' Brief facts of the case as narrated by the learned counsel for the petitioners and admitted as correct by the learned counsel for the respondents Nos.4 and 5 out of which this Civil Revision has arisen are that vide orders dated 23-9-1970 and 15-1-1971 passed by respondents Nos.2 and 3 an area measuring 29-1/2 acres owned by respondents Nos. 4 and 5 was transferred in the command area of outlet situated at RD-33570/L of old Khatwan Distributory. This order was challenged by the petitioners in W.P. No,247 of 1971, which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court vide order, dated 22-2-1971. The order is reproduced as under:--- "The order passed by the Divisional Canal Officer for shifting respondent land from Outlet No,RD- 26030 to Outlet No,R.D. 33570/L in the interest of better irrigation, has been affirmed by the Superintending Canal Officer by the impugned order, dated the 15th of January, 1971. It is contended that petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 have not been heard, despite the fact that they are shareholders in the Outlet No,RD 33570/L. The impugned order clearly mentions that all the shareholders of both the outlets have been heard and this fmding is not displaced in the absence of any cogent proof to the country. The next contention that section 20 of the Canal and Drainage Act does not apply to the facts of the case is uninspiring and we reject the same. The order passed by the Superintending Canal Officer has attained fmality, and as it has not been shown to suffer from lack of jurisdiction, no interference is called for. Dismissed in limine." finality. In spite of the fact that the order dated 15-1-1971 passed by respondent No,2 had become final upto the level of the High Court, the petitioners, who are more in number and appear to be very influential persons did not let the order implemented upto 1973 and managed the sanction for some new outlets from the Chief Engineer of Irrigation Department, Faisalabad (Mr. S.M. Ayyub, since died), vide order, dated 20-2-1973, and in this manner tried to get the Khatwan Distributory curtailed in the area of Chak No,111, wherein the land belonging to the respondents is situate, and armed with this sanction order, they succeeded in getting the order frustrated and not implemented in collusion with Canal Authorities. Having succeeded in getting a valid order upheld by this Court not implemented for a period of about 15 years, they again filed a civil suit seeking a declaration and injunction that in view of the sanction of two more outlets the abovesaid order has become ineffective and could not be implemented. This suit was filed on 21-1-1986 and was dismissed as withdrawn on 24-9-1986.
Without disclosing the details of previous litigation, another suit was filed by the petitioners to obtain almost the same relief during the pendency of the previous suit on 17-9-1986. They obtained an interim stay in the said suit against the implementation of the order, which stay was vacated by the learned trial Court vide order, dated 1-3-1987. The appeal filed by the petitioner was also dismissed on 27-4-1988. The review filed by the petitioners before the District Court was also dismissed on 3-2-1989. Having failed in getting the interim stay against the implementation of the order referred to above, the petitioners did not further prosecute the suit and learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the suit may have been dismissed for want of prosecution.
Learned counsel, however, is not in a position to make a definite statement inasmuch as he says that as per his instructions, the petitioners did not further pursue the suit and it is in these circumstances he stated that the suit may have been dismissed for want of prosecution. Having abused the process of Civil Court for a period of about three years, the petitioners submitted an application to the Irrigation Minister seeking the same relief which they could not get from the Courts. This application was forwarded by the irrigation Minister to the lower Canal Authorities and on the basis thereof, proceedings under section 20 of the Canal and Drainage Act were initiated on that application. Sh. Nazir Ahmed, XEN Irrigation, submitted adverse report to respondents Nos.4 and 5 which had been prepared unilaterally alleging amongst others that the respondents were responsible for imposition of Tawan to other owners of land and recommended the cancellation of order, dated 15-14971. However, the S.E., respondent No,2 did not agree to the report submitted by the XEN and refused to interfere with it vide order dated 15-8-1992 on the ground that the dispute has already been finalized upto the level of this Court. During the interregnum, Warabandi proceedings had been initiated and the SDCO ultimately decided Warabandi proceedings in favour of respondents Nos.4 and 5. The order passed by Sub-Divisional Canal Officer was challenged by the petitioners before Divisional Canal Officer respondent No,3 in this petition, who strangely enough knowing fully well that the petitioners have lost on all forums on judicial side and before his superior Officers as well, immediately issued a stay order on 22-3-1992 and directed that the order of Warabandi which definitely includes the order passed by the S.E. Dated 15-1-1971 shall not be implemented at site. Armed with this stay order, the petitioners filed another civil suit before the Civil Court on 5-9-1992 for grant of almost the same relief which they had failed to get in the earlier round of litigation in Courts as well as before the Irrigation Department. This suit was strangely enough entertained by Mr. Muhammad Latif Cheema, learned Civil Judge, Sargodha, who firstly issued an interim stay and ultimately, vide order, dated 19-10-1992 directed that the order passed by the S.E. Referred to above shall not be implemented, in spite of the fact that the previous litigation and order passed by this Court was brought to the notice of the learned trial Judge, Aggrieved of this order, respondents Nos.4 and 5 filed an appeal in the District Court of Sargodha which has been accepted and the stay order granted by the learned Civil Judge has been vacated and the application for stay has been dismissed vide order dated 19-1-1993. Learned Appellate Court took note of the fact that an order having been finalized upto the level of this Court has not been implemented and has been circumvented for two decades due to the prolonged litigation by the petitioners. This order has been challenged in this Civil Revision before this Court.
