This order will dispose of Constitutional Petitions Nos. 8885 to 8911 of 1992 and 9149 to 9151 of 1992 against the impugned order dated 21-6-1992 where the question of law and fact is identical.
2. Briefly the facts of the case are that respondents were employed as Sanitary Workers and were engaged in the work of cleaning drains sewerage and premises used for manufacturing process or 'in any other kind of work maintained by the Committee which undertakes pumping of water and supply of water to the city as against payment. Respondents filed their claims for recovery of deducted wages for a period from 1981 to 1985. Issues were framed by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation Authority under Payment of Wages Act and finally a sum of Rs.4,000 was granted by way of original claim and another sum of Rs.4,000 as one time compensation.
Respondents' claim was much higher but the same was reduced to Rs.4,000 and not only this, instead of awarding 10 times compensation, only one time compensation was granted as is evident from order dated 28-3-1990 of the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation Authority.
3. Petitioner-Committee filed an appeal against order dated 28-3-1990 and by order dated 13-2- 1992, Punjab Labour Court reduced the amount of compensation to Rs.1,866.48 to each respondent and in this way the claim originally granted was further reduced. The Labour Court held that "I direct to recover the amount after deduction of Rs.1,866.48 in each case from the respondent within two months". In this way the appeal was partly accepted.
4. Respondents filed revision petition and by order dated 21-6-1992 Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal maintained the order of Punjab Labour Court entitling the respondents for a sum of Rs.1,866.48 but the same was doubled by adding one time compensation and the total amount was thus awarded as Rs.3,722.96 in each case.
5. Petitioner-Committee has filed this Constitutional petition against the impugned order dated 21- 6-1992 of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal on the ground that he was not entitled to double the amount by adding one time compensation. It was also vehemently argued by the learned counsel for petitioner that impugned order suffers from lack of jurisdiction as the powers of revision were not available.
6. Before granting compensation to respondents, Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation Authority extensively dealt with the matter after framing issues and recording evidence and then awarded a total sum of Rs.8,000 in each case. Legal submission of petitioner-Committee, that in law, respondents were not entitled to compensation, was rejected and this finding was also maintained by the Punjab Labour Court.
7. In the operative part of order, the Commissioner held that "I am of the opinion that the petitioner is entitled to his dues. I accordingly accept the claim amounting to Rs.4,000. The petitioner had claimed 10 times compensation, but in my opinion one time compensation is awarded in the interest of justice in this case, Rs.4,000 as original claim and additionally Rs.4,000 as one time compensation". The amount of compensation awarded originally was disbursed in favour of respondents but as directed by the Labour Court, the excess amount was to be refunded from respondents after deducting a sum of Rs.1,876.48. While modifying the order dated 28-3-1990, Appellate Court further held that "after recording evidence, learned Authority observed that they all maintain the drainage to accurate the supply of water, by cleaning and are covered' within the definition of Factory employees as enumerated in clause (h) of section 2 of Factory Act. There was no dispute with regard to number of workers for this purpose".
8. From the aforementioned facts, it is amply demonstrated that the objection of petitioner disentitling the respondents to receive compensation was dealt with and finally rejected. As to the objection of learned counsel that Appellate Tribunal did not possess revisional jurisdiction, one has to refer to section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act where if an order is passed by the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation Authority under Payment of Wages Act, appeal would be maintainable before the Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 within whose jurisdiction the cause of action to which the appeal relates arose. This amendment in section 17 was made in the first instance under Ordinance XII of 1974 and then by Act XI of 1975.
9. Relying upon this provision, learned counsel for petitioner submits that no revision petition lay against the order of Labour Court before Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. I have considered this aspect of the case and am in complete disagreement with this view. Admittedly, the appeal would lie before the Labour Court under I.R.O., 1969 and consequently it would also embrace the jurisdiction of Appellate Tribunal to hear the revision petitions against order of Labour Court which power is admittedly available under I.R.O., 1969. The mere assertion of learned counsel for petitioner, that no such power was available and neither the same could be exercised, would not be tenable situation. Even if the case has to be considered from another angle, Appellate Tribunal has done nothing but maintained the order of Punjab Labour Court and only added one time compensation. The claim was filed by each respondent to the extent of Rs.6,300 and claimed 10 times compensation but this was reduced, in the first instance, to Rs.4,000 and only one time compensation was added resulting in the total claim of Rs.8,000. The original claim was reduced by the Punjab Labour Court to 1,866.48 and also rejected one time compensation. Revisional Court maintained the order of Labour Court but only added one time compensation resulting in the total claim of Rs.3,772.96.
