1. MUNAWAR ALI KHAN (CHAIRMAN).--The fact giving rise to this appeal are briefly stated as follows.
2. The appellant, Pinky Gloria was a Std Nurse in the Peoples Medical College Hospital, Nawabshah when due to her negligence one baby patient died on 30-7-1980. She was on her night duty, incharge of the Ward in which the death of the baby accused. The Registrar of the said ward reported the matter to the concerned authorities whereupon the appellant was served with show- cause notice dated 6th August, 1980. As her reply to the show-cause notice was found, prima facie, unsatisfactory, the appellant's services were terminated vide the office order dated 5th January, 1981 of the Medical Superintendent of the said Hospital. The appellant preferred appeal from the said order which was accepted by the Secretary, Health Department, by his order dated 31st August, ,1981. However in the same order the Medical Superintendent of the aforesaid Hospital was directed to hold fresh enquiry against the appellant in accordance with the relevant rules. In, compliance of the Secretary's directions, Enquiry Committee of three doctors was constituted on 9th September, 1981 to hold the enquiry. Some how the said Committee took very long time to submit their report on 15-5-1983. Again the Secretary, Health Department, took more than a year to pass the order on 17th September, 1984, terminating the services of the appellant. It is not clear from the record if the above latest order was challenged in departmental appeal. However by its communication dated 13th January, 1990, the appellant was intimated by the Health Department that her case had already been rejected, adding further that there was no provision to re-open the same. She was advised to approach Service Tribunal or any Court of law. On receipt of the said intimation, the appellant approached Sindh High Court instead of coming to this Tribunal-After her Constitution Petition D-13 of 1993 was dismissed by the High Court's order dated 5-4-1993, the appellant filed the present service appeal on 3-5-1993.
3. We heard Messrs M. Ishaque Abbasi and Niaz Ali Umrani for the appellant and the learned A.A.G. Mr. Abdul Latif Ansari, on behalf of the official respondents. We also carefully went. Through the relevant record available in the case file.
4. Before going into merits of the case, we would like to deal with two important legal objections. The first objection was that the appeal was not maintainable as the mandatory legal requirement relating to departmental remedy had not been fulfilled. In this connection our attention was drawn to the latest order of the Secretary, Health Department, dated 17th September, 1984, whereby the services of the appellant were terminated. Keeping the history of the case in view, it has been reproduced above the aforesaid order was obviously passed in the light of the findings of the Enquiry Committee. There is no trace on the record to show that the appellant went in departmental appeal against the above order of termination of her services. When the appellant's learned counsel were confronted in this regard, they too could not show us any document purporting to be departmental appeal. In fact they were not sure if departmental appeal was ever filed against the Health Secretary's order dated 17th September, 1984.
5. However we came across the Health Department's letter dated 13th January, 1990 whereby the appellant was intimated that as disclosed by the record her case had already been rejected. This intimation was given to her in reply to the appellant's application dated nil. When the appellant's learned counsel were asked to show us that application which brought out the above intimation of the Health Department, they were unable to do so. In absence of the said application it was difficult to pinpoint not only the request made therein and the date on which it was made but also the stage of the rejection of the case. Accordingly it was difficult to hold on the basis of the Health Department's intimation that appellant had filed departmental appeal.
6. The second legal objection is about the limitation. The appellant's application referred to in the Health Department's intimation was without date. It seems to us that after the appellant's service were terminated by the Health Secretary as far back as 1984 she perhaps took no steps whatsoever for her reinstatement and in the mean time the period of limitation for any such action had lapsed. It was at the belated stage that she either on her own or on the advice of some one else decided to agitate for restoration of her services. In our opinion that was precisely the reason that she deliberately suppressed the date of the application, she had made to the Health Department at the very late stage, requesting for justice. The application was obviously also intended to seek fresh period of limitation. But even after she received the intimation hereinabove from the Health Department, she not only did not take the right track by approaching this Tribunal but her approach to the High Court in the Constitution petition was also unduly delayed. Although she received the Health Department's above advice/intimation in January, 1990, yet she went to sleep again the took no action for three .Years, as she filed her Constitution Petition No. D-13 of 1993 obviously in the year 1993. While dismissing the appellant's Constitution petition, the learned Judges of the High Court inter alia made some observations with regard to period of limitation. As the said observations were pertinent to the findings about the limitation, they are reproduced as under:- " However by another order dated 1-1-1984 the services of the petitioner were once again terminated with immediate effect. Thereafter the appeal filed by the petitioner was also not favourably considered and hence this petition. It may be pointed out that not only the petition filed by the petitioner miserably suffers from laches as the above action has been impugned by the petitioner by this petition in 1993, but the petition is also not maintainable in view of Article 212 of the Constitution and the Service Tribunal Act, 1973 under which petitioner could take her grievance before Service Tribunal appointed under the Article. The present petition is, therefore, completely misconceived and it is dismissed in limine."
7. After dismissal of her petition by the High Court, the appellant should have felt reassured that her case had become hopelessly time-barred and therefore it would be absolutely fruitless to waste further time, energy and money in pursuing the same. Obviously even the appellant's Constitution petition filed in the High Court was very much belated, as had been rightly observed by the learned Judges of the High Court. It was filed almost after three years from the date of Health Department's communication addressed to the appellant. So far this Tribunal was concerned, the appellant wasted still more time in approaching the High Court. It is now well settled that the time wasted in pursuing the case at wrong forums was not condonable. As pointed out above, we were not convinced that as provided in proviso (a) to section 4 of the Sindh Service Tribunal Act, 1973, the appellant had availed the departmental remedy before filing the present appeal before this Tribunal and as such the appeal was liable to be dismissed on that score. Even if the Health Department's intimation dated 13 January, 1990 was construed as intimation about rejection of the appellant's departmental appeal, yet it did not disclose the date on which her case was rejected. On receipt of above intimation the appellant made no effort to secure a copy of the rejection order of her case, so that she should have known the date and the manner in which her case had already been rejected. If we take 13th January, 1990, the date of Health Department's latest communication addressed to the appellant as the starting point of limitation, even then the appellant was supposed to have filed the present appeal within 30 days of the said date i.e. Latest by 11th February, 1990. But instead of coming to this Tribunal, the appellant took her case to the High Court and there too after expiry of more than three years. As stated above it was only after she failed in High Court that she came to this Tribunal and filed the present appeal. Meanwhile the period of limitation had run out to the serious detriment of her case which had, by that time, became hopelessly time-barred.
8. For above reasons the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.