1. MUNAWAR ALI KHAN (CHAIRMAN).---This appeal arose from a very old incident which occurred, nearly two decades ago in the year 1975. The appellant, Muhammad Hassan was posted as Head Constable at P.S. Kandhkot when he was included in the police party headed by S.H.O. Sabir Hussain for investigation of the Crime No. 268/74 under section 382, P.P.C. In course of the investigation although some accused persons were arrested, the S.H.O. Sabir Hussain and Police Constable Muhammad Rafique lost their lives in firing encounter with the culprits. As a consequence all the remaining members of the police party including the appellant were suspended and were given show-cause notices. They were ultimately ousted from service by the orders of the S.P. Jacobabad. Their departmental appeals from the order of their ouster were also rejected by the D.I.-G.P. Thereafter they approached the I.-G.P. But he too rejected their petition for reinstatement vide Order No.19465-66/E-111, dated 15-12-1988. Again in 1989 the above police officials including the appellant who were aggrieved by the I.G.P.'s order once again tried to revive their otherwise closed case by approaching the then Prime Minister. Their case was referred to the relevant authorities for reinvestigation as a result of which at least two police personnel namely Hidayatullah and Ali Sher Jakhrani were reinstated in service. On the basis of their identical case, the appellant too approached the authorities for his reinstatement. Thereupon the Addl. I.-G.P.
2. Converted the appellant's dismissal into minor penalty of censure vide his Order No. 14189-90/E-III, dated 21-7-1991. In consequence of that order the appellant was reinstated in service and was posted in Police Lines Headquarter, Jacobabad. Somehow the appellant moved the I: G.P. For allowing him back benefits of the period of his ouster from service who instead annulled the order of his reinstatement vide I.G.P.'s order dated 29-6-1992. The appellant challenged the I.G.P.'s order of annulment in his departmental appeal dated 19-7-1992 filed before the Home Secretary and after waiting for statutory period of 90 days he came up in the present service appeal on 2-11-1992.
3. We heard the lengthy arguments of the appellant's learned counsel, Mr. Abdul Sattar Mughal and also the submissions made by the learned AA.-G. We also carefully went through the documents relevant for disposal of this appeal.
4. The history of the case as recapitulated above would show that the appellant's case for his reinstatement stood finally closed with passing of the order of the D.I: G.P. Who refused to set aside the order of his dismissal from service. Thereafter, the appellant's remedy lay before this Tribunal.
5. But instead of filing appeal in this Tribunal, the appellant chose to go in revision before the I.G.P. But that too was rejected by the I.G.P.'s order, dated 15-12-1988. Thus, the cause of action that accrued to the appellant for resorting to judicial process for seeking the desired remedy came to an end, as he did not challenge the D.I.-G.P.'s order or even the I.-G.P.'s order passed in revision before any judicial forum.
6. He was however, absolutely free to agitate his grievance further at the forums, other than judicial forums. Availing that course, he like other policemen, approached the then Prime Minister for the necessary relief. Thereupon, the Prime Minister directed for reinvestigation of the case of the above police personnel including the appellant. The question arose if the police authorities could reopen their case which stood closed for all purposes? In our considered view, the answer to the above question was obviously in the negative. This being so, the correct legal position should have been brought to the notice of the Prime Minister instead of committing illegalities. However, if the reinstatement of certain policemen was unavoidable, necessary orders should have been obtained from the Chief Minister who being the rule-making authority could order for their reinstatement in supersession of the previous orders of their discharge/dismissal. But without following that course, the same authorities seemed to have reviewed their own earlier orders and at least two of the police party namely Hidayatullah and Ali Sher Jakhrani had been reinstated.
7. They had obviously no such power. The appellant who considered his case to be identical to that of the above two reinstated policemen, also pressed for his reinstatement. Ultimately the major penalty of dismissal infected on him was converted by the Addl. I: G.P. Into minor penalty of censure and in consequence he was reinstated in service. But some how his reinstatement order was subsequently annulled on the ground that the Addl. J: G.P. Being inferior in authority to the L-G.P.
8. Had no power to disturb the latter's order. We see nothing wrong with the I.-G.P.'s latest order of annulment. As stated above even the L-G.P. Himself had no jurisdiction to review or revise his own order, what to speak of the officer inferior in rank to him interfering with his order. Accordingly the Addl. I: G.P. Who did not enjoy the powers and status of the I: G.P. Had absolutely no jurisdiction to interfere with the I.-G.P.'s orders. In other words both D.I.-G.P. And I: G.P. Having rejected the appellant's appeal against the order of his dismissal, the Addl, L-G.P. Could not reduce the penalty of dismissal to that of censure. His order to this effect being in total lack of jurisdiction was void ab initio. The annulment or ignoring of such order of Addl. I: G.P. Was perfectly justified and no exception could be taken to such action.
9. At one stage of the arguments, the appellant's learned counsel drew our attention to the impugned order dated 29-6-1992 of the L-G.P. Which had prima facie annulled the AddL I.-G.P.'s Order No. 7358-59/E-III, dated 27-4-1991. According to the learned counsel the order which was annulled, as above, actually pertained to annulment of reinstatement of policeman Ali Sher Jakhrani and not that of the appellant Muhammad Hassan. He, therefore, submitted that the appellant's reinstatement having remained intact, his reinstatement if already disturbed should immediately be restored. In the light of above submissions of the appellant's learned counsel we called for the explanation of the learned AA.-G. Who has produced T.P. Message dated 22-10-1992 from P.O.L.
10. Sindh, Karachi, addressed to D.I.G-P., Larkana and S.P. Jacobabad, clarifying that due to typographical error instead of annulling the reinstatement Order No. 14189-90/E-QI, dated 21-7-1991 of the appellant Muhammad Hassan, the reinstatement Order No. 7358-59/E-III, dated 27-4-1991 had been annulled. The said T.P. Message required the necessary rectification to be made. As such the objection of the learned counsel was without any force. Even otherwise if the impugned order really did not pertain to the appellant, how then he felt aggrieved and challenged the same in this appeal. More over a cursory glance at the impugned order would reveal that at its top the reference was made to review petition of the appellant and not of Ali Sher Jakhrani. Accordingly we accept the explanation furnished by the learned A.A: G. That due to typing mistake the order bearing wrong number and date was typed in place of the actual order.
11. For above reasons we see no force in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.