' MUHAMMAD BASHIR KHAN JEHANGIRI, J.---In this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, filed by Mst. Nasim Akhtar, petitioner, against: (1) Sher Afzal her husband, (2) Muhammad Irshad Khan Ex-Vice-Chairman, Municipal Committee, Haripur, (3)
Resident Magistrate, Khanpur, Tehsil and District, Haripur and (4) Sessions Judge, Haripur, wherein the judgment passed by respondent No,3 finding respondent No,1 guilty of an offence under section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (No, VIII of 1961) and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment till rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs,600 and the appellate judgment dated 8-2-1992 passed by respondent No, 4 upholding the conviction and the sentence as aforesaid were sought to be annulled and the impugned sentence aforesaid of respondent No,1 enhanced.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner and respondent No,1 were married on 16-8-1987.
Respondent No,1, however, contracted second marriage without the permission of the concerned Arbitration Council or with the consent of the petitioner. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner moved an application on 14-1-1991 before the Chairman, Union Council, Pannian, for taking an appropriate legal action against respondent No,1 which was submitted by him to the Assistant Commissioner, Haripur, who in his turn sent it to respondent No,3 for proceeding therewith in accordance with law.
Respondent No,1 when entered appearance before the Assistant Commissioner, Haripur, pleaded guilty and in consequence respondent No,3 vide his order dated 20-4-1992 sentenced him to imprisonment till rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs,600 or in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for three months. Feeling dissatisfied the petitioner filed a revision petition before the learned Sessions Judge, Haripur (respondent No,4), who upheld the decision of respondent No,3 by dismissing the revision petition vide the impugned judgment dated 8-2-1993.
Hence this petition.
3. Mr. Khurshid Khan, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that respondent No,3 passing sentence duly affirmed by respondent No,4 have shown undue leniency "on the basis of self-conceived mitigating circumstances" although no such material was available on the record and, therefore, both the impugned judgments being against law and facts were liable to be set aside and the sentence of respondent No,1 being inadequate warranted enhancement as provided under the law.
4. After hearing the learned counsel, examination of the record and the precedents on the scope of judicial review, we find that this petition which is also concluded by findings of facts cannot succeed and must be disallowed. It appears that respondent No,1 had been duly tried, found guilty and has been sentenced as stated above. This finding was maintained by the learned Sessions Judge in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction. The scope of interference in Constitutional jurisdiction with the orders passed by Courts/Tribunals possessed of exclusive jurisdiction is governed by well-defined principles of law and the Courts of this country as well as those from foreign jurisdiction have from time to time laid down some useful guidelines. However, here this is not an appropriate occasion nor do we intend to examine in depth the scope of interference in Constitutional jurisdiction, but do wish to emphasize that the Court in issuing a writ of certiorari acts in supervisory and not in appellate or revisional jurisdiction. One obvious consequence of this view is that the Court will not review finding of facts properly reached. Cases of errors of law, lack of jurisdiction, decisions given in breach of rules of natural justice as also cases of findings based on "no evidence" are some of the examples where interference could legitimately be made. But mere inadequacy of or leniency in passing the sentence in a criminal proceeding could hardly provide an occasion for a suitor to ask for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction to enhance the sentence passed.
5. As held in 'Muhammad Hussain Munir v. Sikandar and others' PLD 1974 SC 139 that High Court can interfere with the order of Special Tribunal/Court if it, reaches the conclusion that the said order is- without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The expression "without lawful authority and of no legal effect" are expressions of art and refer to jurisdictional defects as distinguished from a mere leniency in or inadequacy of sentence awarded by a criminal Court. It is well settled that where a criminal Court has jurisdiction to pass a sentence it can neither be enhanced nor reduced in the Constitutional jurisdiction on the premise that it was either insufficient, inadequate or for that matter it was harsh. The provision as contained in Article 199 of Constitution does not empower the High Court to interfere with sentence passed by a Court of inferior jurisdiction merely because the same was inadequate or lenient as in that case it would make the High Court's jurisdiction as that of appellate or revisionals Court which is not the intent of the legislature.
6. In 'Muhammad Zafarullah Khan v. Muhammad Khan and another' 1975 SCM R 473 Hamoodur Rehman, C.J., as his Lordship then was, has emphasized that the validity of an order passed in a proceeding could only have been challenged in a writ petition on the ground of want of jurisdiction or at least an error apparent on the face of the record and that the order passed therein having not suffered from any such infirmity the order of the Supreme Court affirming the dismissal of writ petition was not reviewed.
7. For the foregoing reasons, we find that there is no merit in this G petition which is accordingly dismissed in limine.