' AJMAL MIAN, J.---This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment dated 17-2-1994 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Sindh High Court at Karachi in Revision Application No,211 of 1992 filed by the petitioners against the judgment dated 25-10-1992 of the learned District and Sessions Judge (East), Karachi, in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No,47 of 1992, whereby he recalled the status quo order, dated 1-8-1992 of the learned Senior Civil Judge/A.S.J. (East), Karachi in Suit No,964 of 1992, dismissing the same by maintaining the above appellate order.
2. The brief facts are that the nine petitioners, who claimed to be the proprietors of the Firms mentioned in the title of the petition, were registered contractors for the supplies of material, foodstuff and other articles with respondent No,1, Inspector-General of Prison, Sindh. All were granted contracts to supply for the period commencing from 1-7-1991 to 30-6-1992. It appears that while the petitioners were about to complete the period of the above contracts, respondent No,1 passed the order dated 27-6-1992 stating therein that the petitioners, for the year 1991-92 against the above contracts, furnished eight forged and false bank guarantees shown to have been issued by M/s. United Bank Limited, Sattelite Town, Sargodha Branch, which fact was discovered upon the receipt of letter dated 28-5-1992 from the above branch of the Bank. The petitioners were informed that respondent No,1 debarred all the nine Contractors/Firms to participate in future contract/supplies of Sindh Prison Department for the year 1992-93 and onwards in terms of Rule 180 of Sindh Financial Rules, Vol. I. However, it was clarified that the petitioners would be allowed to complete their running contracts for the year 1991-92 up to the period of the contract. Against the above order, the petitioners filed above suit. Along with the above plaint of the suit, the petitioners also filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C., in which they prayed for the following interlocutory relief:- "APPLICATION UNDER ORDER 39. RULES 1 AND 2, C.P.C. READ WITH SECTION 151. C.P.C.
' For the reasons disclosed in the accompanying affidavit, it is prayed on behalf of the plaintiffs above named that this Hon'ble Court may in the larger interest of justice be pleased to restrain and refrain the above named defendants, their subordinates, employees, workers, agents and/or any other person(s) whosoever acting for and on behalf of defendants in any manner whatsoever by temporary injunction order of this Hon'ble Court from giving effect and implementing in any manner the impugned Order No,171, dated 27-6-1992, as per Annexure "I" of the plaint of the defendants as purpotely of defendant No,1, and also in pursuance thereof from stopping the plaintiff by the defendants in any manner whatsoever to participate in the forthcoming tenders/contracts of supplies for 1992-93 and onwards for the Sindh Prisons under the administration and control of the defendants abovenamed, and also to stop the defendants abovenamed from calling and awarding to any one of the tenders/contracts for 1992-93 for supplies of Sindh Prisons as called by the said defendants from the contractors/other than and without participation of the plaintiffs on 19-7-1992, till the final disposal of the above suit.
' Ad interim injunction order in terms whereof is solicited meanwhile in the interest of justice."
' The above application was resisted by the respondents inasmuch as a counter-affidavit was filed in which, inter alia, it was averred that the impugned order was just and in accordance with law. In paras. 13 to 15 of the counter-affidavit, the following averments were made:--- "13. That in case the application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 is not rejected, not only the defendants but all the prisoners will suffer irreparable loss, as they will remain hungry and there is every possibility of their dying before death due to hunger as the defendants have no alternate immediate remedy available, to make arrangements for bread of the prisoners.
14. That no irreparable loss would be sustained by the plaintiffs, as the amount can be counted in terms of money.
15. That even otherwise, it is not necessary that the plaintiff will succeeded giving highest bid, however, it is submitted that since they are blacklisted, as such they are not entitled to participate in the bids."
' To the above counter-affidavit, the petitioners filed a rejoinder, in which the averments contained in the counter-affidavit were denied. The contents of the abovequoted paras. 13 to 15 of the counter-affidavit were also specifically denied. It was also averred that unless and until their suit was decided, they shall continue at least giving supplies to the prisons of Sindh in accordance with the contract for the years 1991-92 and hence the question did not arise of becoming hungry or dying of any prisoner.