2. On the first date of hearing in this Civil Revision, I directed respondents Nos. 3, 4 and 5 to appear at limine stage, and respondent No,3 to produce record of this case. Record of the civil suit was also requisitioned. The Office was also directed to add W.P. No,247 of 1971. I had also directed the learned counsel for the petitioners to place on record the certified/uncertified copies of the previous litigation which has been undertaken by the petitioners. The case was directed to be listed for 7-2-1993 vide order dated 3-2-1993. Before the date fixed, learned counsel for the petitioners placed on record some of the copies of documents relating to previous litigation. On the date fixed, Ch. Ghulam Rasool Waraich, learned Advocate appeared on behalf of respondents Nos.4 and 5, but Divisional Canal Officer/XEN respondent No,3 did not appear although as per Office report, an intimation was sent to him. Learned counsel for the respondents informed the Court that vires of proceedings under section 20 were challenged by respondents Nos.4 and 5 in W.P. No,6636 of 1988, which was dismissed as being premature, therefore, record of W.P. No,6636 of 1988 was also directed to be produced in Court and it was ordered that Fayyaz Hussain, D.C.O., respondent No,3 shall appear on the next date of hearing alongwith the complete record. Learned Civil Judge who had issued the stay order was also directed to appear in Court. The case was resultantly set down for hearing on 9-2-1993. On the said date as well, respondent No3 did not appear although as per Office report, a notice was sent to him through urgent mail service. Resultantly, the case had again to be adjourned due to non-appearance of Mr. Fayyaz Hussain, D.C.O., respondent No,3. Mr. M. Latif Cheema, learned Civil Judge was also present. The case was partly heard and was adjourned to 10-2-1993 with a direction that Fayyaz Hussain, D.C.O., respondent No3 shall be served through a Special Messenger to appear in Court alongwith the record and also to explain in writing as to why he did not appear in Court on the last dates of hearing. Mr. Irfan Qadir, learned Assistant Advocate- General was also directed to assist the Court. Learned counsel for the petitioners was put on notice to argue about the maintainability of the suit itself out of which this petition has arisen, and also to argue as to why compensatory costs may not be imposed and awarded and why the Contempt proceedings may not be initiated against the petitioners and other persons responsible for flouting the order upheld by this Court, in case it is held that the present suit is incompetent. Learned Civil Judge remained present during the hearing of case and was asked not to appear on the next date and was told that he will be called again, if necessary. Today, the learned counsel for the parties have appeared. Fayyaz Hussain, D.C.O., respondent No3 has also entered appearance alongwith the record. He has filed his explanation in writing. He stated that he was never served as is clear from the report of H.V.C. Sargodha. Therefore, he did not appear in this Court on the last two dates i,e, 4-2-1993 and 7-2-1993. It may be mentioned here that respondent No,3 was summoned to appear in Court on 7-2-1993 and 9-2-1993. There was no date of hearing on 4-2-1993.
3. Sh. Hamid Mukhtar, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioners, has argued that the learned lower appellate Court has exercised jurisdiction illegally and with a material irregularity by accepting the appeal filed by respondents Nos.4 and 5 and by dismissing the stay application.
