1. ' By this common judgment I intend to dispose of these five Revision Applications.
2. ' Briefly the facts are that the present respondent had filed the five suits against the present applicants being Suits Nos. 1151 to 1155 of 1985 for declaration, rendition of accounts and permanent injunction praying for the following relief:-
(i) "For declaration that letter No, MZ/SR/AL-271898-80/27/132/4334 dated 23-10-1980 (Annexure 'C') and the supplementary bill (Annexure D) and the demand contained therein are illegal, void, false, against law, arbitrary, imaginary, without jurisdiction, against the principles of natural justice, not binding on the plaintiff, without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
(ii) For rendition of accounts in respect of consumer's Meter No,AL271898.
(iii) For permanent injunction restraining the defendants their subordinate officials, employees, servants and/or any other persons claiming them from charging or claiming the disputed amount of the disputed supplementary bill in the future regular monthly bills.
(iv) Costs of the suit.
(v) Any other relief grantable to the plaintiff in the interest of justice."
3. ' Their case briefly is that they are doing the business of jewellers in Shop Nos.B-33, 34, 35, 47 and 62 respectively in Korangi Market No,6, Korangi Township, Karachi and are old consumers of the present applicant No,1 who receive their electric supply from their respective meters and have been paying electric charges regularly. It is alleged that in the month of October, 1980 the respondents received notices whereby they were asked to pay the amount of supplementary bills failing, electric supply would be disconnected without any notice. According to the respondents these demands are illegal, void, arbitrary, mala fide and without lawful authority. Thus, they filed the said suits. The present applicants contested the suits. Their case is that an inspection of the meters of the respondents was made by the KESC staff on 17-9-1980 and it was found that the energy was being used direct by passing meters and that the respondents had consumed voltage unauthorisedly. It is also claimed by the applicant No,1 that notices as required under section 24 of the Electricity Act were issued to the respondents on 27-9-1980 and thereafter a letter was sent to the respondents on 23-10-1980 alongwith supplementary bills. The respondents also challenged the maintainability of the suits. The trial Court was pleased to settle the following issues:---
(1) Whether the plaintiffs have tempered with the meters? If so, its effect?
(2) Whether the plaintiffs have extended the lead and provided the electricity to other shops including one small industry? If so, its effect?
(3) Whether the defendants are not entitled to the bills amount mentioned in respective bills as alleged by the plaintiff?
(4) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to ask for rendition of accounts and the defendants are liable to render the same to the plaintiff?
(5) What should the decree be?
4. ' Both the parties led the evidence and the trial Court after hearing the Advocates for the parties decreed the suits of the respondents. The present applicants being aggrieved preferred appeals being CAs. Nos.145 to 149 of 1987 which were also dismissed by the learned III Additional District Judge (East), Karachi. Hence these. Revision Applications.
5. ' I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Mr.S.Hasan Azhar Rizvi, learned counsel for the applicants has contended that the finding of the two Courts below are based on misreading of the evidence. He has pointed out that one Akhtar Shah, the Inspector applicant No,1 was examined in this respect, who has produced the said inspection reports which clearly show that the respondents were consuming excess voltage which being in violation of the provision of Electricity Act they were served with the said notices under section 24 of the Electricity Act and also issued supplementary bills based on average consumption for three years period i,e, 17-9-1977 to 17-9- 1980. He has further submitted that the said witness Akhtar Shah has not been cross- examined with regard to the abovesaid evidence. He has also contended that the respondents have failed to prove mala fides in the present case and that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. He has placed reliance on the provisions of section 26(6) and section 26-A of the Electricity Act. As against this Miss S. Riffat Bano, counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that the respondents were never served with any notice under section 24 of the Electricity Act and, therefore, the letter dated 23-10-1980 and the demand contained therein was mala fide and without jurisdiction and, thus, the suits were competent. She has also submitted that these Revision Applications being directed against the concurrent findings of the two Courts below, this Court will not reopen the question of fact.
