1. SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.--- The respondents in the above appeal alongwith one Banaras were tried by the Special Court (Suppression of Terrorist Activities) Rawalpindi, under sections 302/34 and 307/34, P.P.C. Banaras accused died during pendency of the trial. Out of the remaining 9 accused, respondents 6 to 9 were acquitted by the trial Court. Respondents 1 to 5 were convicted by the trial Court under section 302/34, P.P.C. For committing murder of Nazakat Ali and sentenced to life imprisonment, fine of Rs,50,000 and compensation Rs,50,000 to be paid by each one of them.
2. In default of payment of fine and compensation each one of them was directed to suffer R.Is. For 2 years and six months respectively. Respondents 1 to 5 were also found guilty under section 307/34, P.P.0 for launching murderous assault on Ashiq Ali (P.W. 10) and were sentenced to 10 years' R.I. And fine of Rs,1,000 each and in default to suffer R.I. For six months. They were also directed to pay compensation amounting to Rs, 5,000 each to the injured Ashiq Ali and in default thereof to suffer R.I. For three months. The substantive sentences awarded to respondents 1 to 5 under sections 302/34 and 307/34, P.P.C. Respectively were ordered to run consecutively.
3. ' On appeal filed by respondents 1 to 5 against their conviction and sentences as aforesaid, the High Court set aside their conviction and sentences and acquitted them in the case. The Criminal Revision Application filed by the petitioners against the acquittal of respondents 6 to 9 in the case was also dismissed by the High Court.
4. Leave was granted in case to consider whether acquittal of respondents 1 and 3 to 5 in the case was properly recorded by the High Court in accordance with the principles of safe administration of justice in criminal cases. It was noticed at the time of granting leave in the case that the petition was barred by 274 days and as such the question of limitation was left open to be argued at the time of hearing of the appeal.
5. ' The learned counsel for the respondents very vehemently argued that the appellant has failed to make out a case for condonation of delay in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Saldera v. Muhammad Yar and others PLD 1981 SC 241. The appeal is barred by 274 days. The appellant was represented before the High Court by a counsel. The judgment of the High Court dismissing the Criminal Revision Application of appellant, in limine, and allowing the appeal of respondents 6 to 9, was passed on 26-7-1992. The appellant applied for copy of the judgment of the High Court on 14-9-1992 and it was granted to her the same day. The petition for leave to appeal was filed on 26-5-1993. In her application for condonation of delay filed alongwith the leave petition, the appellant has explained the delay of 274 days as follows:-- "3. It is submitted with respect that the petitioner is the mother of the deceased as well as the injured in this case. Her husband is a patient and he cannot move about. On account of his having: become disabled he was discharged from the Army. Her son is of younger age. The deceased and injured family is a poor family. They cannot afford the expenses for litigation. The uncle of the deceased who had lodged the report with police is also not well of and he also being fed up with litigation and having no expenses did not challenge the impugned judgment in this Honourable Court. There is yet another reason for his not perusing the matter and it was that the accused- respondents were extending threats to him that if he continues proceeding/prosecuting the case, he would be met with dire consequences. The similar threats were being extended to the petitioner and his other family members. This coupled withthe fact of poverty and other meagre resources and poor family circumstances were the factors which delayed the matter, but the petitioner being mother of the deceased and the injured could not resist further and decided to challenge the decision in spite of his poverty. She, therefore, approached this Honourable Court with an application on 24-1-1993 for the services of a counsel free of charges. An application for condonation of delay was also moved. On this application an order was passed by this Honourable Court and a letter dated 10-2-1993 was written by the Assistant Registrar of this, Honourable Court to the Chairman, Free Legal Aid Committee, Pakistan Bar Council. The undersigned A.O.R. Was then appointed as A.O.R. By order dated 22-2-1993. The Counsel's appointment come to be made on 10- 3-1993. He was Ch. Muhammad Akram. Sh. Muhammad Naeem, Advocate, who was pursuing the matter was also appointed as counsel vide order dated 28-3-1993."
6. ' However, in her letter dated 20-1-1993, which she addressed to the Registrar of this Court for providing assistance of a counsel free of charge to pursue her case, she sated that the parties were trying for a compromise in the case and through such tactics of respondents her appeal became time-barred. It would appear from the above-stated facts that the reasons given by her in her application for condonation of delay filed alongwith the petition for leave to appeal, are totally different from those which she disclosed in her letter addressed to Registrar of this Court on 20-1- 1993. Apart from it, she failed to disclose any reason for not obtaining the copy of judgment of the High Court when the complainant was represented by a counsel before the High Court and she was aware of the judgment of the Court. This Court in the case of Saldera v. Muhammad Yar and others (supra) while refusing to condone the delay of 38 days in filing a petition for leave to appeal against an acquittal judgment observed as follows:- "In cases where a petitioner seeks reversal of an acquittal recorded in favour of an accused person, this Court has already ruled in `Piran Ditta v. The State and 2 others' 1970 SCM R 282 that the delay is condoned only in those cases where the petitioner is prevented by an B act of the accused person to file the petition for special leave to appeal in time.
7. ' Even earlier this Court observed in Nabi Bakhsh v. Ghulam Sarwar and others 1968 SCM R 780:-- `This Court has already ruled that delay in an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal filed by a private complainant is not to be condoned unless it can be shown that the person seeking leave was actually kept out of knowledge of the acquittal, and/or prevented by some act of the respondents themselves from coming in time.'
