1. CHAUDHRY MUHAMMAD TAJ, J.---This appeal by leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 18-9-1993.
2. Facts briefly stated are that respondent-plaintiff (Muhammad Taj) filed a pre-emption suit for possession of the suit land against the appellant and respondents Nos. 2 and 3, vendees, in the Court of Sub-Judge Bhimber. On February 14, 1988 the evidence of the plaintiff/pre-emtpor was closed. The defendants-vendees were directed to lead their evidence and the case was adjourned to 16-4-1988. As noone appeared on that date the suit was dismissed for want of prosecution.
3. An application for restoration of suit was moved on June 4, 1988. It was stated by the plaintiff- applicant that on 16-4-1988, the case was called by the Clerk of the Court. The counsel for the parties were not present and the defendant was also absent. The case was further adjourned to 4- 6-1988, for evidence of the defendant. On 4-6-1988, when the plaintiff appeared before the Court, he learnt that the suit was dismissed for want of prosecution on 16-4-1988 and it was not adjourned to 4-6-1988. Thus the application for restoration of the suit was moved on the same day.
4. The trial Court accepted the plea of the plaintiff-applicant and restored the suit on its file. The restoration order was challenged in appeal before the Additional District Judge, Bhimber which was dismissed on 28-12-1992. The second appeal filed before the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir also met the same fate. Hence this appeal.
5. Mr. Muhammad Ayub Sabir, the learned' counsel for the appellant, contended that the suit could not be restored under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the provision is not applicable, where there is a specific provision available in the Code. He further maintained that the application was moved under Order XLVII, rule 1 but the same is disposed of in exercise of inherent powers. On the other hand Ch. Aurangzeb Khan, the learned counsel for the respondent, vehemently opposed the contention and maintained that the suit was rightly restored under the circumstances.
6. The provisions relating to the consequence of non-appearance are provided in Order IX, Rules 3 and 8 of the Order provide for the dismissal of the suit for non-appearance of plaintiff and rules 4 and 9 of the Order are applicable for restoration of the suit. The difference between rules 3 and 8 of the above Order is that rule 3 applies where both the parties, i.e., the plaintiff and defendant are absent, whereas rule 8 is applicable where the defendant is present at the time the suit is called for hearing.
7. In this case the plaintiff-applicant claims that he was present. in the Court when the case was called for hearing by the Clerk of the Court and it was further adjourned to 4-6-1988. On 4-6-1988, he learnt that the case was not adjourned but was dismissed for non-prosecution on 16-4-1988.
8. All the Courts below on the basis of evidence produced by the parties reached at the conclusion that the plaintiff-applicant was not absent on the day the suit was dismissed. Thus the trial Court ordered the restoration of the suit and the order was maintained by the District Judge and the High Court.
9. Now we may take up the objections taken by the appellant's counsel. It may be stated that section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not confer any new power upon a Court but only saves its inherent powers already vested. The inherent powers of the Civil Courts to do right and undo the wrong are preserved under this section. Where a law confers a jurisdiction it impliedly grants powers of doing all such acts or employing such means as are necessary in its execution. The Court has inherent power to take all steps to execute its own mandates and orders. Under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure the powers are to be exercised to secure the ends of justice or for the purpose of preventing the abuse of the process of the Court and it is intended to prevent the Court from being rendered powerless on account of having omission in the Code and to make necessary orders. In the instant case the allegation of abusing the process is levelled against the'
10. AHLAKAR' of the Court and the same is supported by the evidence on record. In the circumstances the section is correctly invoked as for such situation there is no other specific provision in the Code.
11. The view finds support from Syed Nazir Hussain Shah v. Allah Ditta (1973 SCM R 103) and The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore v. Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan and others (PLD 1975 SC 331).
12. It may also be clarified that the contents of the application moved by the plaintiff-applicant for the restoration of the suit carry all those facts which attract the inherent powers and mere mentioning of Order XLVII, rule 1 in the heading of the application will not make any difference so far as the merits of the application are concerned. Even otherwise quoting a wrong provision does not deprive a party to seek a decision on the basis of law.
13. Taking into consideration the law discussed above we advert to the merits of the case. On appreciation of evidence on record the Sub-Judge was pursuaded to restore the suit. This order was challenged before the District Judge in appeal though the appeal was not competent.
14. However, it failed and the second appeal filed before the High Court later on treated as revision was also dismissed. It may be mentioned that the High Court critically examined the evidence and discussed the law applicable in the case and maintained the restoration order. We have also looked into the evidence brought on the record and have also gone through the relevant law. We have not been able to find any illegality warranting interference by this Court particularly when the Courts below appreciated the evidence in accordance with the settled principle of law established by this Court. .
15. In view of the above discussion there is no merit in the appeal which is hereby dismissed with costs.