1. ' SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.---The above petition under Order XXXIIi, Rules 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 has been tiled seeking the following relief:-- "In view of the above, it is prayed that the Supreme Court as a whole may make an appropriate Order to harmonize the two judgments rendered in Civil Appeal No, 39/92 and Crl. Appeal No, 49/91 in such a manner as may be deemed necessary by it in the interest of justice, and also for giving full effect to the Judgment and Order made in Criminal Appeal No, 18/92 as also to prevent Writ Petition No,1989/89 from becoming infructuous."
2. ' The petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the deceased in various murder cases which are pending in the High Court and their interest has been adversely affected on account of alleged conflict in the two decisions of this Court reported as Hakim Khan and 3 others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Interior and others (PLD 1992 SC 595) and Eid Muhammad and another v. The State (PLD 1993 SC 17).
3. ' We have heard Dr. A. Basit, the learned counsel for the petitioners in support of the above petition.
4. The main grievance of Dr. A. Basit is that this Court while deciding the case of Eid Muhammad (supra) made the following observations on a point which did not arise in the case:- "21. An argument was also addressed that this relief or amnesty covered only those who were convicted by the Military Courts during the Martial Law period and were political prisoners and the benefit did not extend to the convicts sentenced by other Courts. The summary submitted by the Secretary, Interior and title of subject do so suggest but the Prime Minister in her recommendation/advice to the President sought approval of commutation of all death sentences awarded by the Military or other Courts up to 6th of December 1988 to imprisonment for life. This dispensation was without qualification or condition and benefited the others who were not political prisoners or cases of conviction by Military Courts. The very expression 'Military or other Courts' would suggest that the words 'other Courts' were used in contradiction and exclusion of Military Courts."
5. ' According to the learned counsel prior to the decision of Eid Muhammad's case (supra) this Court in the case of Hakim Khan (supra) while remanding the cases to the High Court had left the question relating to the scope of the Amnesty Order issued by the President of Pakistan, in exercise of his power under Article 45 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, to be determined by the High Court. It is, accordingly, contended by the learned counsel that large number of people including the petitioners were interested in the decision of those murder cases which became pending in the High Court as a result of the decision in Hakim Khan's case (supra). However, before these cases could be decided in terms of the decision of this Court in Hakim Khan's case, this Court delivered the judgment in Eid Muhammad's case which sealed the fate of all those cases. The !Contention of Dr. A. Basit is, that firstly, the above-quoted observations in Eid Muhammad's case were given on a point which did not arise in Eid Muhammad's case and secondly, if this Court was inclined to decide this point in Eid Muhammad's case, it should have kept in view in earlier decision in Hakim Khan's case under which it remanded the cases to the High Court for decision on this very point. It is accordingly, contended that in these circumstances, this Court should have heard all those persons whose cases became pending as a result of decision in Hakim Khan's case, before deciding Eid Muhammad's case, as their interest was likely to be affected by the decision of this Court in Eid Muhammad's case. The learned counsel on the above premises contended that there is obvious conflict in the above-referred two decisions of this Court to the extent that in Hakim Khan's case this Court had left the question of determination of the scope of the Amnesty Order issued by the President on 6-12-1988 by the High Court in remand proceedings, while in Eid Muhammad's case (supra), this Court expressed the opinion on that very point without hearing the interested parties.
6. ' After hearing the learned counsel, we are unable to find any conflict in Hakim Khan's case and Eid Muhammad's case (supra). Hakim Khan's case was decided by this Court on 19-7-1992. This case arose as a result of judgment of Full Bench of Lahore High Court in which the learned Judges of that Court held that the provisions of Article 2A of the Constitution had become in control of the Constitution and could not be violated, defied or defeated. The learned Judges of the Full Bench however, went on to observe in that case that in cases where death sentences were awarded as 'Hadd' and the principle of 'Qisas' was attracted the President could not exercise power of commutation of sentence of death under Article 45 of the Constitution as the power in such cases vests only with the heirs of the deceased. Exception was, however, made that if the death penalty was imposed by way of 'Tazeer', there was no objection to the exercise .Of power by the President to commute the sentence under Article 45 of the Constitution. After deciding the main controversy in Hakim Khan's case which related to the scope of the authority of President under Article 45 of the Constitution to grant amnesty, this Court in the leading opinion of Nasim Hassan Shah, J., with which the other learned Judges of the Full Bench also agreed, observed as follows:-- "We must also mention that Dr. Abdul Basit, so far as the merits of his appeal is concerned, pointed out that the impugned judgment of the High Court was liable to interference on yet another ground, namely, that under para. (a) of the President's Commutation Order, the relief could be granted only to political prisoners and other persons convicted by the Military Courts and that the said Order did not cover cases of persons awarded death sentence by ordinary Courts. But commutation was granted, by the Authorities charged with implementing this Order, to all persons awarded death sentences prior to 7-12-1988 and that this wholesale benevolence was liable to be set aside on the basis of the grounds urged by him in the writ petition.
