' This judgment shall dispose of Writ Petitions Nos.9574/92 and 1087/93, both of which involve the same controversy.
2. Mst. Saiqa, the petitioner herein, was married to Khalid Iqbal, respondent No,3, on 23-5-1990. Out of this wedlock, a son was born, who is living with the petitioner. It is unfortunate that disputes and differences arose between the spouses, whereupon she filed a suit against respondent No,3 for dissolution of her marriage on the grounds of cruelty, misappropriation of articles of dowry and Khula`. Respondent No,3, in addition to contesting that case, also instituted a suit for restitution of conjugal rights. Both the suits were tried together by the Family Court, which framed the following consolidated issues:
(1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a Khula` divorce, if so, on what terms and conditions? OPP.
(2) Whether the plaintiff was treated by the defendant with a habitual cruel behaviour? OPP.
(3) Whether the defendant deprived the plaintiff from bona fide use of her articles of dowry ? OPP.
(4) - Whether the defendant is entitled to get a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights? OPD
(5) Relief.
' In support of her case, the petitioner produced Muhammad Rafique son of Karim Bakhsh as P.W.1 and her own statement was recorded as P.W.2. On the other hand, respondent No,3 examined Muhammad Farid son of Muhammad Zaman as D.W.1, his father Ali Muhammad son of Fazal Karim as D.W.2 and appeared himself as D.W.3.
3. On the basis of this evidence, it was found by the trial Court that the petitioner had failed to prove any of the issues and was not entitled to the decree for dissolution of marriage.
Consequently, the suit filed by her was dismissed while that of respondent No,3 for restitution of conjugal rights was decreed on 10-2-1992.
4. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed two appeals, both of which were dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore on 9-9-1992, who affirmed the findings of the trial Court. The petitioner has now come to this Court by filing these two Constitutional petitions.
5. The only ground, which learned counsel for the petitioner pressed before this Court, for dissolution of marriage is that of !Chula'. It is contended that it stands established on the record that the brother of respondent No,3 was making indecent overtures towards the petitioner, which were brought by her to the notice of respondent No,3, who instead of taking any remedial measures advised the petitioner to give way to the wishes of his brother and in view of that fact, the petitioner had developed hatred towards respondent No,3 making it impossible for the spouses to live together as husband and wife within the limits prescribed by Allah Almighty.
6. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent has objected to the maintainability of this petition by urging that the concurrent findings recorded by the two Courts below are not liable to be interfered with in the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court and has further contended that there was no evidence to support 'the plea that the parties cannot live together as husband and wife.
7. The objection raised by learned counsel for the respondent that in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction, this Court cannot set aside the finding on questions of fact by reappraising the evidence is well-taken. Learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to point out any misreading of evidence or non-consideration of any material on the record. The Courts below, after thorough appraisal of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the petitioner had failed to establish her allegations about the objectionable conduct of the brother of respondent No,3. An important fact, which prevailed with them, was that a sister of the petitioner, who was married to the brother of respondent No,3, was also living in the same house in addition to the parents of respondent No,3. On these facts, the inference drawn by the Courts below that it was impossible to believe that in the presence of the sister of the petitioner and the parents of respondent No,3 and other family members, who were living in the same house, the younger brother of respondent No,3, who was a student, would dare to make any attempt to harm the modesty of the petitioner, cannot be said to be unfounded.
8. There is nothing on the record to prove that it was not possible for the parties to live together as husband and wife. While appearing as her own witness, the petitioner did not make a positive statement to that effect. In cross-examination, she stated that the only reason for strained relations between her and her husband was the attitude of the brother of respondent No,3.
However, this part of the evidence has been disbelieved by the Courts below and rightly so. The petitioner having failed to satisfy the conscience of the learned Family Judge and the learned Additional District Judge that she could not live as a wife with respondent No,3, is not entitled to the decree for dissolution of marriage on the ground of Khula`.
9. As already observed, the real sister of the petitioner is married to the brother of respondent No,3 and is living with her husband happily. The marriage between the parties has been blessed with a child. The view taken by the Courts below that the petitioner was not entitled to Khula`, in the circumstances of the case, suffers from no illegality or jurisdictional defect.
' In view of what has been stated above, these petitions fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.