' The Hon'able High Court while accepting the Writ Petition No,887 of 1991/BWP vide its order dated 13-4-1993, was pleased to set aside the order dated 19-6-1991 of learned Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue passed in Review Petition No,207 of 1986. The case was remitted to the Board of Revenue for fresh decision.
2. Very briefly stated the facts are that the present petitioner Muhammad Siddique was removed from the office of Lambardar of Chak No,81/1-L, Tehsil Haroonabad, District Bahawalnagar on his conviction in a murder case. Applications were invited to fill the resultant vacancy and the Collector appointed Haji Ilam Din as Lambardar on 14-2-1983. Muhammad Iqbal and Usman Ghani challenged this appointment before the Commissioner who vide his order dated 24-8-1983 appointed Muhammad Iqbal as Lambardar of the village. Usman Ghani and Haji Ilam Din went in appeal before Board of Revenue. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, vide his order dated 12-2- 1985 accepted Usman Ghani's appeal. Muhammad Iqbal went in writ petition against the above said order which was later disposed of as infructuous on account of Muhammad Iqbal's death.
3. Petitioner Muhammad Siddique sought review of the order dated 12-2-1985 of the learned Member (Revenue) through Review Petition No,207 of 1986 which was accepted by the then Member (Revenue) on 19-6-1991. The orders dated 12-2-1985 as well as the orders of the Courts below were set aside and the case was remanded to District Collector for fresh decision. Writ petition against the abovereferred order was accepted by the Hon'able High Court and the case remitted with the observations that the review petition filed by Muhammad Siddique be decided afresh after hearing the parties.
4. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that:---
(a) The very order of his removal from the office of Lambardar is ab initio void as the offence allegedly committed by him did not involve any moral turpitude more so as only role of "Lalkara" was attributed to him.
(b) No show-cause notice was served on him before his removal from the office of Lambardar. He was thus condemned unheard.
(c) The petitioner was set at liberty on 14-5-1986. Immediately thereafter he applied for the copy of the impugned order and filed the review petition.
(d) Arains are the majority community in the village. Respondents belongs to minority community.
He could not have therefore been validly appointed as Lambardar.
(e) There are errors apparent on the face of record calling for review of the impugned order.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner through oral and written arguments elaborated the points made in the memo. Of review petition by reemphasizing that the order dated 10-2-1982 of the A.C./Collector removing the petitioner from the Lambardari was ab initio void as he had not been issued any show-cause notice which was mandatory as per rule 18, sub-rule (3) which clearly prescribes that "a headman shall not be dismissed unless an opportunity has been afforded to him of showing cause against the proposed action". It was further contended that the petitioner was ultimately "acquitted in the murder case" and released from Bahawalpur Jail on 14-5-1986. It is claimed that he came to know of his removal and consequent appointment of the respondent as Lambardar only after he was released from Jail. He applied for the certified copy of the orders on 16-6-1986 which was made available to him on 3-7-1986. The review petition was filed on 6-7-1986.
Thus, no time was lost by the petitioner. Placing reliance on PLD 1975 Lah. 707, it was argued that the order of the removal having been passed without notice was nullity in the eyes of law and the question of limitation did not arise. Referring to 1987 SCM R 468 and PLD 1974 Rev. 75, it was contended that the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner did not involve moral turpitude.
6. The learned counsel for the respondent raised the following preliminary objections:---
(a) Muhammad Siddique was neither a party in R.O.A. No,2 of 1984 in which the impugned order was passed nor was he a party before the Commissioner or Collector. He had therefore no locus standi to seek the review of the impugned order.
(b) Muhammad Siddique was convicted under section 302/364/148/149, P.P.C. By Additional Sessions Judge, Bahawalnagar vide his order dated 27-6-1981 to 10 years' RI. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment by Special Military Court vide its order dated 25-11-1981 under section 302/364/148/149, P.P.C. And his sons Muhammad Ashraf and Faqir Muhammad were sentenced to death whereas his other sons Muhammad Asghar, Muhammad Aslam and Faiz were sentenced to life imprisonment. Faqir Muhammad died in the Jail while Muhammad Ashraf 'met the gallows. The sentence of the petitioner and his other sons was reduced to 10 years by the M.L.A.
Subsequently they were ordered to be released on parole vide order dated 8-3-1986. Muhammad Siddique was never acquitted as contended by him.
(c) The order of his removal dated 10-2-1982 was not challenged by him either in appeal, revision or review. It has therefore attained finality.
(d) The review petition is hopelessly time-barred as it had to be filed within 90 days as provided under section 8 of the Board of Revenue Act.
(e) The order dated 12-2-1985 was challenged in Writ Petition No,88/85/BWP by Muhammad Iqbal.
The writ petition was filed as infructuous on 20-5-1986 in view of Muhammad IqbaPs death. As the order dated 12-2-1985 merged in order of High Court dated 20-5-1986, the review does not lie against it.