7. ' Accordingly, it was not at all necessary for the High Court to examine this case on the touchstone of Article 2A of the Constitution and it had fallen into error in resting its entire judgment thereon. It was, therefore, submitted that the case deserved to be remanded to the High Court for adjudication and decision of the grounds urged in the writ petition in support of this last- mentioned plea.
8. ' We are inclined to agree that this aspect of the case deserved consideration but has not been adverted to at all. Accordingly, the matter must be remanded back to the High Court for decision of this and other relevant pleas namely, to examine whether the terms of the Commutation Order applied to the cases to which its terms had erroneously been extended and whether the orders of commutation passed by the Jail Authorities in such cases were not liable to be set aside?"
9. ' From the following observations made in the separate note recorded by Shafiur Rahman, J. In Hakim Khan's case (supra), it appears that while Hakim Khan's case was being heard by the Full Bench of this Court, other cases involving the scope of Amnesty Order issued by the President on 6- 12-1988, were already heard and judgment was reserved:-- "20. As regards the remand of the matter for deciding whether the dispensation was restricted only to Martial Law convicts and to political cases and not to ordinary cases, we have already a number of cases pending awaiting decision of this Court wherein the arguments have concluded and wherein the power of amnesty actually exercised, that is, whether it related to a particular category of cases or to a particular type of convictions and sentences and not the others is directly in issue.
10. In view of pendency of those connected cases (Criminal Appeal No, 49 of 1991 etc.), it may not be necessary to remand the present matter to the High Court. All the same, as the writ petitioners are not parties in those cases and have necessarily to be heard on the question left unexamined by the High Court technically, there can be no objection to remand as is suggested by my learned brother Mr. Justice Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah."
11. ' It is, therefore, quite clear to us that in Hakim Khan's case (supra) this Court did not express any opinion with regard to scope of Amnesty Order issued by the President on 6-12-1988 as this question was already under consideration of this Court in another case. Eid Muhammad's case (supra) was decided by this Court soon after the decision of Hakim Khan's case on 30-8-1992 and in that case an argument with regard to the scope of the Amnesty Order issued by the President was examined and it was held that the Amnesty granted by the President on 6-12-1988 was not confined to those convicts only who were convicted by Martial Law Courts or were political prisoners but it also extended to prisoners who were convicted by the Ordinary Courts before the issuance of the Amnesty Order.
12. ' As earlier pointed out by us, this Court while deciding Hakim Khan's case was fully conscious that other cases in which questions of scope of the Amnesty Order issued by President were under consideration by this Court, but notwithstanding this fact Hakim Khan's case alongwith other connected matters were remanded to High Court for decision on the scope of the Amnesty Order of President dated 6-12-1988. However, remand of Hakim Khan's case to High Court did not mean that the cases relating to scope of Amnesty Order of President which were heard separately by this Court could not be decided until the decision in the cases remanded to High Court were available.
13. ' In the above-stated circumstances it may be true that the petitioners who were complainant in the murder cases which became pending as a result of decision of this Court in Hakim Khan's case (supra), were affected by the decision in Eid Muhammad's case (supra) but for that reason neither it could be said that there existed any conflict in the ratio of these two cases nor it was necessary for this Court to hear all those persons whose cases were pending before Lahore High Court, before deciding Eid Muhammad's case. We are unable to accept the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that in view of the decision in Hakim Khan's case, this Court could not decide the scope of Amnesty Order of President dated 6-12-1988, as this very question was remanded to the High Court for decision by this Court in Hakim Khan's case. We also do not agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners that before deciding the scope of Amnesty Order of President all those persons whose cases became pending as a result of remand order of this Court in Hakim Khan's case should have been heard. Under Article 189 of the Constitution, the decision of this Court in so far it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law is binding on all.
14. Courts. This binding effect applies equally to a case which is pending before any Court or which may arise subsequently. Therefore, the pendency of a case on similar or identical question of law before any Court or Tribunal either in the ordinary course or as a result of remand of the case by this Court cannot be urged as a ground to withhold decision on that point by this Court as it is likely to affect the decision of the pending case by the subordinate Court or Tribunal. The learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to point out any rule of law or any Constitutional provision which required that the Supreme Court should stay its decision on a legal proposition which is likely to affect some pending cases before the High Court or other Tribunals.
15. ' The learned counsel for the petitioners, lastly, contended that in spite of the decision in Eid Muhammad's case (supra), the petitioners are entitled to contend that the decision in Eid Muhammad's case (supra) is not in accordance with the law and deserved to be reviewed. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is premature at this stage, as admittedly the cases in which the petitioners are party before the High Court are still pending decision. After decision of these cases, it will be open to the petitioners to approach this Court and if it is so available to them, they can pray for review of the judgment in Eid Muhammad's case (supra). The present petition, in our view, is not maintainable and misconceived which is, accordingly, dismissed.