' The litigation leading to this petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by M.Y. Malik (he will be referred to as the judgment-debtor) has a long history. For the purpose of this revision petition, it is sufficient to say that the respondent Splendours International (to be called the decree-holder) brought a suit for recovery of money and this Court in R.FA. No,195 of 1988 decreed the suit to the extent of Rs,9,97,672.30 as against the claim of Rs,36,75,000 made in the suit by a judgment, dated 28-5-1988. There were two appeals before the Supreme Court. There the decree- holder, in its written arguments submitted by their counsel stated that "they would be satisfied if the decree of the High Court for a sum of Rs,9,97,672.30 is maintained and interest @ 13% is awarded to them from the date of suit till the date of payment of the decretal amount". In view of that statement the Supreme Court considered the question in its judgment dated 12-1-1991 "whether the Sellers (decree-holder) are entitled to interest pendente lite and future interest". In so doing, the Supreme Court was pleased to refer to section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure and observed: "This was a commercial transaction. The High Court has not given any reason for not allowing interest on the decretal amount during the pendency of the suit and till payment of the decretal amount. Even otherwise the value of the money has and is depreciating day by day due to inflation. It has depreciated so much that even if interest is allowed at bank rate until payment it will not compensate the seller for the loss. We would, therefore, allow interest on the decretal amount passed by the High Court at the then bank rate of 8% per annum from the date of the filing of the suit to the date of passing of the decree by the High Court and thereafter at 10% from the date till payment."
' Thus, the decree of the High Court was modified "so as to also include interest as mentioned hereinbefore".
2. There was then two review petitions by the judgment-debtor. Disposing of those review petitions, the Supreme Court held: "However, in the connected review petition, the decree of the High Court for a sum of Rs,9,97,672.30 has been reduced to Rs,7,47,672.30 and, accordingly, the interest shall be payable on the sum now decreed at the bank rate of 8% per annum from the date of filing of the suit to the date of passing of the decree by this Court (i,e, till 8-1-1992) and thereafter at 10% from the said date till payment of discharge of the decree."
3. The decree-holder then took out the execution of the decree. It appears that some property was attached and the Executing Court ordered its sale as also the arrest of the judgment-debtor by its order, dated 17-11-1992. It is against that order that this revision petition by the judgment-debtor is directed.
4. This revision petition came up for hearing on 5-12-1992. The parties then agreed that "an amount of Rs,2,00,000 out of the decretal amount shall be paid to the respondent today in Court" and that the "matter regarding the arrest of the petitioner as also auction of his property be postponed for a fortnight till 20-12-1992". It was ordered that "another amount of Rs,1,50,000 shall be paid through Pay Order in this Court on 12-12-1992". In view of this arrangement the auction of the property which was to take place on that date as also arrest was postponed till 20-12-1992. On that date another sum of Rs,1,50,000 was paid in Court by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder. On 23-12-1992 the parties agreed upon another arrangement; it was that out of the principal sum viz. Rs,7,47,672.30, the judgment-debtor would pay Rs,1,00,000 on 16-1-1993, Rs, 1,00,000 on 7-2-1993 and the remaining Rs,1,50,000 on 21-3-1993. They agreed also that after those payments had been made the parties would negotiate as regards the amount of interest and the mode of its payment and that if the abovementioned payments were paid in the manner stated above, the auction of the property and the arrest of the judgment-debtor would remain postponed. It is sufficient to say that the payments have since been made.
5. The judgment-debtor offered to pay the amount of interest by instalments. This offer was accepted by learned counsel for the decree-holder. The parties, however, failed to agree what is the amount of interest due from the judgment-debtor in accordance with the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above. While according to the judgment-debtor, the amount of interest is calculatable on Rs,7,47,672.30 at 8% per annum from the date of the suit till the decree of the Supreme Court viz. 8-1-1992 and on the same amount of Rs,7,47,672.30 at 10% per annum from 9-1- 1992 till payment, and the total amount of interest so calculated is R.10,17,972, according to the decree-holder, it is entitled to the principal sum, Rs,7,47,672.30, and the interest for the period from 5-4-1976 to 8-1-1992 at 8% per annum and on the aggregate further interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of the decree viz. 9-1-1992 till the payment. Two questions, therefore, fall for determination: (i) whether the amount of interest is to be calculated according to the formula put forward by the judgment-debtor or in the manner stated by the decree-holder and (ii) in what instalments the amount so determined shall be paid by the judgment-debtor.
6. For determining these questions, the revision petition is admitted to hearing. I have heard learned counsel for the parties.
7. Learned counsel for the decree-holder referred me to para. 11 of the Supreme Court's judgment, dated 12-1-1991 which has been reproduced above to contend that the order granting interest pendente lite and future interest was made under section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure; in his view there is no provision in the Code other than section 34 empowering the Court to allow future interest and that judgments of the Supreme Court dated 12-1-1991 and 8-1-1992 must be read and understood accordingly. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor, however, invited me to read the judgments of the Supreme Court literally and to hold that the interest was allowed on the "decretal amount" and the decretal amount was Rs,7,47,672.30 only. In other words his contention is that interest both at the rate of 8% per annum and at the rate of 10% per annum is to be calculated on the sum of Rs,7,47,672.30 and that there is no justification to allow interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the aggregate sum viz. Rs,7,47,672.30 plus the interest calculated at the rate of 8% per annum from 5-4-1976 to 8-1-1992.
