The legality of the decision of the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Peshawar dated 18-4- 1993 has been assailed in this appeal as by that decision the grievance petition filed by the petitioner under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance was accepted and as a result the order of the appellant terminating the services of the petitioner-respondent from his establishment was cancelled.
2. The litigation between the parties started in the background that the petitioner-respondent was employed as typist/clerk by the establishment of the appellant on 11-11-1975 and was confirmed in his post on 11-2-1976. It is alleged that thereafter on 1-3-1980 he was appointed as Assistant in the purchase department but the nature of his job remained the same clerical as no managerial power was vested in him. The petitioner was then re-designated as Purchase Officer on 8-7-1986 but he continued performing his clerical duties and besides that was assisting the Purchase Manager. He was next promoted as Assistant Purchase Manager on 1-7-1989 but according to the averment in the petition his duties remained the same as he had no managerial or executive powers. Similarly, as officiating Purchase Manager he could not exercise administrative powers. The petitioner alleged that he was sometime back a unionist and when he again on 2-5-1991 applied for membership of the union which was accepted then as a retaliation his services were terminated on 6-5-1991. He termed this order in violation of the relevant provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance and also mala fide and retaliatory and, therefore, sought reinstatement. The respondent in their written statement objected to the maintainability of the petition under the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and also to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court as according to them at the time of termination the petitioner was employed in the managerial position and was performing duties in that capacity. The order of termination was also defended being legal.
3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant repeated his objections as raised in the written statement and in the evidence of respondent being not a workman. It was pointed out that the respondent was provided all benefits of managerial staff and that on promotion to managerial cadre he has ceased to be a member of the union. The job description Exh. PW-1/7 was shown to be the duties of the manager. It was in the end argued that even if the respondent is admitted to be a workman then his services were terminated as the post on which he was working stood abolished. These arguments were controverted by the learned counsel for the respondent. It is to be mentioned here that numerous precedent cases were cited from either side so as to show as to who would qualify to be a workman under the Labour Laws. It is an admitted fact that every case is to be decided on its own facts and a rule laid down in a precedent case cannot be applied universally. Although I went through those judgments but could not find anyone of the Judgments in those cases having identical factual aspects as the present one.
4. I studied the record in the light of the submissions made at the Bar and the relevant law.
5. There is no denying the fact that initial appointment of the petitioner was on a clerical job and, therefore, on account of this nature of job he could at that time be designated as a workman. Now it is to be seen as to whether the nature of his duties were changed from that of clerical to managerial or executive on account of the promotion given to him. The respondent was firstly promoted as Assistant in Purchase Department as is clear from Exh. RW-1/2 and his job description as such has been enumerated in Exh. RW-1/3. The perusal of this charter of duties would indicate that it does not involve any such duty which would give it the managerial character. The real distinctive feature between the two jobs of a workman and executive is that the former is only of routine nature while the latter needs initiative, control and supervision in performing his duties. To judge on this standard even the job of Purchase Officer or Assistant Purchase Manager do not carry anything special about it and rather are of the same routine, clerical, and manual nature. It is interesting' to note that in case of other officers who were promoted to managerial slot there was particular reference that hence forth the Industrial Relations Ordinance would not be applicable. In this respect Exh. PW-1/9 is referred which reads "You will cease to be a member of workers union and IRO, 1969 will not be applicable to you. You will be in the management cadre and service rules for officers will apply to you". Similar is the case of another officer Abdul Aziz whose order of appointment is Exh. PW-1/10 which is to the effect that "This is a management position and the terms of your employment will be as follows." The respondent was promoted to the job of Assistant Purchase Manager on 1-7-1989 but the documents Exh. PW-1/11 and Exh. PW-1/12 written in April 1991 would show that these were typed by the respondent as a typist. In this context the statement of Muhammad Hassan RW-1 is referred where in his cross-examination he stated that" It is correct that we are paying Rs.300 as extra allowance to the Managerial supervisor staff. Petitioner was not getting this Rs3W allowance, as he was not supervisor." So all this would show that the conclusion of the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court in holding the petitioner-respondent as workman is unexceptionable and is maintained. The second debatable point in the case is as to whether the reason that the services of the respondent were no more required would be a valid reason in terms of section 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance. The order of termination from service is exhibited as Exh. PW-1/14 which reads "Your services are no more required, you are relinquished from the job with immediate effect." The requirement of section 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance are that the termination order must state explicitly the reasons which prevailed when dispensing with the services of an employee. It has been held in many precedent cases that merely mentioning the words your services are no more required in the order would not fulfil the requirement of the said provisions of law. This appeal is, therefore, without any merit and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.