DECISION This appeal calls in question the order of the Labour Court whereby the petition under section 25-A of the IRO was dismissed. It arose in the following circumstances.
The petitioners are entered in the cadre of Guards of Grade-I at Rohri, and Jacobabad, as a result of selection from the lower cadre, in accordance with the provisions of Advance Chapter No.1 to the Pakistan Railways Personnel Manual, the seniority of the Railways Staff including them, was framed in the light of the decision in Khushi Muhammad and others v. General Manager Pakistan Railways reported in PLD 1970 Supreme Court 203, wherein it was held that the "ratio of 50:50 showing direct recruits and the Departmental Promotees merely relates to the policy of their recruitment to the grade and it is not to be. Extended to the fixation of their seniority on their confirmation inter se".
2. However, the General Manager, Railways Lahore through a letter dated 11-3-1987 had revised the Rules of the seniority of promotees and direct recruits and the circular had been later on notified in the Gazette also. This was purported to be in accordance with the principles laid down in the case of the Federation of Pakistan v. Azam Ali etc. PLD 1985 Supreme Court 175 and the policy was to be enforced with effect from 1973. It was alleged that the General Manager was not competent to amend Rule 601 and since the vested interest of the petitioners came under jeopardy, they had served the grievance notice under section 25-A of the IRO on 24-11-1986. It was replied to, but in evasive terms. The petitioners, therefore, had filed the petition with the following prayer:- "(1) That the respondents be permanently restrained and directed not to implement the policy dated 11-3-1987, which is illegal and void by its nature and framed by the incompetent authority, without Lawful powers, and seniority already assigned to the petitioners in the light of para. No.601 of Advance' Chapter No.1 to Pakistan Railways Personnel Manual be kept as intact, in order to save the future of poor petitioners.
(2) That the implementation of policy with retrospective effects i.e. 26-6-1970, without lawful authority, may also be declared as illegal and void; and
(3) That any suitable relief which the Honourable Court deems proper alongwith the costs of this petition."
3. The respondents in their written reply admitted that the letter had been addressed to the petitioners as alleged. It was further alleged that the policy laid down earlier was under scrutiny, and the errors and omission if any committed after 26-6-1970 will be rectified in the light of the clarifications given by the Supreme Court judgment of 1985 referred to earlier. The petition therefore, was not maintainable. Inter alia the bar of jurisdiction and the bar of limitation were also pleaded.
4. The Labour Court for the reasons given by it had allowed the petition and an appeal was 'preferred to this Tribunal. My learned predecessor had remanded the case to the Labour Court with certain directions, as a result of which the petition was amended and further evidence was led in the case. The petition was eventually dismissed by the Labour Court culminating in this appeal.
5. Mr. S.M. Saeed learned counsel for the appellants had contended that the General Manager, Railways could not make or promulgate any Rule or policy adversely affecting the substantive rights of the appellants, which had been acquired over a decade, and that too retrospectively, and without notice. He had also taken me to the provisions of para. 601 of Advance Chapter No. l of the Railway Personnel Manual. He further contended that the General Manager had misconstrued the implications of the judgment in the case of Azam Ali, which was a dispute of the employees of the Pakistan Ordnance Factory, Wah, needing the interpretation of Civil Servants (Appointment and Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973. The issues involved in the pleading, were ably supported and countered, but in the light of the view I am taking, I do not think it is necessary to examine them at all. The petition, as presented according to me does not lie.
6. It was very clearly mentioned in the written statement that the seniority of the staff had not been revised yet, but only certain clarifications had been made in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court. This is what was deposed to by the respondent's witness Abdul Ghani, Abdul Razzak one of the appellants in his cross-examination had also stated that the seniority list was under preparation and he did not know whether the same had been issued. Karim Bux is more forthright, and has admitted that there is no letter received regarding the change of seniority. So, it cannot be said that anybody is hurt. The position, therefore, is that there is nothing beyond a threat or portent, looming large over the heads of the appellants but there is no real cause of grievance to them as nobody's rights have been affected one way or the other. In short the petition is premature. That by itself is enough to dispose of the appeal but there is something more to it.
7. The relief sought by the petitioners is that the respondent should be restrained from implementing the policy dated 11-3-1987.
8. The powers of the Labour Court are, to be found in section 35(5) of the IRO which reads as under:-- "(5) A Labour Court shall--
(a) adjudicate and determine as industrial dispute which has been referred to or brought before it under this Ordinance,
(b) enquire into and adjudicate any matter relating to the. Implementation or violation of a settlement which is referred to it by the Provincial Government,
(c) try offences under this Ordinance, (and such other offences under any other law as the Provincial Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf.),
(d) exercise and perform such other powers and functions as are or may be conferred upon or assigned to it by or under this Ordinance (or any other law).
And the procedure of the Court is to be found in section 36 which reads as under:--
36. Procedure and Powers of Labour Court.-- (1)
(2)A Labour Court shall, for the purpose of adjudicating and determining any industrial dispute, be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) including the powers of: (a)enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, (b)compelling the production of documents and material objects, and (c)issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents.
(3)
(4)
(5)
9. These provisions do not bestow the powers of granting injunction to I the Labour Court. Support is to be found for the said proposition from a judgment of the Division Bench of the Sindh High Court namely Brooke Bond Pakistan Limited v. 2nd Labour Court, Karachi 1973 PLC 111 in which the interim order of the Tribunal in an application under section 34, I.R.O. Praying in substance, for a declaration that the petitioner be continued to be employed by the management, had been challenged. The Bench consisted of Tufail Ali Abdul Rehman, C.J., and Fakhruddin G. Ibrahim, J. And the judgment was delivered by the Chief Justice, wherein it was observed as under:-- "I am, therefore, of the view that subsection (2) does not confer upon a Labour Court, while adjudicating and determining an industrial dispute, all the powers of a Civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code but only such of them as may be described as procedural, i.e. Such as are required `for the purpose' of adjudication and determination. Now, it is clearly not necessary in order to be able to adjudicate or determining a dispute, that pending the adjudication determination, a party be restrained from giving effect to the kind of the order of which respondent No. 2 complained to the Labour Court."
I am of the opinion that there is, no merit in this appeal. I will therefore, uphold the order and dismiss the appeal.