7. On merits it has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that:---
(a) In addition to the conviction earned by petitioner Muhammad Siddique, another case under sections 452, 147 and 148, P.P.C. Was registered against him and his sons vide F.I.R. No,74/80 at Police Station Haroonabad.
(b) Placing reliance on PLD 1986 Rev. 99 (Sindh) it was argued that section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable in the review petition under West Pakistan Land Revenue Act and that the delay cannot be condoned.
(c) Placing reliance on PLD 1950 Punjab (Rev.) 1219 it was contended that the offence of murder affects even the eligibility of the heirs of the dismissed Lambardar. In the above-cited case, even the heir of Lambardar who was convicted of the offence of murder was passed over on that count.
(d) 1987 SCM R 468 and PLD 1974 Rev. 75 referred to by the learned counsel for petitioner are not relevant to the facts of the case as the petitioner and his sons were convicted in case of double murder committed in most gruesome manner.
8. The crucial issues to be determined are:---
(a) Whether the petitioner had locus stand for seeking the review of the order dated 12-2-1985 of the learned Member, Board of Revenue?
(b) Whether the review petition was hopelessly time-barred?
(c) Whether there exist sufficient grounds within the meaning of section 8 of the Board of Revenue Act warranting the review of the impugned order?
9. The petitioner was surely an aggrieved person as far as his removal from the office of Lambardar was concerned. He was dismissed by Assistant Commissioner/Collector on 10-2-1982. Admittedly he never challenged this order. The learned counsel for petitioner argued that the Collector's order dated 10-2-1982 was ab initio void as petitioner was never heard and that the offence did not involve moral turpitude. The nature of the offence can be assessed from F.I.R. 82/80 of Police Station Haroonabad placed on record by the respondent. The relevant extract reads as under: {{URDU TEXT}}
10. death and another half a dozen were caused injuries and that the petitioner was sentenced to at least ten years term and two of his sons to death sentence and other to life imprisonment leaves any doubt about the gravity of the offence. The locale of the murder and the way it was executed further add to the gruesome dimensions of the criminal conduct of the petitioner and his associates. No proof of petitioner's acquittal has been placed on record. The fact that one of the petitioner's son met the gallows lends credence to respondent's version about the petitioner not having earned acquittal. The pleas about absence of moral turpitude and petitioner's acguittal are thus not well-founded and have to be brushed aside. Rule 18(1)(a) of West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules provides that: "A headman shall be dismissed when he has been, on conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude. Sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than six months."
11. In view of the above-stated legal position and the circumstances of the case, petitioner could not have avoided the fate of dismissal. He knew this and that is why he did not challenge Collector's order dated 10-2-1982. As this order has not been impugned even through the present proceedings and as petitioner's conviction in a murder case for at least ten years is proved on record, the issue of his removal from the office of Lambardar cannot be reopened---moreso--as it is extraneous to the contents of Board of Revenue's Order dated 12-2-1985 of which the review has been sought. Once he stood removed, he bad hardly any interest in the selection process which culminated in appointment of respondent as Lambardar.
12. As to the limitation, section 8, subsection (2) of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957 provides that "every application for a review of a decree or order under subsection (1) shall be made within ninety days from the date of that decree or order". The present review petition was barred by 396 days. The plea taken by the petitioner is that he was in Jail from where he was set at liberty on 14-5-1986 whereafter he did not lose any time in filing the review petition. I find it difficult to accept this plea. The convicts remain in continuous contact with their friends and relatives who regularly come to see them almost every fortnight. I find it difficult to believe that the petitioner had not come to know about his removal from the office of Lambardar and consequent developments.
The office of the Lambardari was keenly contested by different aspirants. The litigation had gone up to the Hon'able High Court. It is unthinkable that the petitioner and his sons had remained ignorant of the happenings in the village. The plea of his incarceration wears very thin. The limitation would therefore have to run with effect from the date of the impugned order and not from the date the petitioner was set at liberty. This inordinate delay has nowhere been satisfactorily explained.
13. As held by my learned brother Mr.Akhtar Saeed in PLD 1990 Revenue 12, the case cannot be reopened through exercise of review jurisdiction. During review proceedings the Court cannot assume the powers available only to the Court of appeal. The reviewing Court not being a higher Court cannot sit in judgment over a decision of a Court of equal jurisdiction. Section 8 of the Board of Revenue Act clearly lays down that review lies only in case of discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the petitioner's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or the order was made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason. As laid down in 1979 CLC 609 'any other sufficient reasons' is to be related to the first two facts i,e, discovery of new and important matter or some mistake or error on the face of record. The petitioner has not been able to point out any new or important matter or evidence which was not in his knowledge at the time of the passing of the impugned order nor has any mistake or error on the face of record been pointed out which may warrant the review of the impugned order .
14. In view of what has been discussed above, the petitioner has miserably failed to justify the delay in making the application for review within 90 days of the date of the impugned order and has also not been able to point out any grounds which may warrant the review of the impugned order. The review petition thus fails.
15. The order in this case was reserved which may now be communicated to the parties through their counsel.
Review dismissed.