1. By Office Order dated 25-7-1989 (Annex. 5) of Shahid Saleem Co--ordination Officer, WAPDA House, Lahore, respondent No. 2, Muhammad Nawaz petitioner, Draftsman Scarps Monitoring, WAPDA, Lahore has been transferred to ASOP WAPDA, Lahore in place of Draftsman Mansoor Akhtar, with direction to move first. The petitioner, feeling aggrieved, has challenged his transfer by way of filing petition under section 22-A(8)(g) of the IRO along with an application under Regulation 32(2) of the NIRC (P&F) Regulations, 1973, alleging that the petitioner in the capacity of Chairman, Pakistan WAPDA Labour Union (Regd.) for Sanitary Monitoring Directorate had been championing the cause of his co-workers on account of which he earned displeasure of the management resulting in his stoppage of two increments and subsequent transfer affecting his seniority and fringed benefits. It was asserted that the petitioner will be placed at the tail of the seniority on joining the new assignment. The action of the management was alleged to have been taken for no other reasons but due to trade union activities of the petitioner, it was stated punishable under section 15 of the I.R.O. 1969.
2. The department in its comments, refuted the allegations of the petitioner and challenged jurisdiction of the Commission to intervene.
3. The petition was filed on 30-5-1989. Copy of the petition with copy of the stay application were sent to the respondents with direction to submit comments on 19-6-1989 and in the meanwhile, it was directed that the impugned transfer order, if not acted upon, shall remain suspended. The stay order was subsequently vacated by order dated 25-7-1989, and the case was fixed for recording evidence.
4. To substantiate the allegations, Muhammad Nawaz petitioner appears as P.W.1 and stated that after his election as Chairman of the Pakistan WAPDA Labour Union in S.M. WAPDA Directorate, the attitude of the management changed and he was asked to leave union activities. On refusal of the petitioner to abide by the wishes of the management, victimization started against him. He took short leave for two hours on 9-5-1989 to perform the union work. He was charge-sheeted and in consequence of the inquiry report, his increments for two years were stopped. He filed a complaint before this Commission against the unfair treatment of the management which resulted in his transfer. In case he resumes duty at the new place of assignment, he will cease to remain chairman of the union. His seniority will also be affected besides reduction in his pay. When subjected to the test of cross-examination, he admitted that he can be transferred to any other office of WAPDA by the competent authority. He has not joined at his new place of duty on account of his sickness. He is on leave since 27-7-1989 to date. He has not been served with the transfer order as yet. The office of ACOP is in Lahore at a distance of two three miles from S.M. Directorate.
5. He has remained at S.M. Directorate for about 27 years. He did not make complaints to higher authorities regarding his victimisation at the hands of the respondents.
6. Muhammad Anwar, Senior Superintendent Office of the General Manager (Planning Division), WAPDA House, Lahore, appeared as R.W.1. And stated that the transfer of the petitioner has been made in the interest of Authority's work and not due to trade union activities. He added that the post of the petitioner is transferable under the Service Rules and the terms and conditions of service of the petitioner shall not be affected by his transfer. It is in his cross-examination that scale of the petitioner shall remain intact but the duty allowance of Rs.120 shall be deducted from the petitioner's pay by his transfer. He denied the suggestion that the petitioner's transfer has resulted in . Cessation of trade union activities in the Scarp Monitoring Organisation.
7. Ch. Riaz Ahmad, Advocate appeared on behalf of the petitioner and attempted to argue that the transfer in question was not ordered in the Authority's work but it was due .To trade union activities of the petitioner and for this reason the management was not in a fit mood to allow the petitioner to remain posted at Sanitary Monitoring Directorate. The learned counsel added that in order to victimise the petitioner, his increments for two years were stopped without good reason and he was charge-sheeted for misconduct, without any justification. On the contrary Mr. Abdul Rashid Malik, Advocate appearing on behalf of Authority, maintained that after 27 years stay at Sanitary Monitoring Directorate, the petitioner shifted to ACOP WAPDA, Lahore in the interest of Authority's work and until further order and the action of the management cannot be treated as an act of unfair labour practice.
8. After 27 years stay at Scarps Monitoring WAPDA, Lahore, the petitioner has been shifted to ACOP WAPDA, Lahore in the interest of Authority's work and until further order. There is absolutely nothing on the file to indicate that the transfer order was made with sole purpose to prevent the petitioner to carry out his trade union activities and that the management was annoyed due to trade union affairs of the petitioner- which ultimately resulted in his transfer from one Directorate to the other.
