DECISION These are two appeals in which common point of law is involved and, therefore, I propose to dispose of these two appeals by common order. 2, The point involved for consideration is the interpretation of sub- clause (3) of section 1 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance). Subsection (3) of section 1 reads as under :-- "(1) This Ordinance may be called the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. (2) (3) It shall not apply to any person employed in the police or any of the Defence Services of Pakistan and any services or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan including an ordnance factory maintained by the Central Government or to any person employed in the administration of the State other than those employed as workmen by the Railways, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Departments "
3. Mr. Ali Arajad who appeared for the Sind Government Press Workers' Union raised two-fold contention before me namely, (1) that employer is so defined that it does not include all the workmen. In this connection he made a reference to (c) and (d) of the definition of employer in the Ordinance. He contended, relying on (c), which reads as under :-- " 'Employer' in relation to an establishment means any person or body of persons, whether incorporated or not, who or which employs workmen in the establishment under a contract of employment and includes-- (a) . (b) . .
(c) in relation to an establishment run by or under the authority of any department of the Central Government or Provincial Government, the authority appointed in this behalf or, where no authority is appointed, the Head of the Department." that had the intention of the Legislature been to accept every one employed in the Government Service namely Central or Provincial Government it was not necessary to mention the Head of the Department or to mention the officer appointed in this behalf. It was not, however, very clear to me as wbat he meant. As I understood he meant only the authority appointed in this behalf and not all workmen. There is not much force in this contention.
The definition is one thing, the applicability of the Ordinance is quite a 4 distinct matter. They have no co-relationship or direct relationship. In the! second place he relied on my decision reported in The General Secretary, Provincial Building Division Employees' Union, Hyderabad v. Executive Engineer, Provincial Building Division and another (1). I held in the particular circumstances of that case that the Operator-cwm-Driver employed in the Provincial Building Division was not employed in the Administration of the State. I still hold that view as the Driver in that case could not be said to be appointed in any administrative capacity. These two appeals arose out of applications under section 32(1-A) of the Ordinance. These applications were filed after Strike Notice. It has not been denied before me that the employees of the two Unions are not Government servants. If the Union had gone on strike the administrative work of the Government Department would have come to a standstill. There are many things which come into operation only after it is gazetted in the Government Gazette.
4. It is noteworthy that where Legislature wanted to exempt any Department it has specifically mentioned so, for instance, workmen of Railway, Post, Telegraph and Telephone Departments. If the intention of the Legislature would have been to exempt the Government Press it would have also mentioned the Employees of the Government Press. Mr. Suleman Habibullah in adopted the same arguments as that of Mr. Ali Amjad in . ;5. For the reasons given above I dismiss the above two appeals. (1) 1972 PLC 285