8. ' This view was based on the principal enunciated by this Court in `Abdul Qayyum v. Ghulam Yasin'
9. PLD 1963 SC 151. Although, the delay in that case was of only 15 days yet this Court refused to condone it for the following reasons: `Although this is a petition in a criminal case, the fact that it is out of time by 15 days cannot be condoned. It seeks enhancement of a punishment of transportation for life awarded in a murder case, to the capital punishment. The convict might be placed once again in peril of his life by a petition of this kind, and it is for this reason that the technical requirement of limitation assumes importance. It is not too much to ask that he who seeks to place his fellow-citizens' life in peril, by legal process, should satisfy all the technical requirements of that process. Delay would scarcely ever be condoned, and certainly not only the grounds here advanced, namely, that the petitioner was misinformed about the period of limitation, and that he was delayed in his village through the serious illness of his wife.
10. ' The petition is dismissed/as barred by time."
11. ' In Mst. Rabia Bibi v. Rasool Bakhsh and other PLD 1966 SC 531 this Court emphasized the principle laid down in Abdul Qayyum v. Ghulam Yasin in that the order granting leave to appeal was withdrawn for the reason that the petition for leave to appeal was barred by time, although it was specifically noticed that on consideration of merits of the case, the order granting leave to appeal was fully justified. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:-- "Having heard Mr. Sardar Muhammad on the merits of the case, we may say that the grant of such leave was amply justified by considerations arising out of the merits of the matters, but, however that may be, the rule laid down by this Court in the case of Abdul Qayyum v. Ghulam Yasin cited above is one which is clearly in accordance with right principle and no circumstances appear out of the relevant facts in the present case to justify any departure from that rule. Accordingly, the order which we make in this case is that the leave granted to Mst. Rabia Bibi to appeal against the acquittal of Rasool Bakhsh and Khan Muhammad is rescinded, and the order by which that leave was granted on the 29th June, 1964, is hereby withdrawn. The result is that this appeal which was entertained in consequence of the grant of leave also fails.'
12. It cannot be overemphasized that the right to life is the basic right that human beings possess.
13. Once a charge for a capital offence, duly tried, results in acquittal, the accused person acquires a very precious right and he should not therefore be put in jeopardy of his life by a petition for leave to appeal filed out of time. The law that enables interference with the acquittal must therefore be strictly applied in favour of the accused persons.
14. ' In the present case, the reasons shown for the condonation of delay are so vague that even otherwise these do not deserve consideration. In view of the principles repeatedly laid down by this Court, this is a totally misconceived petition."
15. In view of the above-stated facts and the legal position the reasons stated by the appellant in support of her application for condonation of delay besides being conflicting, are totally vague she has failed to make out a case for condonation of the delay in filing the petition for leave to appeal.
16. Though the appeal is liable to be dismissed as time-barred, we have also found on examination that on merits too, no case for interference with the acquittal judgment of the High Court is made out.
17. ' According to prosecution the deceased Nazakat Ali died as a result of firing by respondents Nos.1, 2 and 3 while Ashiq Ali (P.W. 10) was injured by the firing of respondent No,4. Respondent No,2 was found to be a blind person by the police and his name was placed in column No,2 of the Challan.
18. The trial Court, however, convicted him but High Court acquitted him. Leave has been refused by this Court in the case of respondent No,2. Respondents Nos. 1 and 3 were allegedly armed with Klashnikov and 7 m.m. Rifles respectively. Respondent No,4 was armed with a single bore .12 gun.
19. Respondent No,5 was allegedly armed with .12 bore-double barrel gun but he was not attributed any fire in F.I.R. The police placed his name also in column No,2 of the Challan but trial Court convicted him. The High Court, however, acquitted him in the case. The post-mortem report of the deceased showed that the deceased suffered 13 fire-arm wounds, out of them injuries Nos. 5, 7 and 13 were described as exit wounds. The remaining entry wounds on the person of deceased were stated to be 1 c.m. x 1 c.m. In size. It is conceded by the learned counsel for the appellant that wounds of this size could not be caused by a Klashnikov or a 7 m.m. Rifle's bullet. There was no injury on the person of the deceased which could be attributed to a fire of a Klashnikov or a 7 m.m.
20. Rifle. Javed son of Afsar (respondent No, 4) who was said to be armed with .12 bore single-barrel gun was not attributed any fire on the deceased. It is, therefore, quite clear that the medical evidence negatived the version of the prosecution that the deceased was fired at by respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 by their respective fire-arms which were Klashanikov and 7 m.m. Rifle. No doubt P.W.
21. Ashiq All was an injured witness therefore his presence at the spot could not be doubted but in view of the admitted deep-rooted enmity between the parties, the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that corroboration of the statement of Ashiq All from the other independent pieces of evidence in the case was necessary in the circumstances. The recovery of Klashnikov from Mumtaz Khan son of Ghulam Khan (respondent No,1) and 7 m.m. Rifle from Firdous Khan son of Banaras Khan (respondent No,3) could not provide any corroboration to the ocular testimony in the case as admittedly the injuries found on the body of the deceased could neither be caused by a Klashnikov nor a 7 m.m. Rifle fire. Similarly, there was no explanation in the prosecution evidence for presence of empties of .12 bore at the roof of the shop. The .12 bore gun recovered from the possession of respondent No,4 did not match with the empties recovered from the spot. No recovery was made from respondent No,
5. In these circumstances, the High Court rightly reached the conclusion that in the absence of corroboration of the ocular testimony in the case with other independent pieces of evidence, the case against respondents Nos.1 and 3 to 5 could not be said to have been established beyond reasonable doubt. It is well-established rule of law that an acquittal judgment cannot be interfered with by an appellate Court only on the ground that on reappraisal of evidence that Court has reached a conclusion different from that of the lower Court. The appellate Court can only interfere with the acquittal judgment if it finds that the conclusions reached by the lower Court on the evidence on record are such that no reasonable person would have reached the same or the Court below while acquitting the accused in the case has misread the evidence in a way which resulted in the miscarriage of justice. No such case is made out. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.