DECISION These are two cross-appeals filed against the order of the Labour Court No. V, Karachi.
One has been filed by the Employees* Union and the other has been filed by the Management. 2.
Karachi Hosiery Mills' Workers had formed a Union and was registered as such. The Union raised certain demands in respect of the employees of Jupiter General Industries, Karachi by serving a Demand Notice under section 26(1) of the I. R, O. on 16-6-1973 which was followed by Strike Notice on 30-6-1973. The Union, thereafter, resorted to strike when on 4-10-1973 it was prohibited by the order of the Labour Court on an application made by the Management under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The application was finally disposed of on 13-2-1972 holding that the strike was legal. However, before the disposal of the application the Union referred the dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication under section 32 of the I. R. O. on 29th of January, 1974.
3. The Management filed a Written Statement resisting the dispute. It was pleaded that the Union was not legally constituted according to the provisions of the Industrial Relations Rules, 1973 and could not raise an Industrial Dispute and, therefore, the application was not maintainable. It' was further urged that the application was belated and on that ground also it was not maintainable. With regards to the various demands exception was also taken.
4. The learned Labour Court rejected the contention of the Management that the Union was not legally constituted and held that the Union waa competent to raise the dispute. As for the delay is concerned it was observed that the application under section 32 was made well after four months and, therefore, the requirements of law requiring the application to be made before or after the commencement of the strike, was not complied with. On the basis of this view the application made by the Union was dismissed.
5. The Union filed the present appeal against the dismissal while the Management filed the appeal against the decision that the Union was com* petentto raise dispute.
6. Mr. Ali Amjad, the learned counsel for the Union, pointed out that although the Union was general Union but it was competent to represent the workers and raise the dispute. After referring to the various provisions of law he sought in aid an un-reported decision of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan in M/s. R. B. Avari & Co. Ltd. v. All Karachi Liquor and Vine Workers, Union and others, decided on 31st of October, 1974. 1 have gone through this decision and it is clear that the point involved in the piesent case has been fully dealt with and supports the contention which has been raised before me. Without dilating on thus point I with due respect follow the decision.
7. It was, however, urged by the learned counsel for the Management that the constitution of the Union was contrary to the provisions of section 22(1) of the I. R. O. as its members were not one-third of the total number of workmen employed by the Management and there was no office-bearer from those workmen, apart from the fact that it also contravened the provisions of Sind Rule 5(2) whatever may be the merit of this legal objection it cannot be entertained as no such objection was specifically pleaded in the written statement. The objection which was taken in the written statement, as it reads, was vague and in general terms.
Simply to say that the Union was not legally constituted is not sufficient but the grounds on which the objection was based should have been specifically pleaded. It is not a pure question of law but it is mixed question of law and fact. The legal plea depended entirely upon the question of fact.
Since those facts were not pleaded in the written statement the Management could not be allowed to be heard at a later stage much less any finding could be given unless the written statement was suitably amended and the facts were clearly stated.
8. Dealing with the next point that the application made under section 32 was belated, it was urged by the learned counsel for the Union that no timelimit was prescribed in law and, therefore, the Labour Court could not dismiss the dispute. I entirely agree with this contention. Indeed, it is true that in case no time-limit is fixed it is necessary that the proceeding should be taken within a reasonable time. What is reasonable time depends upon the circumstances of each case. In the present case as already stated in the statement of facts that the strike was prohibited by the Labour Court on an application made by the Management and before the application was disposed of the Industrial Dipute was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication of the] demands. Even the application which was made by the Management wasp dismissed by a subsequent order holding that the strike was legal. It, there-1 fore, cannot be said that undue delay was caused in approaching the Labour Court for adjudication of the demands. The contention of the learned counsel for the Management that the words "before or on the commencement of the strike" were very important and, therefore, the dispute should have been taken to the Labour Court within a few days of the commencement of the strike, has no force. It has nowhere been prescribed by law that the dipute must be taken to the Labour Court within a few days of the commence-, ment of the strike. The contention that when the strike came to an end the remedy under section 32 was no longer available is equally devoid of force. The terminus quo is not the calling off the strike but the right to take the dispute to the Labour Court arises even before resorting to strike. In my view the dispute was referred to the Labour Court within a reasonable time and view taken by the Labour Court is not sustainable.
9. In the result I dismiss the appeal filed by the Management and allow the appeal filed by the Union and remand the case to the Labour Court for disposal of the demands on merit. Each party to bear his own cost.