SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J: --These three appeals under Article 212(3) of the Constitution have been filed by the same appellant and relate to grievances not very dissimilar and leave was granted in all the three and these have been heard together.
2. The earliest in point of time is Civil Appeal No, 446 of 1990. In this appeal a grievance was made against the seniority list of Grade-19 Officers in the Police Occupational Group wherein the appellant was shown at Serial No. 86 while the contesting respondent No. 2 in that appeal was shown at Serial No. 76. This appeal was filed on 24-11-1987 before the Tribunal and the Tribunal held it to be time-barred observing as hereunder:-- "The appellant did concede while arguing the appeal that the appeal was filed after 32 days of the period of limitation. But he urged that the order of the induction of the respondent No. 2 in the Police Service of Pakistan was void ab initio and, therefore, question of limitation would not arise; and in any case, the delay in filing the appeal is condonable even otherwise in view of the circumstances stated in the application for condonation of delay. The grounds stated in the condonation application are that the appellant was holding dual charge in the office as his immediate superior officer was away on Staff College course and the appellant also had to proceed abroad on official duty on 23-10-1987 and on his return, he attended to another petition and after doing that, he filed this appeal. The grounds stated do not furnish satisfactory explanation to more than a month's delay in filing the appeal. As regards the nature of order of the respondent No. 2, the notification of his appointment was issued, on 30-11-1986 but the appellant did not challenge that notification at an earlier stage and he made his cause of action, if any, time-barred. The cases relied upon by him, therefore, do not advance his case. The appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed as time-barred.
Since the appeal is held to be time-barred, the merits of the case are not adverted to."
Leave to appeal was granted in the matter to examine whether the appellant could overcome the bar of limitation by pleading that the appointment of the aforesaid respondent No. 2 was made by an incompetent authority, was in violation of the law on the subject and had to be treated for that reason as ad hoc appointment.
3. The next in point of time is Civil Appeal No. 141 of 1992. It was instituted before the Tribunal on 8-2- 1980 challenging the induction policy framed and implemented by the Government of Pakistan in respect of the Police Occupational Group. The appellant pleaded that he came to know of it when upon a request made he was supplied a copy of it on 10-1-1988. The Tribunal disposed of this appeal upholding the preliminary objection to it as hereunder:-- "We have considered the matter and find that no order has been passed by the respondent in the case of the appellant under which he can be said to have been aggrieved within the meaning of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Therefore, on the basis of facts as stated in the memo.
Of appeal and the documents annexed thereto the appellant cannot call in question before this Tribunal the vires of "Induction Policy" under the provisions of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The appeal being incompetent is dismissed in limine."
Leave to appeal was granted to examine the following points arising in the service appeal before the Tribunal:-- "(i) Whether the induction policy dated 10-2-1980 satisfied in all respects requirement of the Constitution and the law, to achieve efficacy?
(ii) Whether the rule of seniority framed thereunder can hold the field?
(iii) Whether the seniority of respondents Nos. 2 to 28 in C.P.L.A. 141-R of 1989 has been correctly fixed?"
4. The third appeal (Civil Appeal No. 142/1992) was filed before the Service Tribunal on 7-4-1988 claiming seniority over respondents Nos. 3 to 29 and all the consequential benefits arising out of refixation of such seniority. This service appeal related to a matter which already stood decided against the appellant but he wanted to re-agitate the matter on disclosure of certain information and decisions which became available to him subsequently and which according to him were available to the Government all the time but were withheld from him. In this service appeal also the preliminary question of its maintainability in view of the earlier decision in Service Appeal No. 118-- R/1983 arose. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that after the decision had been given by the Service Tribunal in the earlier appeal, no fresh order had been passed to justify a second appeal on the same subject. It expressed its conclusion in the following words:-- "In the instant appeal, he is seeking the same relief in inverted form that the respondents Nos. 2 to 29 be declared junior to him and he may be given seniority accordingly. Of course, the second appeal may not be barred altogether if it is based on certain facts which were not within the knowledge of the appellant during the pendency of the earlier proceedings or new facts having emerged from subsequent developments. Nevertheless, the appellant had to project his case to the departmental authorities and then come to the tribunal if the grievance were not redressed departmentally. In the instant case, the appellant states that he did make representation for reconsideration of his case on the basis of the facts which, according to him, came to his knowledge later. He has filed a copy of his petition to the President of Pakistan dated 10-2-1987 for the relief of seniority. He awaited orders on his representation for 90 days and he filed this appeal on 9-4-1988 without waiting further for the orders. Appeal to the tribunal lies against final order, original or appellate, as provided under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. In the appellant's case agitated afresh. There is no order, original or appellate, to appeal against before this tribunal. Thus, the appeal is premature and is dismissed in limine."