9. The management has inherent right to transfer its employees for smooth running of its business and it cannot be challenged. Transfer is the prerogative of .The employer. It is always ordered in the best interest of the Establishment. The posting of an employee from one place of posting to another in the same Establishment is the right of every management and does not constitute unfair labour practice. If an employee is aggrieved by his transfer, he can only go to the appropriate forum for redress and not through a petition under section 22-A(8)(g) of the I.R.O., 1969. The petitioner's letter of appointment gives unfettered right to the management to post the petitioner anywhere in Pakistan including the present place of duty. The management has the right to utilise the services of its employees according to the needs and requirements of the petitioner. It may not be out of place to mention here that the petitioner has not reported for duty at the new place of his assignment which clearly indicates that he has no respect of the orders of his superiors and tries to avoid transfer on one pretext or the other. It is not denied that transfer of any member of the union does not essentially involve violation of the provisions of section 15(1)(d) of the IRO which deals with cases of unfair labour practice on the part of the employer and places restriction on his power to dismiss, discharge, remove from employment (or transfer), or threatened to dismiss, discharge or remove from employment (or transfer) a workman or injure or threaten to injure him in respect of his employment by reason that the workman is or proposes to become, or seeks to persuade any other person to become, a member or officer of a trade union, or participate in the promotions, formation or activities of a trade union. In the instant case the petitioner has failed to point out that due to his trade union affiliations, the transfer was made as a measure of victimisation. It is not denied that law does not give licence to members/office-bearers of the union that they cannot be transferred by the management. The transfer can be ordered at any time and at any place in the interest of the management and it cannot be avoided in the name of union activities. Learned counsel for the petitioner maintained that the transfer of the petitioner was not ordered in the interest of Authority's work but it was made in order to accommodate Mansoor Akhtar Draftsman, substitute of the petitioner. He relied on Muhammad Afzal v. Secretary, Education Government of the Punjab. Lahore and 2 others 1992 PLC (C.S.)
117. The submission of the learned counsel has not impressed me. Nothing has been brought in evidence in support of the assertion. I am satisfied that the transfer has been made in good faith and it has not been ordered to accommodate another person for undisclosed reasons. The cited ruling is distinguishable and speaks of the different situations. It has no bearing on the facts of the present case.
10. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the transfer in question was the result of victimisation of the petitioner at the hands of the respondents and thus, the respondents were liable to be punished for committing unfair labour practice. The submission is without force. The petitioner has not been able to bring anything on the file to show that the transfer was motivated on account of his participation in the trade union activities. No instance of unfair labour practice has been cited to show that the real purpose behind the transfer was some thing else and that it was not' made in the interest of Authority's work. The allegations of unfair labour practice, as held by the Superior Courts, is a serious allegation and has to be substantiated by the facts. If an authority is needed on the point reference can be had to the following observations made in Bahari Iron Works v.
11. Daghubhai AIR 1976 SC 98:-- "A word of caution is necessary. Victimisation is a serious charge by an employee against an employer, and therefore, must be properly and adequately pleaded giving any particulars upon which the charge is based to enable the employer to fully meet them. The charge must not be vague or indefinite being as it is an amalgam of facts as well as inferences and attitudes. The fact that there is a union espousing the cause of the employees in legitimate trade union activity and an employee is a member or active office-bearer there, is, per to no crucial instance .......--- As stated above, the transfer of the petitioner, cannot be said to be an act of unfair labour practice under the relevant provisions of the IRO, 1969, as the petitioner has not been able to prove by cogent and convincing evidence that his transfer was ordered with a view to deter him to persue his lawful and legitimate trade union activities. The evidence produced by the petitioner in support of the accusation falls far short of the required standard and cannot be believed in the absence of supporting material.
12. Adverting to the question of jurisdiction of the Commission to interfere in such like matters, I find that according to law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Iftikhar Ahmad v. President, National Bank of Pakistan and others (Civil Appeal No. 221 of 1985 and other appeals) (PLD 1988 SC 53), this Commission has jurisdiction to interfere only if a case falls within the scope of section 15 of the IRO 1969. This provision of law provides redress of grievances arising out of victimisation for trade union activities only. No other victimisation, even if proved, is actionable by this Commission in exercise of jurisdiction created by section 22-A(8)(g) of the IRO 1969. The following observations were made in the mentioned ruling:-- "It will, therefore, appear that the cases which the Benches are empowered to hear under the clause must have an element of unfair labour practice in them; it does not encompass cases where an allegation of unfair labour practice is made. It may be mentioned that sections 15 and 16 of the Ordinance set out instances of unfair labour practice on the part of the employers as well as workmen. It is therefore, not right to construe the clause in question as conferring a general jurisdiction upon the Benches to entertain. All kinds of grievances petitions even though they may not be relatable to unfair labour practice---------.."
13. In Arshad Mahmood v. Factory Manager, Gulshan Carpet Industries Ltd. Lahore 1994 PLC 35 it was held:-- "The jurisdiction of the Commission is confined to the case falling under the scope of section 15 of the Ordinance and nothing beyond that. It implies that in cases of victimisation for any reason other than the trade union activities this Commission will have no jurisdiction. The allegations made in the petition which appear to be general and sweeping in nature, even if they are permitted to stand do not make a prima facie case of unfair labour practice. The existence of unfair labour practice is prerequisite for proceeding with a case under clause (g) of subsection (8) of section 22-A of the I.R.O. This jurisdictional prerequisite is missing in the present case."
14. In conclusion, the petition fails for lack of jurisdiction which is hereby dismissed.