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PLD 1970 Karachi 444

MESSRS PUNJAB SOAP FACTORY, LAHORE vs THE ASSISTANT REGISTRAR OF

CitationPLD 1970 Karachi 444
CourtSindh High Court
Judge(s)Noorul Arfin
ResultH.

This appeal is under section 76 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 and seeks to challenge the order, dated 5-3-1964 of the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks refusing registration of the appellant's mark consisting of the words "Punjab Soap Factory". The registration was refused on the ground that these words were not adapted to distinguish under sec--petition 6(1)(a) of the Act, under which the name of a company, individual, or a firm may be registered as a trade mark if it is represented in special or particular manner.

2. The learned Advocate for the appellants, Mr. A. A. Zari, contended that by long user since 1927, these words have acquired a secondary signification and have become distinctive of the appellants' goods and, therefore, are registr--able as a trade mark under section 6(1)(e) and (3) of the Act, which permits registration of a mark upon evidence of its distinctiveness. Under subsection (3), the registrar is required, in determining whether a trade mark is adapted to distinguish, to have regard to the extent to which-

(a) the mark is inherently adapted to distinguish, and

(b) the mark has in fact become adapted to distinguish by reason of use.

3. The appellants' case now, is not for registration under section 6(1)(a), but under section 6(1)(e) read with subsec--petition (3). For this purpose, the appellant has relied on the use of the words "Punjab Soap Factory" since 1927 and the registration of this mark with the Sub-Registrar of Assurances, Calcutta. But this use of the words has not been as trade mark, but only as the firm name of the appellants. The registration with the Sub-Registrar of Assurances, Calcutta was also not the registration of a trade mark, but was a mere declara--petition of ownership of these words.

It cannot be said that a firm name, can become distinctive for the purpose of appropriation as a trade mark without, however, being used in relation to the owner's goods. In my opinion, the require--ment of section 6(1)(e) and subsection (3) is that the use of a mark should have been in respect of the goods and by such use the mark must have become adapted to distinguish the goods. But there is no evidence to establish that the words "Punjab Soap Factory" have been used not merely as a firm name but to describe the appellants' goods since 1927 and have thereby become distinctive of the products of the appellants.

4. But assuming that the user of these words by the appel--lants was as a trade mark, and that the words have thereby acquired distinctiveness in fact, this by itself would not entitle the appellants to obtain registration of these words B under the Trade Marks Act. In the connected Misc. Appeal No. 76 of 1964, I have held that distinctiveness under sec--petition 6(1)(e) and subsection (3) would depend on whether-

(a) the trade mark is inherently adapted to distingu--ish, and

(b) the use of the trade mark has made the mark adapted to distinguish.

Even if the appellants' statement is accepted that the words "Punjab Soap Factory" have in fact become distinc--tive of the appellant's products by long user, the question would still remain whether these words are inherently adapted to distinguish. It is not disputed that the words " Soap " and "Factory" are merely descriptive. The word " Punjab " is a geographical name and, as held by me in Misc. Appeal C No. 76 of 1964, geographical names are generally not suitable for use as trade marks. The names of well-known places are incapable of becoming inherently adapted to denote goods of a trader or manufacturer, because no person can be given a monopoly of such names. It is not, and cannot, be disputed that the word "Punjab" is a well-known geographical name.

It cannot be maintained that this word has any innate distinctiveness or could have acquired any secondary significa--petition with respect to the appellants' goods. In this view of the matter. I see no merit in this appeal which is consequently dismissed but with no order as to costs.

Cited by 3 cases

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