CH. MUSHTAQ AHMAD KHAN, J.- Facts of the < e out of which this civil revision has arisen are that Muhammad Hussain and tv others, purchased land measuring 52 kanals situated in the village Widhowala Tehsil Shapur vide a registered sale deed dated 17.6.1979. The respondents No.1 and 2 filed a suit to pre-empt the aforementioned sale on 17.6.1980 on the basis of their qualification of being owners in the estate. Initially minor vendees were sued without appointing a guardian who was subsequently appointed after the period of limitation to file the suit had expired. The suit was contested by the vendees.
2. The trial Court on the basis of pleadings of the parties, settled the following issues: I Whether the suit is barred by time?
2. Whether the suit has not been correctly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction, if so what is its correct valuation?
' Whether the "Zari Panjum" has not been deposited in time, if so, its e fleet?
4 Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form?
Whether the defendants are entitled to special costs u/s 35-A CPC, if so. To what extent?
6. Whether the ostensible sale price of Rs.50,000/- was fixed in good faith and actually paid?
7. If issue No.6 is not proved then what was the market value of the suit land at the time of sale?
8 Whether the plaintiffs have superior right of pre-emption qua the defendants?
Relief:
3. The learned Civil Judge vide judgment and decree dated 13.1.1982, decreed the suit in favour of the respondents. Aggrieved of this judgment and decree, the petitioners filed 1 first appeal in the District Court, Sargodha which has been dismissed by the learned Addl: District Judge, Sargodha, vide judgment and deers e dated 5.3.1984. These two judgments and decree have been challenged in this ( Civil Revision.
4. Mr. Tahir Qureshi, Advocate has appeared on behalf of the petitioners whereas Ch. Shahbaz Khurshid, Advocate has appeared on behalf of the respondent No.1. None has appeared on behalf of respondent No.2. Malik Muhammad Hassain Awan, Advocate has appeared on behalf of respondent No.3.
5. This appeal was admitted to consider the question of limitation as according to the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, at the admission stage, was that the sale took place on 17.6.1979 and the suit was filed on 1 S.6.] 680, therefore, was time barred. Today, learned counsel for the petitioner has conceded that the suit was filed on 17.6.1980 as is clear from the stamp paper on the face of the plaint, a certified copy whereof has been annexed with this petition as annexure 'A'. However, learned counsel argues that still the suit is barred by time inasmuch as the period of limitation shall expire on 16.6.1980 as the period of one year shall expire on that date.
Learned counsel has further argued that as the suit was originally filed against Zubair and Hafiz Mehmood minor co-vendees without appointment of guardian who was appointed subsequently under the orders of the court after expiry of period of limitation to tile the suit, therefore, the suit shall l>e barred by time and, hence, is liable to be dismissed in toto on the principle of partial pre- emption.
6. As against the above arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner Ch .- Shahbaz Khurshid, Advocate, on behalf of respondent No.1, has argued that the suit is well within time inasmuch as while calculating period of Muhammad Hussain V The Stale (Ch. Mushtaq Ahmad Khan, J) limitation, the first day is to be excluded and, hence, the period of one year will expire on 17.6.1980 and, hence, the suit was filed within time on 17.6.1980, the last day of limitation.
Learned counsel contended that the suit was filed against the minor vendees within limitation and it was the duty of the trial Court to have appointed a guardian of the minors. If the respondents-pre emptors failed to implead the guardian and merely because a guardian was appointed subsequent to the filing of the suit will not make the suit as barred by time. In this connection learned counsel has referred to the provisions of Order 32 Rule 3 of CPC which reads as under:
(1) Where the defendant is a minor, the Court, on being satisfied of the fact of his minority, shall appoint a proper person to be guardian for the suit for such minor.
(2) An order for the appointment of guardian for the suit may be obtained upon application in the name and on behalf of the minor or by the plaintiff.
(3) Such application shall be supported by an affidavit verifying the fact that the proposed guardian has no interest in the matters in controversy in the suit adverse to that of the minor and that he is a fit person to be so appointed.
(4) No order shall be made on an application under this rule except upon notice to minor and to any guardian of the minor appointed or declared by an authority competent in that behalf, or where there is no such guardian, upon notice to the father or other natural guardian of the minor, or, where there is no father or other natural guardian, to the person in whose care the minor is, and after hearing any objection which may be urged on behalf of any person served with notice under this sub-rule.