8. It is beyond question that the order allowing interest on the principal sum Rs,7,47,672.30 from the date of the suit till the date of the decree viz. 8-1-1992 as also future interest was made by the Supreme Court under section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section was expressly mentioned in para. 11 of the Supreme Court's judgment dated 12-1-199F the order in that para. Was modified by a judgment of the Supreme Court dated 8-1-992, in that sum of Rs,9,97,672.30 was reduced to Rs,7,47,672.30 but that did not affect the position that the order relating to interest was made under section 34, C.P.C. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the Court to order: "Interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable on the aggregate sum so adjudged, from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit."
' That section provides further that if "such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest on such aggregate sum as aforesaid from the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date, the Court shall be deemed to have refused such interest, and a separate suit therefor, shall not lie".
9. Thus, section 34 vests the Court with a discretion to order payment of interest (i) on the principal sum adjudged by the decree from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, and (ii) further interest on the aggregate sum so adjudged (that is to say, the principal sum plus the interest for the period from the date of the suit to the date of the decree) from the date of the decree to the date of payment or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit.
10. It is true that in the judgments of the Supreme Court, the expression "aggregate sum" has not occurred in relation to further interest at the rate of 10% per annum, but if I am right in thinking that the order relating to interest was one under section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, then the absence of the expression "aggregate sum" in the judgments of the Supreme Court did not alter the true position, for a reading of section 34 as a whole compels the conclusion that while the Court has discretion to allow or not to allow further interest, yet when it allows further interest, it does so on "the aggregate sum". And it has been seen that the expression "aggregate sum" means the principal sum adjudged by the decree and the amount of the interest calculated at the rate as allowed by the Court for the period from the date of the suit to the date of the decree. It was argued by learned counsel for the decree-holder that this view of the order of the Supreme Court receives support from the fact that the interest in such cases is awarded to compensate the decree-holder for nonpayment of the money which was due to him and which was wrongly withheldby the judgment-debtor. I incline to this view and am of the opinion that the expression "interest" as used in section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure should not invite the reproach of usury. As was said in Riches v. Westminster Bank Ltd. 1947 AC 390 at 400: ".. The essence of interest is that it is a payment which becomes due because the creditor has not had his money at the due date. It may be regarded either as representing the profit he might have made if he had the use of the money, or conversely the loss he suffered because he had not that use. The general idea is that he is entitled to compensation for the deprivation. From that point of view it would seem immaterial whether the money was due to him under a contract express or implied or a statute or whether the money was due for any other reason in law. In either case the money was due to him and was not paid, or in other words was withheld from him by the debtor after the time when the payment should have been made in breach of his legal rights, and interest was a compensation, whether the compensation was liquidated under an agreement or statute, as for instance under section 57 of the Bill of Exchange Act, 1882 or was =liquidated and claimable under the Act as in the present case. The essential quality of the claim for compensation is the same and the compensation is properly described as interest. For reasons that go back far in history the distinction between interest proper as it has been called, that is, interest due under a contract, statute or the like and interest by way of damages, that is, not due under an agreement express or implied, has since very early days been recognised in England whether in the ecclesiastical or common law Courts."
11. I should think, therefore, that the expression "decretal amount" in the Supreme Court's judgment dated 12-1-1991 and the expression "the sum so decreed" in the judgment, dated 8-1-1992 must be understood in that sense. That the word "interest" has been used in that sense in section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure also receives support from the following observations of the Supreme Court in the judgment, dated 12-1-1991: "Even otherwise the value of the money has and is depreciating day by day due to inflation. It has depreciated so much that even if interest is allowed at bank rate until payment it will not compensate the Seller for the loss."
12. I hold, therefore, that the judgment-debtor is liable under the decree of the Supreme Court to pay Rs,7,47,672.30 as the principal sum, interest on that sum at the rate of 8% per annum from 5-4- 1976 to 8-1-1992 and on the aggregate sum so calculated, interest at the rate of 10% per annum from 9-1-1992 to the date of the payment.
13. As regards the second question I think it will be fair to the parties to allow the payment of the decreed amount so calculated in the following instalments. The first six instalments will be paid at the rate of Rs,70,000-per mensem; and the remaining instalments will be paid at the rate of Rs,80,000 per mensem. Indeed the last instalment if it is less than Rs,80,000 will also be paid accordingly. The judgment-debtor shall pay the first instalment of Rs,70,000 on 15th of June, 1993 before the Executing Court and the remaining instalments also before the Executing Court on the 15th of each succeeding month.
14. If the judgment-debtor fails to pay any instalment in accordance with this order, the whole amount then due would become immediately payable; in that case the attached property of the judgment-debtor will become immediately liable to sale and the judgment-debtor will also become liable to arrest.