided in these provisions of law is not adequate as compared to the contempt of Court proceed--ings, under the contempt of Court Act. , In this connection, reference may be made to the case of Muhammad Samiullah Khan and another v. The State (PLD 1963 SC 237). Hamoodur Rahman, J., as he then was observed, while considering the power of the Court for contempt of Court proceeding, as under:- "But this power should be used sparingly and only in serious cases' and that Courts should not be either unduly touchy or over-astute in discovering new varieties of contempt, Star for, `its usefulness depends on the wisdom and restraint with Textile which it is exercised.' It appears to be desirable, when considering whether a particular act amounts to a contempt or Worker not, to balance on the one hand the effects it might have on Union the litigation with, on the other, the wider public interest of extending to the litigant public the freedom of conducting Khan, their litigations without being constantly under the threat of a conviction for contempt and only if on the balance there Tribune is a benefit to the public interest in the wider sense, this power should be utilized. Even otherwise, where normally some other adequate method is available for correcting the intransigence, recalcitrance or contumacy of a party or a witness or for compelling obedience to the orders of the Court, then this power should not be invoked."
8. It is clear from the above observation that where a clear and alternative remedy is available, the Court should be reluc--tant to take recourse to its extraordinary power, for contempt proceedings.
On principle, I am against any party trying to take recourse to the extraordinary powers of the Court when specific remedy is provided under the Ordinance.
9. Mr. Khan; the learned Representative for the applicants, very strenuously contended that it' would be in the public, interest that this Court exercises its extraordinary power in favour of the Company.
I do not think that,' in the circumstances of the present case, when the Court itself has got sufficient power to take action in an application made by a party for violating the propitiatory order, that this Court should take action under section 38(5) of the Ordinance. It is said that the remedy of committal for contempt of Court is arbitrary and unlimited and should be most jealously and carefully watched and should only be exercised with the greatest reluctance and the greatest anxiety on the part of Judges.
Keeping this principle in view and in the circumstances of the present case, I would hold that the application for contempt of Court proceedings is not maintainable as an alter--native, clear, specific and equally adequate remedy is available to the Company. The application for these reasons is dismissed.