1. While working as Regular Staff Reporter in the Daily "News", Lahore, the services of Jamil Anjum Mufti petitioner were terminated under section 4 of the Newspaper Employees Conditions of Service Act, 1973 with immediate effect by Office Order dated 2-11-1993 (Annexure H) of Resident Director, Daily News, Lahore, respondent. The petitioner, feeling aggrieved, challenged his termination by filing petition against the management of the Daily "News" through Resident Director, Lahore, respondent, under section 22-A(8)(g) of the IRO 1969 accompanied by an application under sub- Regulation (2) of Regulation 32 of the NIRC (P&F) Regulations, 1973 complaining that his termination had taken place on account of his union activities in violation of the provisions of law, and employer was guilty of committing acts of unfair labour practice against the petitioner. It was disclosed in the petition that the order of termination came into the notice of the petitioner for the first time on 8-111993, when the petitioner appeared before the commission in connection with his earlier petition No.4-A(553)/93-L and a contempt application No. 7(295)/93-L against the same respondent, when it transpired that the services of the petitioner had already been terminated, Ajmal Taufeeq Administrative Officer appearing on behalf of the respondent. Management in his statement, repudiated the allegations of the petitioner deposing that the termination order was passed for valid reasons; that it had been communicated to the petitioner in time; that the petitioner had knowledge of his termination and that it involved no element of unfair labour practice.
2. Mr. Sohaib Ahmad Roomi, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to paras. Nos.4 and 5 of the petition and attempted to argue that the petitioner had no knowledge of his termination and that it was on 8-11-1993 when he came to know of his termination when he appeared before this Bench in connection with his earlier petition regarding his transfer and contempt application arising out of it. Having come to know of the termination, the petitioner was stated to have hurriedly rushed to the Commission to obtain an. Appropriate relief. On the contrary, Mr. Asadullah Siddiqui, Advocate, learned counsel for the management maintained that the petitioner had full knowledge of his termination; that the order of termination was duly communicated to him through all possible means at the disposal of the management and that the factum of termination was concealed for reasons not far to seek.
3. Having heard the submissions of the learned Advocates of the parties, on this aspect of the matter, I find that the petitioner had full knowledge of the action taken by the management against him but he concealed this fact for reasons best known to him. It is evident from the statement of Ajmal Taufeeq, Administrative Officer of the management that the termination letter was issued on 2-11- 1993 and the petitioner was relieved the same day. Thus, the termination stood implemented.
4. Thereafter the petitioner did not attend the office. The notice of termination was sent to the petitioner through Registered A.D. And T.C.S. It was also published on 4-11-1993 in the Daily News, Lahore. The copies of the cutting of the Newspaper, postal receipt and T.C.S. Receipt have been placed on the file. The witness was subjected to the test of cross---examination to show that the petitioner was not aware of his termination but nothing material could be elicited. The petitioner, is a Staff Reporter in a Newspaper of wide publication. He is also a Law Graduate. A notice regarding his termination was published in the daily "News", Lahore on 4-11-1993. It is difficult to belief that he remained ignorant of his termination and subsequently came to know of it on 8-11-1993 when he appeared before this Bench in connection with his earlier petition and a contempt application moved by him against the same respondent. I feel satisfied that the petitioner was fully aware of his termination but he concealed this fact with the hope to obtain a favourable order. The act of termination, having accomplished in all respects, the interim relief of suspension of the impugned termination order, could not, have been granted to him under the relevant provisions of law. In Dr. Aijaz Hussain Qureshi petitioner v. National Industrial Relations Commission and 2 other respondents, reported in PLD 1976 Lah. 611, it was observed:-- "There is no express power conferred on the Commission to order re--instatement by way of interim relief while trial of a complaint under section 53 of the Ordinance or Regulation 32 is in progress. The Regulations do have a statutory basis and force and they do expressly provide and empower the Commission to direct the reinstatement of the employees. But such a direction has been made dependent on the Commission's finding the person standing trial guilty under section 53 of the Ordinance. Such a power of directing reinstatement is not ancillary or incidental to the process of adjudication but is consequential to a finding of guilty. It is only when the Commission has arrived at the guilt of the employer that a further discretion is required to be exercised in the matter of directing the reinstatement of the employees. In other words, the precondition of the finding of guilt has to be satisfied before the power to direct reinstatement either finally or as an interim measure, can be ordered. As the scheme of the Act itself contains no provision for determining ad interim the guilt of a person charged of the offence, the consequential relief dependent on final adjudication cannot be availed of to provide interim relief. Keeping in view the scheme of the Ordinance and the Regulation the power to direct reinstatement does not appear to be either incidental or ancillary. Instead, it appears to be consequential and, therefore, it cannot be exercised ad interim only because the jurisdiction to try an offender has been conferred on the Commission."