(5) A person appointed under sub-rule (1) to be guardian for the suit for a minor shall, unless his appointment is terminated by retirement, removal or death, continue as such throughout all proceedings appellate or revisional Court and any proceedings in the execution of a decree." 7.
Malik Muhammad Hussain Awan, Advocate, learned counsel for respondent No.3 has supported the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
8. I have considered the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. Sale took place through a registered sale deed on 17.6.1979. The suit was filed on 17.6.1980. C calculating the period of limitation in accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act, read with the General Clauses, Act, the period of one year shall expire on the expiry of last minute of .17.6.1980. The suit, therefore, could have been filed during the Court hours on 17.6.1980. It was filed on that date within court hours and as such is well within time. This view also finds support from the case of Muhammad Yousaf and 3 others Vs. Zafarullah and another (1992 SCM R 117) wherein the method of calculation of the period even fixed by the Court has been laid down by the Lordship of the Supreme Court and it has been held that the period is to start on the next day of the date when the order is passed and in this case applying the same principle, the period of limitation shall start w.e.f the next day, from the date on which the sale deed was registered. At pages 119 and 120 of the report referred to above, it has been held as under:- The learned Single Judge has referred to the statement of law appearing in Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edition), Volume 55, Para 1127, which may be reproduced herewith advantages " when a period of time ruming from a given day or event is prescribed by law or fixed by contract, and the question arises whether their computation is to be made inclusively or exclusively of the fust mentioned are of the last mentioned day, regard must be had to be context and to the purposes for which the computation had to be made. Where there is room for doubt, the enactment or instrument ought to be so construed as to effectuate and not to defeat the intention of Parliament or of the parties as the case may be. Expressions such as "from such a day" or "until such a day" are equivocal, since they do not make it clear whether the inclusion or the exclusion of the day named may be intended. As a general rule, however, the effect of defining a period in such a manner is to exclude the first day and to include the last day.
Reference was also made to Re: Lympone Investments Ltd. (1972) 2 All ER 385) and Re: deceased)
Roberts and another v. Maclaren and others (1068) 1 All ER 999).
6. This is a case not of enactment or contract, but of an order passed by a Judge. The order will therefore have to be construed as to effectuate the intention of the Court, regard being had to the context and the purposes for which the order was passed, nor overlooking the need of an equitable interpretation desirable in the interest of the person who has to make the deposit and who should be free from any doubt. Now an order of the Court must have some semblance of uniformity with the interpretation which the law would put any equity support in such a case where time is prescribed for the doing of an act by a statutory enactment (See Ramehandra Govind Unavne's case (supra). Under section 8 of the Provincial General Clauses Act, 1956 a date from which the period of time is to be reckoned has to be excluded, while computing the period, See Puran Chand's case and Ramehandra Govind Unavne's case (supra). For the purpose of uniformity, the same interpretation should be given where a Court's order fixes the date fr6m which a period has to commence. The view of the learned Single Judge is, therefore, appropriate and correct. His interpretation is also equitable and removes all difficulties that may arise in the way of persons who may be call upon by Court to make such deposits and find themselves in a dilemma when trying to interpret Such Second limb of argument addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the question of limitation is also without any force. The suit was filed against the minor vendee within limitation. If then- guardian was appointed later it will have no relevancy to determine question of limitation. After a suit is filed against minor as is clear from the clear words of Order 32 rule 3 CPC, it is the duty of the court to appoint the guardian. If the Court failed to discharge its duty and to appoint a guardian of the minor defendant, the plaintiff cannot suffer due to the act of the court which include, omission to pass an order of appointment of the guardian of the minor defendant. The moment a guardian was appointed the proceedings in the suit stood validated w.e.f the date on which the same was filed, therefore, the amended plaint having been filed in the suit, it shall be deemed that the defendants were sued through guardian w.e.f the date on which the suit was originally filed. Consequently on this account as well it cannot be said that the suit is barred by time. I, therefore, hold that the suit is within time and has rightly been held by the two Courts below as such. Having held that the suit is within time, the question of partial pre- emption will not arise in this case inasmuch as suit has been filed regarding the total land sold as well as against all the vendees. No other point has been argued by the learned counsel for the parties in support of this civil Revision.
10. Resultantly, I see no force in this Civil Revision. The same is dismissed with costs throughout.