ABDUL RAZZAQ A. THAHIM (CHAIRMAN): --This appeal is erected against the order dated 14-6- 1993 whereby the appellant has been suspended. The learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Mian Mahmood. Hussain, has referred to a case reported in 1985 SCM R 63 (Muhammad Sadiq Khokhar v.
Engineer-in-Chief, Pakistan Army) and submitted that this Tribunal has got the jurisdiction to interfere in the impugned order of suspension as it is a final order.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at length. He has not been able to lay hands on any other authorities of the Supreme Court or of this Tribunal whereby such appeals were entertained and disposed of. In the reported case, referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant, some passing remarks had been made by their Lordships but later on the position changed and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with this question thoroughly in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. Mazhar Ali (Civil Appeal No. 6 of 1980), and it was held that suspension is not a final order which is not appeal-able before the Tribunal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment read as under:-- "For the purposes of this case, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution had two important limitations. The more important of these was the exclusive jurisdiction of Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution read with section 3 of the Service Tribunals Act in, among others, disciplinary matters concerning civil servant. Suspension pending an inquiry squarely falls within the definition of discipline. The only objection in the context could be that an appeal to the Service Tribunal is competent only against final order and such a regulatory periodic order as of suspension does not qualify as final order and hence is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. Where the scheme of a law provides appeal only against the final order, the legislative intent is manifestly one of shutting out all challenges to interlocutory, interim or procedural orders, which do and could end up in an appeal-able final order. To hold that all such interim, procedural and interlocutory orders could, on account of such exclusion, be brought before superior Courts under Article 199 of the Constitution would not only amount to deflecting the legislative intent, but seriously impede the passing of the final order itself. An expression of such a legislative intent is found in section 9 of West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1961 (denial of interim relief in pending proceedings) and section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (limitations regarding appeal to orders passed under specified sections). In two cases that came to this Court under the former law, Syed Muhammad Ali Shah Bokhari v. Chief Administrator (1972 SCM R 297) and Mumtaz Hussain alias Bhutta v. Chief Administrator of Auqaf (1976 SCM R 450), an effort to seek redress in Constitutional jurisdiction was not allowed. In the present case the bar of Article 212 of the Constitution read with section 3 of the Service Tribunals Act excluded the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution.
The other limitation on the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is want of "other adequate remedy". It is clear that an order of suspension is interim in character, regulatory in effect and directed toward smooth and expeditious completion of an enquiry at the end of which the order of suspension is substituted by another final order with which it emerges. In' respect of such a final order it is impossible to hold that there is no other adequate remedy provided by law. On that view of the matter also the civil servant should be. Left to face the inquiry and to let it proceed to a conclusion. '
We find on a survey of the facts and law that the Constitutional petition filed by the respondent against his suspension and the show---cause notice was not maintainable. Accepting the appeal, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and recall the writ that issued. No order as to costs." rn similar circumstances, another case of Ms. Sarosh Sultan v. Mr. Ghulam Haider Wyne, the Chief Minister, Punjab, Lahore (Appeal No. 442(R)/92, decided on 2-3-1993) came up before this Tribunal in which the above-cited cases were dealt with and it was held that order of suspension cannot be interfered till a final decision is made by the competent authority and attains finality. That decision of the Tribunal has been upheld by the Supreme Court.
3. For the reasons recorded above, the appeal is not competent and the appeal alongwith the application for stay order, is dismissed, in limine.