10. When questioned that petitioner did not raise the question of jurisdiction before Revisional Court, learned counsel relied upon PLD 1989 SC 360 "Shagufta Begum v. The Income-tax Officer" where it was held that "it is well-known that a plea regarding the assumption of jurisdiction by a Tribunal or a Court is available to a litigant even when appearing before the highest Court in the country. It is, therefore, hoped and expected that when an objection, in this behalf is raised before the learned Officer concerned, he Should dispassionately examine it on its own merits and render a decision which he believes bona fide, to be correct".
11. There is no cavil with proposition that petitioner could have raised the question of jurisdiction before the Appellate Court and that he was bound to decide the same and failing that the same objection could be raised before highest Court. But in this case, petitioner did not raise any such objection and therefore, law laid down in the precedent case would be made inapplicable in the case of petitioner. However, even if it be held that the Tribunal whose order is assailed in this Constitutional petition did not possess revisional jurisdiction, I am not inclined to exercise my discretionary jurisdiction in this particular case because impugned order is fair, just and equitable and does not prejudice the case of petitioner. The Labour Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction only granted a sum of Rs.1,866.48 in case of each respondent which has been maintained by the Appellate Tribunal and he only added one time compensation which was not at all considered by the Appellate Court.
12. It has been held in 1988 SCM R 516 "Zaheer Ahmad and another v. Bashir Ahmad and others" that the Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be extended in aid of injustice. Similar was the view taken in PLD 1985 SC 265 "Umar Din v. Syed Muhammad Abdul Aziz Sharqi" where it was held that order of settlement authority being eminently just, proper and in consonance with principle, could not be interfered. It has been held in PLD 1991 SC 691 "Muhammad Baran and others v. Member (Settlement and Rehabilitation), Board of Revenue, Punjab" that before a person can be permitted to 'invoke discretionary Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199, it must be shown that the order sought to be set aside had occasioned some injustice to the parties. If such order does not work any injustice to any party, rather it causes a manifest illegality, then the extraordinary jurisdiction ought not to be allowed to be invoked". In 1991 SCM R 654 Pakistan Engineering Council and 2 others v. Engineer IA. Osmani and 3 others" it is laid down that "in the matter of entertainment of petitions and grant of relief in equitable and discretionary jurisdiction, it was necessary not to be guided wholly by the technicalities of the law but. Also by the substance of the controversy when the proceedings did not suffer from mala fides of fact". In PLD 1980 Peshawar 183 (DB) "Hazrat Ghani and others v. Magistrate First Class, Timargarah" it was held that "High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of Constitution, held, cannot pass order resulting in restoration of an order ipso facto illegal and without lawful authority or jurisdiction". In this particular case, Appellate Court was unmindful of the fact that under the law, respondents were entitled to 10 times compensation but even one time compensation was not at all considered. To this extent, order of Appellate Court was, therefore, illegal and without jurisdiction and if impugned order is set aside, illegality committed by the Labour Court in exercise its original jurisdiction cannot be perpetuated.
In 1986 CLC 1680 Muhammad Nawaz and 7 others v. Muhammad Ibrahim and 5 others this Court held that "Discretionary and equitable jurisdiction must be exercised to aid and to subserve cause of justice but surely not to defeat it. Where substantial justice had been done, High Court would decline interference despite some irregularity in proceedings".
13. In view of the settled law laid down, plea of petitioner for interference in this case is not legally sustainable and I am not inclined, as already stated, to interfere in the impugned order in exercise of my extraordinary jurisdiction.
For the aforementioned reasons, all the petitions are dismissed in limine. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.