Learned counsel contends that the previous round of litigation upto the level of this Court as well as before the Civil Court does not debar the present suit inasmuch as neither the general principle of res judicata is applicable to the facts of the case in hand nor the suit is barred under section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. In support of his contention about the non-applicability of principle of res judicata, learned counsel has placed reliance on cases of Shah Muhammad v. Nawab Khan and 5 others PLD 1966 Lah. 904, Muhammad Swaleh and another v. M/s. United Grain & Food Agencies PLD 1964 SC 97, Mst. Gul Farosha v. Umar Gul and 11 others 1985 CLC 810, Mst. Zubaida Begum v.
Muhammad Saeed through L.Rs, and 2 others 1991 MLD 1312, Qutab-ud-Din. v. Gulzar and 2 others PLD 1991 SC 1109 and Saifur Rehman etc. v. Rehmat All etc. 1989 ALD 485. Elaborating his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that this suit is based upon a fresh cause of action which arises out of the proceedings under section 20 of the Canal and Drainage Act, which proceedings have been fmally decided by Superintending Engineer Canals respondent No,2 on 15- 8-1992, and further that the two new outlets having been created, previous order has become ineffective, inasmuch as the respondents have not succeeded in getting the said order implemented for more than two decades and are getting water from the old source, therefore, the suit having been filed on the basis of fresh cause of action, the previous litigation is not at all relevant for the purpose of decision as to whether the suit is competent and the petitioners have a prima fade case or not. Learned counsel has further contended that the respondents Nos. 4 and 5 belong to different Chak and brotherhood and as two new distributories have been sanctioned and created subsequent to the order dated 15-1-1971, respondents Nos.4 and 5 are left with no cause of action and they cannot insist on getting the order dated 15-1-1971 implemented.
Consequently, it is a fit case where the stay order should have been granted. I have asked the learned counsel for the petitioners to address arguments on the point that in case this Court comes to the conclusion that fresh suit was not competent and is not based upon any fresh cause of action, whether the suit itself can proceed and in that eventuality why this revision petition and the suit may not be dismissed? Learned counsel has contended that as the suit is pending before the lower Court, even if the Civil Revision is dismissed, the suit cannot be dismissed in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. I have asked the learned counsel for the petitioners as to whether under the facts and circumstances of this case, the petitioners are not liable to be proceeded against for Contempt of Court, inasmuch as they have flouted the judgment of this Court, and, have abused the process of law to the maximum by filing frivolous proceedings as a result whereof a lawful and valid order passed by the competent Authority of Irrigation Department upheld by this Court has not been implemented for a period of more than two decades, and in this manner have ridiculed and undermined the authority of the law Courts including this Court and have also misrepresented on various occasions to obtain the relief from the Courts by suppression of the material facts, learned counsel contended that as the present suit is based upon a fresh cause of action, it cannot be said that the petitioners have committed Contempt of Court. I have asked the learned counsel for the petitioners to address arguments on the question that in case, it is held that the suit out of which the present civil revision has arisen is frivolous and has been filed in mala fide manner why the petitioners be not burdened with compensatory costs for causing agony, mental torture and financial loss to the respondents, learned counsel has reiterated his argument and has contended that the suit being competent and having been based upon a fresh cause of action under the changed circumstances, no question of grant of compensatory costs would arise in this case.
' I have asked Fayyaz Hussain, D.C.O. Respondent No,3 who is present in Court to explain the circumstances under which he has issued a stay order. He has stated that as the petitioners filed appeal against the order passed by the S.D.C.O., deciding Warabandi, he was competent to issue a stay order. He, however, explains that he issued stay order as during the proceedings under section 20 of the Act, respondent No,2 has issued a notice to the respondents Nos.4 and 5 and hence h6 was of the view that the order dated 15-1-1971 stands reopened and cancelled, and, therefore, he issued a stay order in this case and after he had come to know that the S.E. Has refused to interfere in the matter vide order dated 15-8-1992. He has already issued a notice to the petitioners to show cause as to why the stay order may not be recalled. He admits that a period of 5-1/2 months has already passed since the order, dated 15-8-1992 was passed by respondent No,2, and he is still keeping the matter pending. He is not in a position to disclose any ground for not deciding the matter family till now. I have asked the D.C.O. Respondent No,3 as to whether he was not aware of the whole litigation which had earlier been decided, he stated that he knew the earlier litigation including the judgment rendered in W.P. No, 247 of 1971 passed by this Court, yet he still was of the view that he had an authority to stop the implementation of the order as he was hearing an appeal against the order of Warabandi passed by Sub-Divisional Canal Officer. Regarding his failure to appear on the last date, respondent No,3 has simply stated that he was not served and that he was present in Lahore on the said dates. Had he been served, he would have appeared in this Court. Regarding the receipt of summons, he relied upon the report of H.V.C. According to which no such summon/notice was received in the Office of Fayyaz Hussain, D.C.O. Respondent No,3.
