' Ahmed, Fazal Karim, Munir Ahmed, Shaheen Akhtar, Pir Muhammad, Hasan Muhammad and Raj Muhammad, are the owners in possession of land comprising Survey.No, 2941, measuring 18 Kanals 12 Marlas, situate in village Chhani Raikie, Tehsil Bhimber. Three Kanals and few Marlas out of this land was acquired previously for the construction of local school. Land measuring 2 Kanals 10 Marlas was further acquired for the extension of the School premises and playground. An award was made by the Collector, Land Acquisition, on September 8, 1992, @ Rs,7,000 per Canal. The acquisition proceedings, including the award, were assailed by invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court, under section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974.
2. It was argued that the proceedings were violative of mandatory provisions of sections 4 and 6, Land Acquisition Act. The objections filed by the petitioner in the light of the provisions of section 5- A, were not disposed of nor a report was submitted to the Government for its disposal. Reference was made to the different correspondence between the Education Department, Collector, Selection Committee, Commissioner, Revenue, as appended with the petition in the shape of Annexures P/1 to P/20. Respondents Nos. 1 to 11 contested the claim of the petitioner and supported the award of the Collector, respondent No, 1.
3. Mr. M.S. Tariq, the learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his respective arguments, referred to PLD 1975 Pesh. 103; PLD 1972 Lahore 458; PLD 1971 SC 61 and 124; AIR 1959 Kerala 343 and AIR 1952 All.
752. Raja Muhammad Siddique Khan, the learned Counsel for the opposite side emphasised that the provisions of sections 4, 5-A, 6 and 9, Land Acquisition Act, were followed in letter and spirit. The acquisition proceedings were lawful. An opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner. It was further argued that the petitioner has not come with clean hands. He maliciously suppressed the leading facts. The award in dispute was made on September 8, 1992 and an application for copy of the award was moved by the petitioner on September 16, 1992. He had the knowledge of the award but in his writ petition instituted in this Court on September 15, this aspect of the case was suppressed. The application was moved for issuance of order of status quo. Thus status quo was ordered on October 8 when the petition was admitted for regular hearing. Prior to that, a civil suit was instituted in respect of the impugned proceedings, in the Court of Sub-Judge, Bhimber on August 25, 1992. The suit was got dismissed on October 19, 1992, after the admission of the petition.
This question of fact was also suppressed in the petition.
4. The preliminary objection raised by Raja Muhammad Siddique Khan relating to conduct of the petitioner, was not squarely denied by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. However, it was explained that the civil suit was not deemed appropriate remedy, as such, it was got dismissed. No explanation was furnished as to why the question of institution of civil suit was suppressed in the petition. Likewise, no explanation was furnished for suppression of the fact of the award of the Collector, made on September 8, 1992. The award, prima facie, reflects that it was made after hearing the parties. The objection, therefore, finds ample support from the record to believe that the petitioner deliberately suppressed the material facts in the present case.
5. The first objection pertained to allegation of non-compliance with the provisions of section 4, Land Acquisition Act. It was argued that the proceedings for acquisition preceded the publication of the notification under section 4, L.A.A. Reference was made to letter of the Deputy Commissioner and letter of Director, Education, Planning Division. Section 4 of the Act provided that whenever it appeared to the Government that land in any locality was needed or was likely to be needed for public purpose, notification to that effect shall be published in the official Gazette and Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given, at conspicuous place in the said locality. In compliance with these provisions, under subsection (2), it was provided that thereupon, it shall be lawful for an officer authorised by the Government to enter upon and survey and take levels of the land and to do all other necessary acts in that behalf. In the present case, a letter was addressed to the Collector, Land Acquisition, in the light of the recommendation of the Selection Committee to initiate acquisition proceedings. The letters referred to in the petition by themselves cannot be deemed as part of acquisition proceedings. The fact of the matter is that the acquisition proceedings were initiated by the Collector and not by any other authority.
Therefore, the fact that the Education Department for which the land was sought to be acquired, moved the respective authorities for acquisition of land for extension of the School, was an exterior acquisition act. This was inevitable as unless an authority, Government or a Company moved the concerned authorities by informing them of their need for land for public purposes, no action could be initiated. Therefore, it was wrong to suggest that the correspondence which preceded the publication of notification under section 4, Land Acquisition Act, was part of the acquisition proceedings, as such it vitiated the subsequent proceedings taken by the Collector. The principle of law enunciated in Umar Farooq's case PLD 1975 Pesh. 103 is correct, but it is not applicable to the proposition under consideration, on account of different facts. In that case, notification under section 4, Land Acquisition Act, was published on completion of the acquisition proceedings by the Collector. This is not the position in present case.
6. The object of notification under section 4, Land Acquisition Act, is to reflect the intention of the Government to acquire the property for a public purpose, As a matter of fact, the notification under section 4, is a public pronouncement by the appropriate Government, in respect of the land needed for a public purpose. Secondly, the notification empowers the Departmental officers, local authority or Company, as the case may be, to undertake survey and other incidental acts by entering the land. The other condition precedent therein is that the notification has to be published and its copies affixed at conspicuous place on the land to be acquired or at a conspicuous place in the village where the land was situate. The Government may also adopt, in that respect, some other prescribed manners, in order to bring the matter to the notice of the public. Therefore, personal or individual service of notification under section 4, Land Acquisition Act, is least insisted.
