Mrs. NASIRA IQBAL, J.- The petitioner in this Constitutional petition, Jafferia Trust, has been registered and established for charitable and religious purposes and has purchased, subsequent to its registration, property and land for the above mentioned purposes from different vendors. These sale-deeds were submitted for registration "before respondent . No.1, Sub-Registrar(Urban), Rawalpindi. The respondent No.1 has impounded the above mentioned sale deeds claiming additional payment of stamp duty. The matter was referred uItimately to respondent No3, Secretary (Settlement) Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore, who has held that the disputed deeds are chargeable with stamp duty under Article 23 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act 1899.
2. The petitioner is aggrieved by this decision of the respondent No.3 dated 27-1-1994 and has assailed the same on the ground that the disputed deeds are in the nature of "Settlements" which fall under Article 58 A (i) of Schedule I of the Stamp Act and are chargeable with stamp duty provided under Article 15 of the Schedule.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner being a charitable and religious trust has purchased the properties for religious and charitable purposes and the present transactions fall within the ambit of "Settlement" as defmed in section 2 (24) of the Stamp Act on which the duty will be payable in terms of Article 58 A (i) of Schedule I. He has placed reliance on case cited as The Chief Controller Revenue Authority vs. Dr.Pes!Hoton Dubash (PLD 1960 (WP)
Karachi 116) in support of his arguments.
4. Learned counsel has also contended that by agreement of parties the Stamp Duty on each deed is to be paid by the Petitioner Trust. .It would cause great hardship to the Trust which has been established for religious and charitable purposes, since large amount would be diverted towards payment of stamp-duty which would be otherwise spent on charity.
5. Para-wise comments have been submitted on behalf of respondents No.1 and 2, Sub-Registrar (Urban),Rawalpindi, and Deputy Commissioner, Rawalpindi, respectively. Leamed Assistant Advocate-General has also appeared on behalf of respondent and argued on this point. It has been contended on behalf of respondents that the deeds in question are sale-deeds and therefore section 2 (24) of the Stamp Act would'not be attracted for the determination of Stamp Duty on the same since they would fall within the purview of "Conveyance" on sale as defined in section 2 (10) of the Stamp Act and Stamp Duty fixed under Article 23 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act is leviable in this case. That a "Conveyance" is based on a contract of purchase and sale and if the document operates as a "Conveyance" the substance of the transaction is to be .Looked at and it is immaterial by which name the parties to choose to call it. Furthermore, all the documents which have been impounded are titled as sale-deeds and the vendor in each case has received the sale-price of the property from the petitioner and the transaction has been described in the sale deed as absolute sale. The mere mention in some sale deeds that the vendees would be competent to use the property for religious/charitable purposes, does not change the nature of the transaction.
6. I have heard the leamed counsel for the parties and also examined the relevant provisions of the Stamp Act. The term "Settlement" is defined in section 2 (24) of the same as under:- "settlement means any non-testamentary disposition, in writing, of movable or immovable property made-
(a) in consideration of marriage,
(b) for the purpose of distributing property of the settler among his family or those for whom he desires to provide, or for the purpose of providing for some person dependent on him, or
(c) for any religious or charitable purpose; and includes an agreement in writing to make such a disposition (and, where any such disposition has not been made writing, any instrument recording, whether by way of declaration of trust or otherwise, the terms of any such disposition."
From this definition it is clear that the term "Settlement" applies only to such transactions where the executant divests himself of movable or immovable property in consideration of marriage, or for distributing the, property among his family/dependents or for religious or charitable purposes. No monetary benefit accrues to the settler/executant in consideration for the settlement. In the present transactions, the petitioner has acquired property as vendee and the documents which have been impounded have been executed in consideration of money received by the vendors/executants. Thus they do not fall within the category of "Settlement" as defined above.
7. In case of a written instrument regarding a transaction the substance and not the form should be looked into for the purpose of determining its true nature. Reference can be made with adyantage to PLD 1993 Karachi 700 titled Civil Aviation Authority V. M/s.Data International (Data Baggage House), Karachi.
8. The case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of no help to him since the document which was the subject-matter of that case was an instrument distributing property among the heirs, couched in form of trust and reserving uItimate benefit to religious society. The documents impounded in the present case clearly fall within the ambit of "Conveyance" as defined in section 2(10) of the Stamp Act. Section 2 (10) is re-produced for reference:- "conveyance" includes a conveyance on sale and every instrument by which property, whether movable or immovable, is transferred inter vivos and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by Schedule I."
9. As regards the argument of the leamed counsel for the petitioner that hardship would be caused to the petitioner trust since it has agreed to pay the Stamp Duty on the deeds, suffice it to say that contractual liability for payment of Stamp Duty assumed by the petitioner will not transform the disputed instruments which are "Conveyances" on sale into "Settlements". Nor can the petitioner be absolved from the responsibility of payment of proper Stamp Duty on this ground.
10. It is well settled that the province of the Courts is confined to ascertaining the law and to applying it to the facts of each particular case. It is not for the Courts to judge the consequences of the application of the law or the hardship resuIting in any case or any class of cases. Reference can be made to the cases reported in 1992 SCMR 663 A&B Food Industries V. Commissioner of Income Tax/Sales, Karachi and 1973 SCMR 445 titled The Commissioner of AgricuItural Income Tax V B.W.MAbdur Rehman, Manager, Toki Bara Taraf Wards Estate.
11. In view of the above discussion the impugned instruments are to be charged to stamp duty as conveyances and the respondent No.1 has correctly impounded the disputed deeds. The order of respondent No3 passed on 29-4- 1993 and conveyed to respondent No.1 on 27-1-1994 suffers from no legal infirmity warranting interference of this Court. The petitioner is liable to pay the stamp duty on the sale-deeds under Article 23 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act. This petition has, therefore, no force and is hereby dismissed.