4. In reply to the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, Ch. Ghulam Rasool Waraich, learned counsel for respondents Nos.4 and 5 has contended that the petitioners have abused the process of law and have ridiculed and undermined the authority of the Law Courts including this Court. They have insulted and teased respondents Nos.4 and 5 to the maximum and they are not allowing a lawful order passed by the competent authority upheld by this Court to be implemented by bringing successive and frivolous incompetent proceedings and law suits. According to the learned counsel, the dispute is with regard to the implementation of the order, dated 15-1-1971 and this dispute is being raised by the petitioners just by jugglery of words of filing of various proceedings at various times before various Courts/Authorities in reckless manner as a result whereof respondents Nos.4 and 5 have suffered a great financial loss and mental torture. They are also suffering in irrigation of their fields since 1971. It is contended that not only the civil revision is liable to be dismissed, the still born suit is also liable to be dismissed being incompetent and the petitioners as well as the responsible Officers of the Irrigation Department including respondent No,3 are liable to be proceeded against for commission of Contempt of Court. He prays that while dismissing the civil revision as well as the suit, a direction may be issued for proceedings against the petitioners as well as the said officers and mspondent No,3 for commission of Contempt of Court and compensatory costs may also be awarded to respondents Nos.4 and 5. Mr. Irfan Qadir, learned Assistant Advocate-General, has not entered appearance and has not rendered the assistance.
5. I have considered the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record as well as the case-law cited at Bar. Admittedly, vide order dated 15- 1-1971, Superintending Engineer, Canal, Sargodha, directed transfer of the petitioners land to the R.D.
In dispute. This order was challenged in W.P. No,247 of 1971 by the petitioners which was dismissed and the order was upheld. The petitioners did not allow the order to be implemented for a period of more than two decades in collusion with the officials of Irrigation Department and by bringing frivolous litigation, they managed to get an order of sanction and creation of two more channels and although creation of such channels was irrelevant factor for the purpose of implementation of the order referred to above, they lodged frivolous proceedings on the basis of this decision and managed the same to remain pending upto August, 1992 in various Courts and before various Authorities. They also managed to get unilateral false and frivolous reports from D.C.O. Sh. Nazir Ahmad, in their favour and against respondents Nos.4 and 5 but ultimately did not succeed. They brought the matter twice before the Civil Court and failed. They tried to interfere with the Warabandi proceedings before the S.D.C.O., but did not succeed. They filed appeal before Fayyaz, Hussain, Divisional Canal Officer, respondent No,3 and got a stay order from him which is still in force as a result whereof the order dated 154-1971 is not being implemented. The respondent No,3 is openly supporting the petitioners even in this Court and he insists that he has the jurisdiction to re- open the matter while deciding the question of Warabandi in appeal which is pending before him and stay the proceedings. Having failed twice in their civil suits, a similar type of suit has again been filed, although in the plaint it is stated that the order of refusal of the S.E. Dated 15-8-1992 be set aside. Object of the suit clearly is to get the said order dated 15-1-1971 cancelled. The net prayer as reflected in the plaint is that the S.E. Has illegally refused to interfere which was upheld by this Court in earlier writ petition for setting aside of which the earlier civil suits of the petitioners also failed. It is definitely not a suit which is based upon a different cause of action. The object of the suit admittedly is vacation of the order dated 15-1-1971. In case of Aziz Ahmad and others v. Mst. Hajran Bibi and another (1987 SCMR 527) at page 529 of the report, it is held as under:--- "It is then contended on behalf of the appellants that before the suit at Bahawalpur was dismissed the suit at Faisalabad had already been instituted: that being so, rule 9 of Order IX was not in terms applicable as this rule only prevented a plaintiff from instituting a fresh suit but had no effect on a suit which had already been filed. The contention insofar as the construction of rule 9 is concerned is correct but that does not mean that the second suit is not barred and can be tried on merit.
There is well-established principle that no one is to be twice vexed for the same cause of action.
