This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 arises out of an application under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 filed by respondent No.l against the petitioner in respect of a shop. situate in Aminapura Bazar, Faisalabad on the grounds of default in payment of rent; sublettig and personal use of her son. This application after trial was accepted by the Rent Controller on 14 January, 1979 on the solitary ground of personal use, other two grounds having been found to be not proved. Two appeals one by the tenant-petitioner and the other by the landlady were filed against this order. The learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad on 24th February, 1980 accepted the appeal of the petitioner- tenant and dismissed that of respondent No.l landlady. Aggrieved by this decision respondent No.l/landlady filed W.P.No.1900 of 1981 which came up for hearing on 8th February, 1986 and was accepted by this Court with the consent of both the parties and the appeal of the petitioner was remanded to the District Judge, Faisalabad "for its decision afresh in the light of the evidence on the record in accordance with law". After remand the appeal was taken up for hearing by the learned District Judge who on 17th June, 1986 dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and upheld the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller on 14th January, 1974.
2. Mr. Abid Hassan Minto, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the learned District Judge while deciding the appeal has K completely ignored the evidence lead by the petitioner, so much so, that neither the names of the witnesses examined by the petitioner nor the gist of the statements, made by them are discernible from the impugned judgment. In the submission of the learned counsel, by doing so, the District Judge not only acted contrary to law but also against theth direction contained in the order of remand by this Court which required the District Judge to decide the appeal in the light of the evidence on the record.
3. Mr. A.K. Dogar, learned counsel for the respondents, however, defended the impugned order by relying upon an authority of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Rafique v. Mehr Din acrd others (1983 SCM R 1184) and contended that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality notwithstanding that there is no discussion as regard evidence of the respondents which should be presumed to have been examined and discarded by the District Judge.
Under section 15 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, the District Court is the final Court of appeal and is under an obligation to examine the entire material on record including the evidence led by both the parties before arriving at any conclusion. A one-sided view of the matter cannot but be frowned upon. In the present case, as already noticed the District Judge has completely shut his eyes to the evidence produced by the petitioner and it does not even appear from the impugned order as to what evidence was led by the appellants. Such a treatment of a matter involving valuable rights of the parties cannot be countenanced. As regards the authority cited by the learned counsel for the respondent, a close reading thereof shows that it goes against the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner rather than supporting him. Following observations may be reproduced with advantage:-- "However, we do not approve of judgment by a trial or appellate Court which does not reflect a proper application of mind to the case of the parties and records the reasons for the decision."
Moreover, in the present case, the appeal had been remanded to the District Judge by this Court to decide it in the light of evidence on record. Thus in addition to the statutory duty cast upon the learned District Judge, he was also obliged by the order of remand to examine the evidence of the parties and then to decide the matter. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents cannot, as such be accepted. The appeal filed by the petitioner has not been decided in accordance with law and the, matter will, therefore, have to be remanded again to the District Judge, Faisalabad.
In view of what has been stated above this petition is accepted and the judgment of the District Judge dated 17th June, 1986 is declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect with the result that the appeal filed by the petitioner shall be deemed to be pending before him and shall be decided afresh in accordance with law keeping in view the observation made in this judgment.
Since the matter arises out of an ejectment petition filed 14 years back and has been remanded twice by this Court, the appeal shall be decided by the District Judge within three months from today. The parties shall appear before the District Judge on 20th February, 1990. There shall be no order as to costs.