6. ' I have considered the above submissions of the learned counsel. No doubt the present Revision Applications are filed challenging the concurrent findings of the two Courts below and, thus, it would not be open to this Court to enter into the question of fact unless it is shown that the findings of the two Courts below are based on non-reading or misreading of material evidence or the same are not based on evidence. In the case of Jam, Pari v Muhammad Abdullah 1992 SCM R 786, it has been held by their Lordships that "It is well-accepted that revisional jurisdiction is primarily meant for correction of errors in the orders made and proceedings conducted by the subordinate Courts, and a finding of fact is not open to revision unless it is shown to be not based on any evidence or suffering from non-reading or misreading of material evidence". The other question that arises is whether the suit would be competent in the present case. The learned counsel for the applicants has placed reliance on the case of Ghafoor Textile Mills Ltd. v.. Karachi Electric Supply Corporation 1983 CLC 3214. In support of his contention that the Electric Inspector is the authority under the Electricity Act and his decision in case of dispute between licensee and consumer is final. He has also relied on the provision of sections 26(6) and 26-A of the Electricity Act which read as under: "(6) Where any difference or dispute arises between a licensee and a consumer as to whether any meter, maximum demand indicator of other measuring apparatus is or is not correct, the matter shall be decided, upon the application of either party, by an Electric Inspector, within a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of such application, after affording the parties an opportunity of being heard and where the meter, maximum demand indicator or other measuring apparatus has, in the opinion of the Electric Inspector, ceased to be correct, the Electric Inspector shall estimate the amount of energy supplied to the consumer or the electrical quantity contained in the supply, during such time as the meter, maximum demand indicator or measuring apparatus has not, in the opinion of the Electric Inspector, been correct; and, where the Electric Inspector fails to decide the matter of difference or dispute within the said period or where either the licensee or the consumer decline to accept the decision of the Electric Inspector, the matter shall be referred to the Provincial Government whose decision shall be final: ' Provided that, before either a licensee or consumer applies to the Electric Inspector under this subsection, he shall give to the other party no less than seven days' notice of his intention so to do.
7. 26-A. Dishonest abstraction or consumption of energy,---Notwithstanding anything contained in section 23, the licensee may charge the consumer on the basis of one or more of the following consideration for the amount of energy deemed to have been dishonestly abstracted, consumed or used, for the period during which the meter, maximum demand indicator or other measuring apparatus had, in the opinion of the licensee, remained connected, disconnected, injured, altered or prevented from registering the amount of energy supplied or the electrical quantity contained in the supply---
(a) consumer's connected load or maximum demand in kilowatt hours during any period;
(b) consumer's maximum consumption of energy in kilowatt hours during any period;
(c) consumer's load factor;
(d) the power of consumer's load;
(e) the hours and the time for which the energy is deemed to have abstracted, consumed or used by the consumer; and
(f) the purposes for which the energy is deemed to have been abstracted, consumed or used by the consumer?
8. ' However, in the present case as argued by the learned counsel for the respondents, the first question that arises is whether a notice under section 24 of the same Act has been given or not.
9. Section 24 reads as under:--- "24. Discontinuance of supply to consumer neglecting to pay charge.---(1) Where consumer neglects to pay any charge for energy or any sum, other than a charge for energy, assessed against him by a licensee in respect of supply of energy to his premises, the licensee may after giving not less than seven clear days' notice in writing to such consumer and without prejudice to his right to recover such charge or other sum by suit or otherwise, cut off the supply and for that purpose cut or disconnect any electric supply-line or other works, being the property of the licensee, through which energy may be supplied to such premises or to any other premises, other than domestic premises, running distinctly in the name of such consumer, and may discontinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and re-connecting the supply and the minimum charges on account of continued reservation of supply during the period of such discontinuance, are paid, but no longer."
10. ' The above provisions would show that it is a mandatory requirement of law that a notice in such case ought to have been given by the applicant No,1 before making any such demand. In the case of Muhammad Rafiq Chaudhry v. WAPDA 1983 CLC 2397, it has been held that the demand made from consumer before issuing him notice under section 24 for determining his liability is unlawful and in such cases there would no bar of jurisdiction of Courts and suits would be maintainable. In the present case it has been admitted by Akhtar Shah the witness of applicant No,1 that notice was not sent through registered post and there is no evidence to show if the notices were served on the respondents. Thus, it cannot be held that notices were served upon them.
11. ' Learned counsel for the applicant has referred to the facts of the case but a mere reading of the evidence of their witness Akhtar Shah would demolish the case of the present applicants. This witness has produced the inspection reports which inspection is supposed to have taken place on 17-9-1980. The reports are Exhs.D-2 to D-6 on the record. All these five reports at Exhs.D-4 to D-6 show that the same were prepared in the year 1985 but there is an overwriting on No,5 whereby it is made to No,-0. Secondly, this report is signed by two Inspectors Akhtar Shah and Abdul Ghafoor.
12. Abdul Ghafoor has not been examined. Akhtar Shah in his cross-examination had admitted that he cannot write or read English but very strangely he has put his signature in English. The said witness also stated in cross-examination that at the time of inspection he was alone to have inspected the meters and the consumption of the respondents but yet he has not taken any notes of such inspection. All the above facts go to show that the applicants have not been able to prove their case against the respondents. From the foregoing discussion I am of the view that there is no substance in the present Revision Applications which are accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.