On 5-3-1989, Mumtaz Ahmad Shah, the petitioner herein; was appointed as Executive Editor of Daily `Mashriq', Lahore by the Chairman, National Press Trust. On the next day i.e. 6-3-1989, he was also delegated the powers of the Chief Executive of the aforesaid Daily by the National Press Trust.
2. According to the petitioner, he, on an application made by him, was granted two months leave w.e.f. 4-8-1990. However, on 9-8-1990, he learnt that he has been suspended from service by Mr. Mashooq Ali Khan Hasrat, respondent No. 2 herein, in his capacity purportedly as Acting Chairman of the National Press Trust. The petitioner challenged the order of his suspension by filing this Constitutional petition during the course of which it was stated on behalf of the respondents on 23- 11-1992 that the services of the petitioner have since been terminated. As this development had taken place during the pendency of the petition, the petitioner was allowed to amend the same. In the amended petition, he has challenged the order of his suspension dated 9-8-1990 and the order of his dismissal from service dated 13-9-1990.
3. Dr. A. Basit, learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions, in support of this petition:-- (i)That respondent No. 2 had no jurisdiction to take any action against the petitioner as the said respondent was neither a Chairman nor even an Acting Chairman of the National Press Trust and, in any case, his appointment as Acting Chairman was without any lawful authority.
(ii)That the impugned orders are mala fide and have been passed as a measure of political victimisation against the petitioner.
(iii)That the order of dismissal from service and the record produced in support thereof has been forged, fabricated and predated.
4. The, learned counsel for the respondents apart from refuting the arguments f the petitioner's learned counsel have also raised a preliminary objection as , to the maintainability of this petition on the ground that the services of the petitioner were governed by the principle of Master and Servant and as such no Constitutional petition can be maintained.
On merits, it has been argued that respondent No. 2, who was appointed by the competent authority to act as Chairman of the National Press Trust was fully competent to suspend the petitioner and to dismiss him from service. It has been maintained that the dismissal of the petitioner was amply justified in view of the misconduct of the petitioner which stood established in the inquiry conducted against him.
5. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner as to the competence of respondent No. 2 to pass the impugned order of suspension and the dismissal from service of the petitioner is well-founded. It is a common ground between the parties that such action could only be taken by the Chairman of the National Press Trust. The question which, therefore, arises is as to whether respondent No. 2 was a duly appointed Chairman of the Trust.
6. After perusing the available record and hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am clearly of the view that the answer to this question has to be in the negative. It is not even the case of the respondents that the President of Pakistan had ever appointed respondent No. 2 to be the Chairman of the National Press Trust. On the other hand, it is apparent on the record that after the removal of Mr. Wajid Shamas-ul-Hassan from the post of the Chairman, National Press Trust, the Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, on 7-8-1990, asked Mr. M.A.K. Hasrat, respondent No. 2, who at the relevant time, was General Manager of the National Press Trust to look after its affairs till further orders. Under section 4 of the National Press Trust (Appointment of Chairman) Act, 1972, the power to appoint Chairman of National Press Trust vests in the President of Pakistan.
While passing the orders of suspension and later on dismissal of the petitioner, Mr. MAX Hasrat described himself as Acting Chairman of the National Press Trust. However, it is obvious from the letter dated 7-8-1990 that he was never appointed as Acting Chairman but was, on the other hand, allowed to look after the affairs of the National Press Trust which cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed as order of his appointment as Acting Chairman. Furthermore, on a perusal of the National Press Trust (Appointment of Chairman) Ordinance, 1972, it does not provide for appointment of an Acting Chairman of the National Press Trust but only of a permanent incumbent to be known as "Chairman" and that power too vests in the President of Pakistan and not in anyone else. That being so, it is obvious that the two impugned orders were passed by a person having no lawful authority to do so and deserve to be quashed.
7. In view of the findings on this question, the other arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner need not be attended to in detail. However, from the facts and circumstances prevailing on the record, prima facie, the contention that the impugned orders were mala fide and were taken primarily on account of political affiliation of the petitioner cannot be said to be unfounded.
Neither in the written statement nor in the parawise comments the details of the allegations against the petitioner on the basis of which the removal of the petitioner was ordered are not forthcoming. However, the respondents under an order passed by this Court have placed on record a relating to the inquiry ordered against the petitioner which was not only ex parte but there are serious infirmities in the proceedings taken by the respondents which appear to be totally one- sided. On the state of the record, neither the report nor the proceedings are confidence inspiring. It is interesting to notice that pages 1, 5 and 11 of Inquiry Report are in the hand of one person and the other pages like 3, 7, 9, 13 and 15 appear to have been written by someone else. There is also nothing on the record to show the service of any of the notices issued by the Inquiry Officer upon the petitioner.
8. So far as the maintainability of this petition is concerned, it is to be seen that the employment of the petitioner was protected and governed inter alia by the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973. Section 4 of the Act provides that the services of Newspaper employee cannot be terminated by Newspaper Establishment without good cause having been shown through a notice in writing for such termination. This Court while considering the effect of the aforesaid provision of law held that newspaper employee is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 in case of termination of service. (See Karam Hussain v. Daily Mashriq and 2 others 1992 PLC 136).
In view of what has been stated above, this petition is allowed and the impugned orders are declared to be without any lawful authority and of no legal effect. There shall be no order as to costs.