MAUK MUHAMMAD QAYYUM, J.- This is Second Appeal under Section 15 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, from order of the Rent Controller dated 1.9.1990, which was maintained in first appeal by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, on 9.1.1993.
2. The dispute arises out of an application under Section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, filed by respondent against the appellant seeking his eviction from the shop in question cm the ground of default in payment of rent and requirement thereof by the respondent for his own use. In his written Statement, the appellant controverted these allegations and also pleaded that the rate of rent as claimed by the landlord was exnorbitant.
3. On the basis of the evidence led by the parties, the Rent Controller, by his order dated 11.1.1990, accepted the ejectment petition on the ground of personal need. Aggrieved the appellant went in appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, who by his order dated 163.1991, accepted the same and dismissed the ejectment petition. This judgment of the learned Additional District Judge was challenged by the respondent by filing W.P. No. 3196/91 in this Court, which was accepted on 8.11.1992, with the consent of the parties as it was found that the decision of the learned Additional District Judge on the question of personal need was not sustainable. The appeal was, consequently, remanded to the learned Additional District Judge, who after hearing the parties, held that the landlord had successfully proved that the shop in question was required by him for own use. He, therefore, affirmed the order of the Rent Controller and dismissed the appellant's appeal on 9.1.1993. Hence this second appeal.
4. Ch.A.Waheed Saleem, learned counsel for the appellant has firstly argued that as it had been found by both the Courts that the respondent had set up a false plea regarding default in payment of rent and had also claimed rent at exhorbitant rate, it could not be held that the application for execution had been filed bonafidely and in good frith. 1a support of this submission, reliance has been placed upon Rahmat Khan V. Abdul Razzaque (1993 CLC 412) and Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. V.Main Muhammad Sharif(M7 SGMR 1768).
5. There is no merit in this contention of the learned counsel although it may be correct that in certain cases setting up of a false plea may reflect adversely upon the claim for personal need but nevertheless personal use is a ground independent of other pleas if on the basis of the evidence on record, a landlord succeeds in proving that he requires the premises in dispute for his own use, he cannot be non-suited merely on this ground. In the present case, the Rent Controller as also the Additional District Judge, after thoroughly appraising the evidence, have found as a fact that the personal need of the landlord stood established and, therefore, mere that the landlord has' also pleaded default in payment of rent and clamied rent at an excessive rate could not be itself a ground for non-suiting the appellant. The precedents relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are clearly distinguished. In Rahmat Khan's case. The landlord was denied relief as he had failed to give details of his need in his affidavit. In the I present case, the landlord has appeared as a witness and explained his requirement. Muslim Commercial Bank's case has also no relevancy , for in that case what was held that if the demand to increase of rent has been made in a close proximity to the filing of ejectment petition, it would reflect upon the bona-fide of the landlord. No such question, however, arises here.
6. It was next contended by learned counsel for the appellant that there was sufficient evidence on the record to show that the landlord was already in occupation of a shop and secondly that he was a contractor. On' both these questions, there are concurrent findings by the Rent Controller as also the learned Additional District Judge, who have relied upon the statements of PW.1 and PW.2.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant complained that the learned Additional District Judge has failed to discuss or take notice of various precedents cited by him at the bar. These judgments, which have also been relied upon before me merely lay down certain broad principles applicable to cases of personal need which have to be applied to the facts of each case. As already observed, it has been found as a fact by the Rent Controller as also the learned Additional District Judge that the petitioner is not in occupation of any premises and requires the shop for his own use. Neither any misreading of evidence nor any legal error has been shown to exist.