5. Adverting to the next submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, I find that whether a person is holder of any office of a trade union or its member, is immaterial. What is to be seen is whether or not unfair labour -practice has been committed and he has been discriminated by the employer for undisclosed reasons. In the present case, the hammer is stated to have fallen on the petitioner- on account of being Vice-President, The News Employees Union (Regd.) Lahore. The petitioner is stated to have been championing the cause of the workers from the platform of the union and holding meetings from time to time, to ventilate their grievances, which according to the learned counsel, caused annoyance to the management and ultimately resulted in the unjustified and illegal termination of the petitioner. It is true that the petitioner is the Vice-President of the union, but it is equally true that he has not given details of his trade union activities which may have annoyed the management. He has made general and sweeping allegations ' that he is an active trade unionist without details showing the nature of union activities carried out by him. It would not be possible to visualise the severity of action of the management. A photo copy of a notice dated 14-10-1993 regarding an emergency meeting of the union, has been brought to my notice to show that for holding the very said meeting the petitioner was made victim of excesses. However, there is nothing in the notice to indicate that the services of the notice caused annoyance to the management which culminated in the ultimate termination of the petitioner. A valid reason has been given in the impugned termination order and, I see no good reason to interfere with it. The I termination order reads:-- "It has come to our knowledge, through your own statement that you are practising as an advocate in the District Court. You have also hung a board to this effect on Chamber No.207 of the District Court Chambers. In view of this it is evident that you are no more interested in your job. Your services are, therefore, hereby terminated under section 4 of the Newspaper Employees Conditions of Service Act, 1973 with immediate effect. Two months' notice pay has been credited to your account. You may collect your other dues from the office on any working day."
6. I may pause here to mention that a domestic inquiry was initiated into the conduct of one Javed Rafiq, an employee of the management. In this inquiry the petitioner appeared as a witness on behalf of Javed Rafiq and admitted in his cross-examination that in addition to reporting he was also practising as an advocate. This has come in the statement of Ajmal Taufeeq, Administrative Officer of the management. He was subjected to lengthy and searching cross-examination in order to show that the petitioner had not stated so, but nothing could come out of it. The petitioner having admitted the factum of his being a practising lawyer, cannot wriggle out of his statement.
7. According to law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Iftikhar Ahmad v. President, National Bank of Pakistan and others (Civil Appeal No.221 of 1985 and other appeals) PLD 1988 SC 53, this Commission was found to have jurisdiction to interfere only if a case falls within the scope of section 15 of the IRO, 1969 which lists the unfair labour practise on the part of employers and prohibits dismissal, discharge, removal from employment etc. Of a workman who participates in the promotion, formation of activities of a trade union. Subsection (8-A) of section 53 makes a violation of this prohibition punishable with imprisonment which may extend to four years or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees or with both. This provisions of law provides redress of grievance arising out of victimization for trade union activities only. No other victimization, even if proved, is actionable by this Commission in exercise of jurisdiction created by section 22-A(8)(g) of the IRO, 1969. The following observations were made in the cited rulings:--- "It will, therefore, appear that the cases which the Benches are empowered to hear under the clause must have an element of unfair labourpractice in them; it does not encompass cases where an allegation of unfair labour practice is made. It may be mentioned that sections 15 and 16 of the Ordinance set out instances of unfair labour practice on the part of the employers as well as workmen. It is, therefore, not right to construe the clause in question as conferring a general jurisdiction upon the Benches to entertain all kinds of grievances petitions even though they may not be relatable to unfair labour practice..."
8. In yet another case captioned Arshad Mehmood v. Factory Manager, Gulshan Carpet Industries Ltd., Lahore reported in 1994 PLC 35, it was remarked:-- "The jurisdiction of the Commission is confined to the cases falling under the scope of section 15 of the Ordinance and nothing beyond that. It implies that in cases of victimization for any reason other than the trade union activities this commission will have no jurisdiction. The allegations made in the petition which appears to be general and sweeping in nature, even if they are permitted to stand do not make a prima facie case of unfair labour practice. The existence of unfair labour practice is prerequisite for proceeding with a case under clause (g) of subsection (8) of section 22-A of the IRO. This jurisdictional prerequisite is missing in the present case."
9. In view of what has gone above it follows that the impugned termination order dated 2-11-1993 was passed for a valid reason and it is not open to exception. It was duly communicated to the petitioner and he had full knowledge of it. The order cannot be faulted either in law or discretion. An order passed by a competent authority for valid reasons, cannot be successfully challenged unless the same is found to have been made for extraneous considerations. In the present case no such consideration exists, to show mala fides on the part of the management.
10. In conclusion, without feeling the necessity to invite the parties to adduce evidence, I dismiss the petition as non-maintainable. Stay application also meet the same fate.