DECISION I propose to dispose of these three appeals by common order. They are directed against the Order dated the 31st of January, 1974. The learned Labour Comt No. II has disposed of all the three applications by common order dated the 31st of January, 1974. r 2. The facts giving rise to these appeals briefly put are these. One Muhammad Aqueel Zia had filed his application in individual capacity while the other two namely that of (l) of Muhammad Bashir and (2)
Muhammad Riaz were filed through the General Secretary of the Union.
3. The learned Court rightly dismissed the three applications mainly on the ground of non-compliance of the provisions of section 25-A by not giving grievance notice. At the relevant time when the services were terminated Standing Orders Ordinance, as it stood, applied to Industrial Establishments or Commercial Establishments employing 50 or more workmen. It was only on 15th of November 1972 that the law was amended so as to make the Standing Orders Ordinance applicable to Commercial Establishments or Industrial Establishments which employed twenty or more workmen but an exception was made in respect of an Industrial Establishment regarding the provisions of 10
(b) and 11. Clauses 6 and 8 of the Standing Order l2 and Standing Order 15 wherein not more than 49 persons were employed on any day during the preceding l2 months but the Government could by Notification in the official Gazette extend all or any of the said provisions to any such establishment or class of such establishments. So far as the appellant Muhammad Aqueel is concerned the admitted position is that he did not make any grievance petition to the appellant.
He admitted in his cross-examination that he had not made a Representation to the Management after receiving 4he letter of termination dated 16th of May, 1972 which the appellant stated to have been received on the 20th of May, 1972. He stated that he received the final letter dated the 30th of May, 1972 terminating his services on the 5th of June, 1972 that his services has been terminated w. e. f. lst of June, 1972 on the ground of continued absence from the 6th of May, 1972. Mr. F. M Azad, the learned Representative for the appellant relied on sub-clause (6) of section 25-A ih support of his contention that it was not necessary for his client to have given' any grievance notice. Sub-clause
(6) reads as under l-- "Notwithstanding anything contained in subsections (1) to (4) any worker aggrieved by the termination of his employment as a result of retrench- ment, dismissal, discharge, lay-off, lock-out, or otherwise not earlier than two months preceding the commencement of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972, may, within a period of two months from the commencement of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1973, or the termination of the employment, whichever is latter, either himself or through his Shop Steward or Trade Union, take the matter directly to a Junior Labour Court having jurisdiction in the area in which the establishment is situated.'* The short answer to the submission of Mr. Azad is that the amendment relied upon was brought about on the 9th of February, 1973 much later than the cause of action and, therefore, in the absence of any grievance notice the appellant, cannot be said to have complied with the provision of section 25- A of the Ordinance. The appeal is dismissed and the Award of the leamed!. Labour Court is maintained. y 3. I would now take up the appeal of Riaz.
His services were terminated by the respondent-Management by a letter dated the 19th of April, 1972. An application under section 25-A of the Ordinance was filed on the 24th of May, 1972 for re- instatement and back benefits. It is noteworthy in the first lace that the application does not disclose that any grievance petition as required under section 25-A was given to the respondent against the alleged illegal termination of service. The learned Labour Court rightly observed that in this case the General Secretary should have appeared to depose the contents of the application so that the respondent may have bad a chance to cross-examine him. Mr. F. M. Azad, the learned Representative for the appellant contended that the statement of Muhammad Aqueel Zia that the press employed only 40 persons should not be read as a statement in the case of Riaz and Bashir.
He submitted that the press in fact employed 54 persons as stated by Riaz in his cross- examination. In my opinion it makes no difference as to whether Standing Orders Ordinance applied to the press or not. Even if it dtH apply the fact still will require consideration as to whether the provisions of section 25-A have been complied with or not. As I Have already observed the application still does not disclose that any grievance petition was sent either by the workmen concerned or by the Trade Union or Steward. Mr. Azad, the learned Representative for the appellant Riaz, relied on Annexures 'A* and *C* in support of his contention that the appellant had sent grievance petitions to the Management. Letter dated 13-4-1972, Annexure 'A' is addressed to the Proprietor and letter dated 15th April, 1972, Annexure 'C* is addressed to the Assistant Commissioner, Karachi. The heading of both the letters is grievance under Standing Order 18. It is noteworthy as observed by the leamed Labour Court that the services of the appellant having been terminated with effect from the 19th of April, 1972 the letterl cannot be said to be grievance petition because a grievance petition should bej5 after the date of termination. I would hold that the appellant, Riaz or the Union failed to comply with the provisions of section 25-A and, therefore, the leamed Court rightly dismissed his application. The appeal is dismissed.
4. I would now proceed with the appeal of Muhammad Bashic filed through the Union. In this case also no grievance petition was given by the appellant himself or through the Union. This fact is not disclosed in the petitition under section 25-A of the Ordinance. Mr. Azad, the leamed Representative for the appellant contended that the so-called charge-sheet of 3rd of April, 1972 was not served on the appellant. On the other hand the contention of Khalid Jamil, the learned Representative for the respondent was that it was served. In support of this they have produced charge-sheet dated the 3rd of April, 1972 which bears the signatures of Mahammad Bashir, which Bashir stated to be forged one. The signature, however, on Exh. R-4, which is at page 49 of the record is similar to one produced as Exh. A-9 which is at page 81. The two signatures are so similar that even a layman cannot miss the similarity which relate to signature. Exh. A-9 was put to the witness Mushtaq, who denied the receipt thereof. It is a letter notifying the change of the office- bearers. Mahammad Bashir has signed it as President of the Union. Muhammad Bashir, therefore, cannot deny his signature on Exh. A-9. Exh. A-9 continues upto page 83 of record. On page 83 also there is a signa- nature of Muhammad Bashir. In these circumstances I would hold that the appellant was served with a charge-sheet. However whether the appellant was served with a charge-sheet or not is immaterial as his application was dismissed on the ground of failure to follow the provisions of section 25-A of the Ordinance. At any rate I have gone through the alleged grievance petition sent by the General Secretary of the Union. Annexure "E" which is at page 35 of the record of the Labour Court. I agree with the conclusion of the learned Labour Court that the Annexure 'E* dated 10th of May, 1972, cannot be said to be a grievance petition within the meaning of section 25-A of the Ordinance. Moreover as the said Annexure 'E' has challenged the date of the charge- sheet, the General Secretary should have himself appeared and deposed as to the contents of the letter Annexure 'E* dated the 10th of May, 1972. I would hold that no grievance petition was sent to the Proprietor. Tho Award of the learned Court, for these reasons, is maintained and the appeal is dismissed. '