Reference in this context is invited to a Division Bench of judgment of the Lahore High Court in Amir Din, Shahab Din v. Shiv Dev Singh (AIR 1947 Lah. 102) where the maintainability of the second suit brought before the dismissal in default of the first suit was considered and it was held that the second suit was hit by the above-mentioned principle and it was also liable to be dismissed on the ground that its institution and trial amounted to the abuse of the process of the Court.
' It was then argued by the learned counsel that the causes of action in the two suits were different as the suit filed at Bahawalpur was in respect of the property situate hi Bahawalpur alone whereas the suit instituted at Faisalabad covered properties both at Bahawalpur and Faisalabad; consequently, the dismissal of the first suit could not have any effect on the second suit. This contention is again without any merit. The causes of action in the two suits were precisely the same, that is, the wrongful allocation of a share in the property left by Sultan Muhammad to respondent No,2. The mere fact that in the first suit the appellant did not seek relief in respect of the property at Faisalabad would not make the cause of action in the second suit a different one. In fact by not seeking any relief in respect of the property situate in Faisalabad in the suit filed at Bahawalpur the appellants would be taken to have given up their claim to the said property, and the second suit would be hit by the bar contained in rule 2(2) of Order 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
' Similarly in case of Asif Jah Siddiqi v. Government of Sindh and others PLD 1983 SC 46 at page 52 of the report, it has been held as under:--- "There is a further reason for repelling the argument of the learned counsel. Section 9, C.P.C.
Provides that the Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The ratio underlying the decision in the case of Abdul Majid is law declared. It would thus appear that the suit filed by the petitioner in this case would be barred by section 9, C.P.C. Both expressly and impliedly. When looking at various aspects of the question of res judicata, it is expressly barred, because the Supreme Court has declared it as a law. And immediately (sic) because even if it had not come strictly within the four corners of the facts of the case of Abdul Majeed, the ratio of the said case and the principle discussed therein, would impliedly bar the suit.
' The same would be the effect if we keep in view and apply the principle and the spirit underlying the recent amendment in section 12, C.P.C. Whereunder "when a person challenges the validity of judgment, decree or order on the plea of fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction, he shall seek his remedy by making application to the Court which passed the fmal judgment, decree or order and not by a separate suit." Similar observation was made by the Court in this behalf in the case of Abdul Majeed when dealing with the question of Resultantly, while holding that the stay application has rightly been dismissed, I further hold that the suit filed by the petitioners as being incompetent in law isremedy for an affected person in circumstances visualised in the amended section 12 of C.P.C. It was observed additionally in that behalf that:- 'Notwithstanding the foregoing comment on this question, it is necessary to explain that the High Court or the Supreme Court might itself, in view of peculiar circumstances of a given case, when opened before it on any ground which might require further examination in a proper trial by a lower Court, make such observation, as might enable that Court to deal with the relevant question including that of nullity.'
' The above visualised situation would among others, arise when for example a party realizing a difficulty or weakness in its case, does not press the point before the High Court or the Supreme Court and request for such an observation without obtaining a decision on the relevant point. This might arise amongst other situation, either when withdrawing a matter or when seeking its dismissal, without pressing the same."
' Hence the suit is barred and is liable to be dismissed as per law laid down in the above cases, and the stay application has therefore been rightly dismissed by the learned First Appellate Court by setting aside a sketchy, unjust, illegal and perverse order passed by the learned Civil Judge, and, I do not consider it a fit case for exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court particularly when justice has been done by the learned first appellate Court to interfere with the impugned judgment.
The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the question of res judicata and maintainability of fresh suit are distinguishable on facts and are not attracted to the facts of the case in hand.
6. It is an established principle of law that a still-born suit is to be dismissed at the earliest in view of the law declared in case of Burmah Eastern Ltd. v. Burmah Eastern Employees' Union and others (PLD 1967 Dacca 190) wherein it has been held that it is the duty of the court to bury a still-born suit in its inception as is clear from the following dictum at page 193 of the report:--- "Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code, as quoted above enumerates certain categories under which the Court is called upon to reject the plaint, but, it is abuse (sic) that they are not exhaustive. It appears from the language of Rule 11 of Order VII that it requires that an incompetent suit should be laid at rest at the earliest moment so that no further time is wasted over what is bound to collapse as not being permitted by law." also liable to be dismissed and this Court while deciding a revision petition filed against an interim order is competent to dismiss an incompetent and frivolous suit filed by the petitioners.