Leave to appeal was granted in this case in the same terms in which it was granted in the other appeal (CA. No. 141/1992) and is already reproduced.
5. We have heard at great length the learned counsel for the parties on the merits of the case and on all aspects of it. The first and the primary question to be examined in all these matters is whether the decision of the Service Tribunal with regard to the maintainability of the appeals is liable to be interfered with.
6. In the first appeal (Civil Appeal No. 446/1990) it was conceded before the Service Tribunal that the appeal was barred by 32 days. The explanation given for this delay has not satisfied, the Tribunal. The reasons given before us also do not fully account for the delay. An effort has been made to avoid this delay by claiming that order impugned was void ab initio and that there was a subsisting grievance in the matter which could justify institution of service appeal at any time.
The concept of delay, laches or inaction has an altogether different qualitative content in matters other than service cases. In service matters, the importance of prompt action was examined in the context of a Constitution petition and mandamus in the case of the Chairman, District Screening Committee, Lahore and another v. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi (PLD 1976 SC 258). This principle of promptness in bringing service grievances before the Courts of equity was given a statutory form in the Service Tribunals Act where while the departmental appeal itself was pending decision, a right was conferred for preferring an appeal to the Service Tribunal. The time prescribed was short.
The rules made it possible for a dissatisfied civil servant to even file his appeal by post. All these factors pointed to a strict application of the period of I limitation prescribed under the law.
7. As regards the order of appointment being void and the avoidance o: period of limitation, the same reported case was reconsidered as Sharif Ahmad Hashmi v. Chairman, Screening Committee, Lahore and another 1978 SCM R 367. Even assuming the voidness of the order the bar of limitation could not be avoided in the case of the appellant as there was no satisfactory explanation for it and the equities were against it. Hence, the decision of the Service Tribunal does not call for interference in this appeal (Civil Apnea: No.446/1990) and maintained.
8. In the second appeal (Civil Appeal No. 141/1992), the tribunal was in error in holding that the policy letter of 10-2-1980 did not amount to an order or a departmental order or a final order. An order for the purposes of Service Tribunals Act can have many forms. It may be a general order. It may be a particular order directed against an individual. It may be a policy decision. It may be a decision of a particular grievance or an order refusing to redress a grievance. All such orders, if they affect the terms and conditions of the service of the employee would qualify as departmental orders ex facie issued by the authority within the department empowered to do so. Hence, such orders would be amenable to appellate jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. A similar policy decision in the case of revision of pension had been the subject-matter of litigation in I. A. Sharwani and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad and others (1991 SCM R 1041) and the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal was upheld in all such cases.
9. There is, however, a more relevant objection to the competency of this service appeal not considered by the Tribunal but covered by the law laid down by this Court. The Policy decision dated 10-2-1980 related to induction of Army Officers in Unified Grade-18. When it was passed and came into effect the appellant was not in that Grade. He came in that grade subsequently when it had already been in force for sometime. The decisions of this Court in Khan Faizullah Khan v.
Government of Pakistan through The Establishment Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat and another (PLD 1974 SC 291) and Muhammad Umar Malik and others v. Federal Service Tribunal and others PLD 1987 SC 172 lay down the law that a person not in the particular grade but expecting to come into that grade cannot challenge the alterations of the rules relating to that higher grade. At the time when this policy of induction was enforced the appellant could not have objected to it being in the lower grade. After it has remained in force he cannot claim locus standi to challenge it on entry in the Grade. Besides, this circular under attack is dated 10-2-1980 and the attack to it was made in 1988. This will also attract the principles laid down by this Court in Sharif Ahmad Hashmi's case and would bar the maintainability of the appeal.
10. As regards the third appeal (Civil Appeal No. 142/1992), the matter decided earlier could not be reopened by a separate service appeal on the same subject unless there were good grounds for doing so. The Service Tribunal has not found the grounds sound and sufficient. The main reason given in support of a second appeal on the same cause is that during the course of another litigation the Government took up a position in respect of another Occupational Group namely, Secretariat Group, that there was during the relevant period no policy of induction of Army Officers in the Secretariat Group and it was all against law. Such an admission or disclosure even if made by the Government related to a particular Secretariat Group. In the Occupational Group to which the appellant belonged there was no such admission nor can that admission be interpreted and extended to cover this Occupational Group. Such a disclosure or plea taken by the Government in respect of another Group would not justify the reagitation of the same matter which stood earlier decided. It is against this principle of finality of adjudication.
11. In the result we find that none of the service appeals was competent before the Service Tribunal for the reasons recorded or approved by us and we would not like to express anything on the merits while disposing of these appeals on a preliminary point with regard to their maintainability because our jurisdiction under Article 212(3) of the Constitution is limited to a matter and question decided by the Service Tribunal.
12. These appeals fail and are therefore dismissed with no order as to costs.