' The learned Civil Judge, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties; disposed of the abovestated application as follows:--- "In the light of above authorities and circumstances of the case mentioned above I am of the humble opinion that plaintiffs have a good prima facie case, balance of convenience is also in their favour and they will suffer irreparable loss as they are earning their livelihood for their families, as such I confirm the status quo already granted by this Court vide order, dated 18-7-1992.
Application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. Stands allowed."
' Against the above order, the respondents filed above Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, which was allowed by the learned District Judge through the above judgment for the following reasons:--- "In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the respondents' position is of a contractual one and their period of contract has already expired. It is their case that they have been blacklisted on account of furnishing forged bank guarantee and it was without hearing them and they want that the department may be restrained from inviting tenders for supplies of next financial year i,e, 1992- 93 till disposal of the suit. Position of the respondents is nothing but is of an intended bidder in tender. No doubt they have been blacklisted on account of alleged forgery which is a triable issue, but for the purpose of grant of injunction, it is necessary that a party seeking discretionary relief from the Court must prove that he has a good prima facie case and the balance of convenience lies in his favour and in case injunction is not granted, he will suffer irreparable loss.
' In the present case, at least for grant of injunction respondents have no case as their contract period has already expired. The grant of injunction amounts to interfering in the performance of public function as they have to invite tenders for supply of edible, material and other articles for the prisoners in the Province of Sindh. The balance of inconvenience is more to the department concerned, rather than convenience in favour of grant of injunction in favour of the respondents, in case of ultimate success of the respondents can easily be compensated in terms of money by way of damages. The respondents have no case for the period 1992-93.
' Trial Court has ignored the settled principles for grant of injunction and was influenced only by prima facie case on account of principles of natural justice."
' The petitioners then filed above revision application, which according to them was allowed and the judgment was dictated in open Court but when 'the judgment was signed it was found that their revision was dismissed. The petitioners have, therefore, filed present petition for leave to appeal.
3. In support of the above petition Mr. Mushtaq Ahmad Memon, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the petitioners, has vehemently contended that the above impugned order dated 27-6-1992 passed by respondent No,1 is mala fide inasmuch as the alleged forged bank guarantees furnished by M/s. UBL Sattelite Town, Sargodha Branch, were not in fact acted upon inasmuch as the respondents had asked the petitioners to furnish bank guarantees of any bank of Karachi branch.
' His further submission was that the Rule 180 of Sindh Financial Rules relied upon by respondent No,1 in the impugned order has no relevance to the controversy in issue. He has also submitted that the period specified in the contract was 16-8-1991 to 30-6-1992 which was extendable for maximum period of six weeks in terms of clause (a) of the agreement but factually a contractor is allowed to continue to supply various items till fresh contract is awarded.
4. We would not like to express on the merits of the case as the suit is still pending. A perusal of the above clause (A) of the agreement indicates that the contract was for the period commencing from 16-8-1991 to 30-6-1992, which was extendable further up to the maximum of six weeks.
Admittedly, the above period has expired. The reasons given by the learned District Judge, quoted hereinabove for setting aside the order of the learned Civil Judge, do not suffer from any infirmity which could have warranted interference by the learned Judge in Chambers while exercising his revisional jurisdiction and hence no exception can be takbn to the impugned judgment of the High Court.
' As regards Mr. Mushtaq Ahmed Memon's submission that the petitioners' above revision application was allowed and the judgment was dictated in the open Court but the same was changed before it was signed, there appears to be sufficient material on record to support the above submission. In this regard, it may be pertinent to observe that a Court is entitled to change its view before it signs an order or a judgment but once the order or judgment is orally announced or is dictated in presence of the parties in the Court the propriety demands that the Court should rehear the parties before taking a different view than what was indicated to them while announcing the oral order. In the present case we would have remanded the case on the above ground but we feel it will not serve any purpose.
' We may observe that though the petitioners in their application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. Had prayed for a number of reliefs but the learned Senior Civil Judge allowed the above application by granting a status quo order meaning thereby that the case should remain as it was at the time of passing of the status quo order, which in turn implies that the impugned order, dated 27-6-1992 was to hold the field.
' In our view it will be just and proper to direct the learned Trial Court to dispose of the above suit within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order so that the petitioners may participate in the bids in case the above impugned order, dated 27-6-1992 is found by the Trial Court to be illegal.
5. With the above observations, leave is refused.