7. It stands established that the petitioners have teased and tortured respondents Nos.4 and 5 to the maximum and have succeeded in getting authority of law Courts flouted as a result thereof respondents Nos.4 and 5 have suffered agony, torture and fmancial loss. Therefore, following the law, laid down in case of Shamir, through Legal Heirs v. Faiz Elahi through Legal Heirs (1993 SCMR 145 at page 149) of the report, as follows:- "Resultantly, the instant appeal is dismissed. However, we are of the view that the plaintiff/predecessor-in-interest of the appellant dragged the defendants/respondents in a protracted litigation without any rhyme or reason and put them to unnecessary financial loss, mental torture and agony, and to compensate them we burden the deceased/plaintiff Shamir with compensatory costs of Rs,50,000 which shall be recoverable from his estate in the hands of his legal heirs (appellants herein)."
' It is held that the petitioners are liable to pay compensatory costs to respondents 'Nos.4 and 5, as the petitioners dragged them in a protracted litigation without any rhyme or reason and put them to unnecessary financial loss, mental torture and agony. As is clear from the narration of the afore- mentioned facts, a prima facie case has been made out against the petitioners, Fayyaz Hussain D.C.O., respondent No,3, and Sh. Nazir Hussain D.C.O. For issuance of show-cause notice to initiate proceedings against them under the Contempt of Court Act, 1976, as per law declared in case of Bashir Ahmad v. Abdul Hameed and another (1984 SCMR 689) as is clear from the following reproduced portion of the report at page 691 as under:--- "We questioned the petitioner himself regarding the grounds on which he wanted to press the suit.
His answer is that he had become the owner of property by virtue of his so called adverse possession against the predecessor-in-interests of respondent No,1. This issue was finally closed by the decision of the Supreme Court in the first round in C.P. No,481 of 1979. The question of relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and respondent No,1 was finally decided against him by Supreme Court in another round on 19-6-1983. The petitioner then filed an objection against execution and lost upon (sic) the High Court. Thereafter, he again has tried to re-open the same question in a civil suit out of which this petition has arisen. It is a classic case of misuse of the procedures made available by the law of the land for genuinely aggrieved persons to seek remedies. There are several recent judgments of this Court whereby such approach to law and Courts has been disapproved. The re-opening of the matter in this case has rightly been held to be barred by law. We accordingly while dismissing this petition, issue notice to the petitioner for Contempt of this Court. Notice shall issue, to the lawyers who drafted the petitioners' pleadings upto the Supreme Court in this last round of litigation to show cause as to why they should not be debarred from legal practice."
8. Resultantly, this revision petition is dismissed. The suit titled `Muhammad Yaqoob and others v.
Province of Punjab etc.' filed by the petitioners pending before the trial Court is dismissed as being incompetent in law. Petitioners are directed to pay Rs,30,000 (Thirty thousand) by way of compensatory costs to the respondents Nos.4 and 5. A show-cause notice shall C be issued to the petitioners, respondent No,3 (Mr. Fayyaz Hussain) D.C.O./XEN Sargodha and Mr.Sh. Nazir Hussain, D.C.O./XEN Irrigation Department to show cause as to why proceedings under the Contempt of Court Act, 1976 may not be initiated against them. Divisional Canal Officer, respondent No3 is directed to decide the appeal pending before him not later than a fortnight w.e.f. Today in accordance with law.
9. Before parting with this judgment it is observed with great concern that respondents Nos. 4 and 5 have suffered at the hands of the petitioners in collusion with some of the Officers of Irrigation Department. While it is appreciable that some of the Officers did their duty very well while dismissing incompetent and frivolous proceedings initiated by the petitioners, yet at the same time, it is very said state of affairs that some of the Officers helped the petitioners not only to deprive respondents Nos. 4 and 5 of the fruits of a valid order but also to cause agony, mental torture and financial loss to them. This type of attitude and acts of the public functionaries create impressions in the society that the Law Courts are helpless and that the poor resourceless people cannot get their grievances redressed through the Courts of law which impression is a cause of frustration and encourages corruption and ultimately results in creation of law and order situation in the society. It is expected, therefore, that the public functionaries shall refrain from becoming privy to the evil designs of private persons for extraneous and illegal considerations. A copy of this order shall immediately be sent to the Secretary, Irrigation and Power Department, Government of the Punjab, Lahore, so that he should take necessary steps to ensure that such like acts/omissions do not re-occur, with the help of functionaries of his Department.