This judgment shall dispose of W.P. No. 15364/93 (Mst. Tiyaba Bibi v. The Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P. No. 15365/93 (Basharat Ali v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P. No.15366/93 (Muhammad Ashraf v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P. No. 15367/93 (Abaidullah v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P. No. 15368/93 (Akram Masih v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P. No. 15369/93 (Hassan Raza v.
Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P. No. 15370/93 (Muhammad Latif v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P. No.15371/93 (Muhammad Arshad v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P. No. 15372/93 (Abdul Rehman v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P. No. 15373/93 (Javed Iqbal v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P. No. 15374/93 (Azmat Ali v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra,), W.P. No. 15375/93 (Iqbal Ahmad v.
Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P.No.15376/93 (Liaqat Ali v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P. No.1537'7/93 (Hafiz Umar Hayat v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P.No.-15378/93 (Allah Ditta v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P. No. 15379/93 (Muhammad Jameel v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P. No. 15380/93 (Muhammad Saleem v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra); W.P. No. 15381/93 (Muhammad Shafiq v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P.No.15382/93 (Muhammad Riaz v.
Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), W.P. No. 15383/93 (Shaukat Ali v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), and W.P. No. 15384/93 (Muhammad Qasim v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra), together, as common question of law and facts arise in all of them.
2. The facts are that Municipal Committee, Gojra, advertised certain posts in the press for selection of suitable candidates to fill up the existing vacancies to effectively run the affairs of the Committee. In response, the petitioners applied for their appointment on such posts. They were tested and interviewed by the Selection Board, which was constituted for the said purpose. In consequence, the petitioners were selected and appointment letters were issued to them on 8-7- 1993. The petitioners accepted their appointments and joined the service by starting the performance or their official duties in the Committee. On 15-8-1993, all the local councils in the Province were dissolved by the Government of the Punjab. On 24-8-1993, the services of the petitioners were terminated by the respondent, Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra, saying that their services were no more needed. The said orders were challenged by the petitioners before this Court vide W.P. No.10767/93 (Muhammad Qasim and 23 others v. The Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra). On 1-9-1993, of his own, the impugned orders, referred to above, were withdrawn by Mr. Muhammad Afsar, Sajid, Assistant y Commissioner/Administrator, Municipal Committee, Gojra. In other words, the main ground that services of the petitioners were not needed, in fact, stood abandoned by the respondent for all intents and purposes. The writ petition was, thus, disposed of as having been fructified. The petitioners were, accordingly, reinstated in their service in view of withdrawal of the impugned orders.
3. On 19-9-1993, unfortunately, fresh notices vide Annexure `B' were issued to the petitioners for termination of their services because they were appointed when there was complete ban imposed on fresh recruitment in the Municipal Committee. Reliance in this behalf was placed on a letter dated 25-5-1993. The petitioners contested the validity of the show-cause notices by sending written replies vide Annexure `B/1', disclosing that there was no ban when their appointments were made and as such there was no lawful authority vested in the respondent to proceed against them. On 21-10-1993, the services of the petitioners were again terminated by the respondent, this time, on the ground that their appointments were void because there was ban already imposed on fresh recruitment in the Municipal Committee. The petitioners have challenged the validity of said orders by means of these Constitution petitions before this Court.
4. It is contended with vehemence by the learned counsel that there was no ban in existence at the time of recruitment of the petitioners inasmuch as they were appointed on 8-7-1993 while the ban was admittedly imposed on 28-7-1993. It is maintained that after decision of the first writ petition in favour of the petitioner, in the first round of litigation, there was no justification in law and facts with the respondent to disturb the services of the petitioners for the second time. It is stated that the petitioners have continuously been doing their duties. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent argues that in presence of the ban, the respondent was not competent to provide employment to the petitioners and as such their appointment letters were issued without lawful authority. At any rate, he argues that the petitioners were heard by the Committee before passing the impugned orders.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also perused the record with their assistance. In the first round of litigation, W.P.No. 10767/93 (Muhammad Qasim etc. v. Administrator, Municipal Committee) was disposed of as having been fructified on the statement of Muhammad Afsar Sajid, Administrator, Municipal Committee, because the impugned orders were withdrawn by him. It may be noted that in the first round of litigation, plea of ban, although available, was not taken by the respondent-functionary for unknown reasons. Their plea was that services of the petitioners were not needed by the Committee. A different plea of ban has now been taken in these proceedings, on the second thought with mala fides. It is well settled that a litigant cannot be permitted to take at his pleasure, different grounds on different occasions to suit his needs. The plea of ban was available but it was not pressed into service by the respondent against the petitioners in the first instance. Even otherwise, there is no substance in the argument inasmuch as the impugned letter dated 28-7-1993 shows that ban, if any, was imposed on 28-7- 1993 while the petitioners head already been appointed on their posts on 8-7-1993 much earlier to the crucial date. The date of imposition of ban namely 28-7-1993 was not disputed by the respondent during the hearing of the case. This being so, the appointment of the petitioners were made by the competent authority when there was no ban, on recruitment. As pointed out above, the posts were advertised in the Press to be filled by suitable candidates. The petitioners were found fit and were employed in the Committee. Till today, they have continuously been performing their functions in the Municipal Committee to the entire satisfaction of the respondent. To begin with, respondent dispensed "'with the services of the petitioners because they were not needed by the Committee. This time, they have come out with a. Different plea of ban, which was not raised earlier. The; respondent, therefore, cannot be permitted to give up the first plea by taking I up another at different stage to suit his whim in order to deprive the petitioners; of their right to have employment in the Municipal Committee. In such a situation, the respondent is, undoubtedly, guilty of approbation and' reprobation. The petitioners were appointed against permanent posts and as such, they shall be deemed to have been appointed on permanent basis. In this' view of the matter, the impugned orders are not at all sustainable in law. The impugned orders dated 21-10-1993 are, therefore, set aside by declaring them to have been passed without lawful authority and of no legal consequence. The petitions succeed and are allowed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.