In present case, the aforesaid conditions prescribed under section 4, Land Acquisition Act, have been found fairly complied with. The fact that the petitioner was not personally served, is not a legal defect in the publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act and its display by affixing a copy on the conspicuous place on the land under acquisition. It appears from the record that public was informed of the intention of the Government, in accordance with law. The objection is, therefore, repelled.
7. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was not provided an opportunity of hearing, in the light of provisions of section 5-A of the Act. Moreover, the decision of the Collector as a result of inquiry, was not submitted to the Government for its decision, as required under subsection (2) of section 5-A, Land Acquisition Act.
8. Section 5-A, Land Acquisition Act postulates that on publication of notification under section 4(1), any interested person may file objections within 30 days after the issue of the notification, against the acquisition proceedings. The objections were to be made in writing, to the Collector. On filing of such objection, it was enjoined upon the Collector to provide an opportunity of hearing, either in person or by pleader, to the objector and after hearing such objections, and making further inquiry, if any, his decision was to be submitted to the Government, along with the record of the proceedings and report containing the recommendation on the objections. The Government was next to give its decision on the objections referred to above. The decision of the Government was final.
9. The object of the provisions of section 5-A was that no final acquisition should be made by the Collector without giving owner of the land under acquisition, an opportunity to put forward his objections to the proposed acquisition. The Government was to take a decision in the light of such objections. These provisions safeguarded the interest of the owner of the land under acquisition and afforded an opportunity to the Government to take a final decision in the light of the true position of the property proposed to be acquired. Thus, a valid right was conferred on the owner of the property under acquisition to object, if so desired, to the acquisition of land.
10. The inquiry conceived by section 5-A, Land Acquisition Act, was summary in nature. No formal procedure was prescribed. However, the Collector was under duty to hear the objectors and to prepare a report in the light of the objections and submit the same to the Government for its final decision. Such report provided an opportunity to the Government to decide whether particular land was needed for a public purpose or for Company, or not. It also provided a safeguard against an arbitrary and malicious action on the part of the authorities. The inquiry and decision of the Government was an administrative act and not quasi-judicial. Be that as it may, the principle of B natural justice was obviously applicable to the inquiry and decision of the Government. The principle of law enunciated in Ram Charan Lars case AIR 1952 All. 752 and Lonappan's case AIR 1959 Kerala 343, is squarely applicable to the proposition under consideration.
11. The facts of the present case reflect that on publication of notification under Section 4, objections were submitted to the Collector, but unfortunately, no copy of such objections was appended with the petition. The copy of objection, Annexure P/3 dated February 3, 1992, placed on record, could not be construed as objections post-notification under section 4. The application preceded the notification, as such, it could not be deemed as objections in compliance with the provisions of section 5-A. Nevertheless, the award of the Collector appended with the written statement as 'RA', at page 2, para 2, reflects that after publication of notification under section 4, Land Acquisition Act on March 9, 1992 and notification under section 5-A on April 11, 1992, the objected is were filed by the petitioner and co-owners in the land, on June 3, August 9, and August 20, 1.992 , respectively. All the aforesaid objections were found to have been filed beyond the stipulated period of 30 days, on publication of notification under section 4, Land Acquisition Act.
Therefore, the objections beyond the statutory period were not entertainable in the eye of law.
12. Section 5-A does not provide any scheme to issue the notification under it. Despite that, it appears that the Collector issued a notification under the section on April 11, 1992. This was, of course, frivolous action on the part of the Collector. Be that as it may, the fact remains that no objections having been filed within 30 days after the issue of notification under section 4(1), were available on record. That leads to the conclusion that no violation of provisions of section 5-A, was shown to have been made in the present case.
13. The declaration under section 6, Land Acquisition Act, was one of necessary formalities, in acquisition proceedings. It postulated that on the satisfaction after considering the report, if any, made under section 5-A(2) that any particular land was needed for public purposes, the declaration was to be made to that effect under the signature of the Secretary or some officer duly authorised in that behalf.
14. The proviso, however, laid down that the declaration under this Section, shall not be made unless compensation to be awarded for the property was paid, wholly or partly. The declaration was to be published in the official Gazette, containing the district or territorial division where the land was situate, the purpose for which it was needed, and its approximate area etc. Such declaration was conclusive evidence that land was needed for public purpose or for a company, as the case may be. The rest of the proceedings were to follow the aforesaid declaration under section 6, Land Acquisition Act. In present case, the declaration under section 6 was made in a proper manner on August 5, 1992.
15. It was argued that the amount of compensation to be paid to the owner of the land was not deposited, wholly or partly, with the Collector, at the time of declaration under section 6. The objection has been made in abstract manner as no substantive or tangible evidence in its support has been placed on record. Therefore, at this stage, it is least permissible to enter into inquiry on the question of fact which has not been substantiated by the petitioner in support of his respective objections.
16. Likewise, the objections relating to non-compliance with the provisions of sections 9 and 10, Land Acquisition Act, are repelled. No cogent reason was advanced in support of the objections.
The argument was primarily addressed on the basis of alleged violation of provisions of sections 4 and 6, Land Acquisition Act. We have already examined the scope of provisions of sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the Act and have reached the conclusion that the formalities described under these provisions were complied with by the Collector, as such the objections merit no consideration. The authorities cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in support of his objections raised in the petition relate to writ jurisdiction of the Court, to examine the propriety of the award and acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act: This Court is well empowered in exercise of its jurisdiction to examine the acquisition proceedings and award, to satisfy that such proceedings and award were carried through and made in accordance with law. The petition, therefore, merits no consideration. It is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.