1. ' The only ground on which eviction was sought in the instant proceedings was the ground of personal need of the respondent-landlord, who had maintained that, suffering from heart ailment and finding it difficult to climb stairs because of his then recent heart surgery it was inconvenient from him to live in a second floor premises, owned by his son. In evidence the landlord examined himself, his son and one Vicent Pinto, Administrative Assistant at the OMI (Pvt.) Limited (hospital), the last witness proving the signatures on the documents produced to show the heart condition and open heart surgery undergone by the respondent-landlord. On his part, the appellant examined himself alone. In such manner, the case of personal requirement having been established the learned Controller ordered the appellant's eviction.
2. ' Before me, Mr. Mustafa Lakhani has pointed but that the respondent-landlord did not conclusively prove that he was in need of the ground floor premises because for one thing, no medical evidence was examined and, for another, no certificate was produced even suggesting that the landlord was advised to occupy a ground floor accommodation. On the contrary, according to Mr. Mustafa Lakhani, the landlord has been shown to be pursuing rent cases, instituted by his wife, which cases proceeded in Court rooms, which themselves were situated on a second storey. In support of his contentions, Mr. Mustafa Lakhani has placed reliance on Abdul Ghaffar v. Abdur Rasool 1986 CLC 869 and Azra Kazi v. Sirajuddin, 1990 CLC 399, the first of which lays down that a requirement to live on a ground floor premises occupied by a tenant would be proved where the landlady establishes the fact of her ailment and medical advice, suggestive of a necessity to move into a ground floor tenement, whereas the second precedent disallows a projected personal requirement to move into a ground floor tenant-hold, which was expressly let out upon a stipulation that subsequent to its letting out the landlord would be entitled to construct upon the first floor in the same building and to himself move into it. On these facts, it was found in such case of Azra Kazi that the nature of ailments of the landlord and his wife could not have been so serious as to make it necessary for them to move into the ground floor premises.
3. Hearing the learned counsel I am of the view that the finding on the ground of personal requirement recorded by the learned Controller is eminently just and lawful. It is correct that the landlord did not examine the doctor or doctors under whose charge, as a patient, he must have remained. However, he did prove the signatures on the relevant documents, establishing the plea as to his heart condition and treatment thereof. It would have been incumbent on him to summon the medical evidence, properly so-called, if the A appellant-tenant had questioned the factum of his ailment or of the treatment he had undergone. In the absence of such challenge, the assertion of the landlord to that effect remaining un rebutted the documentary material produced and proved from his side was sufficient to establish the state of the landlord's health and the treatment provided to him.
4. As to the next question that there was no proved advice for the landlord to move into the ground floor tenement, all that need be said is that law does not cast any obligation to obtain such an advice from a medical practitioner. Requisite advice may be inherent in a given state of health. No doubt, such an advice, properly tendered, would strengthen a case of personal requirement on a ground germane to health but lack of it, in itself, cannot be destructive of the ground provided always that other material is available on record to suggest that the landlord's occupation of a ground floor tenant-hold would be more advantageous and conducive to his health, otherwise found to be sub-normal. Such material seems to be there, on the facts as stated above and as are borne out from the record.
5. Lastly, it was urged that the landlord failed to prove that he was unable to climb stairs to sustain the plea of necessity to move from a second floor premises to a ground floor one. It does not seem to have been the case of the landlord that he was totally unable to climb stairs. All that he urged was that he found it difficult to do so and that it would be ameliorative for his failing health, if he was permitted to occupy the ground floor tenant-hold in possession of the appellant-tenant. This he seems to have duly shown in his evidence.
6. ' Another aspect of the matter, which possibly cannot be ignored, is that the landlord has been putting up with his son and that in itself, other things being in place, may be sufficient to sustain a case of personal requirement for him to move into a property of his own.
7. ' The record does not show that the requirement was wanting in good faith. That question, therefore, does not arise.
8. ' Accordingly, I find no merit in this appeal and dismiss it in limine. With the dismissal of the appeal the Civil Miscellaneous Application listed at serial No,2 above is also dismissed. However, further two months' time is allowed to the appellant-tenant to vacate provided that he continues to pay or deposit the accruing rents as hitherto before.