1. ' These four Revision Applications, arise out of similar orders passed by the learned Civil Judge, Karachi under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. And the subsequent judgments passed by the learned Ex Officio Additional District Judge, Karachi, dated 22-12-1982 and 22-1-1984 respectively. The facts forming the background of these petitions are that respondent is owner of the land in question which has been bifurcated into small units and allotted to different allottees. The four petitioners are allottees of such units.
2. ' The petitioners had filed suits for declaration and permanent injunction before the learned Civil Judge at Karachi averring that they were not liable to pay development charges @ Rs,60 per sq.
3. Yd. To the respondent and that the respondent was duty-bound to execute a proper lease deed in their favour.
4. ' Before any written statement could be filed by the respondent before the learned Trial Court, applications under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. For summary rejection of the plaint were filed by it on the ground that as per para. 5 of the Lease Agreement, the petitioners were duty-bound to pay rates, taxes, development charges etc. To the respondent and the Karachi Building Control Authority had also given approval to the respondent for making demands in respect of such development charges from the allottees. Admittedly, the copies of the Lease Agreement and the certificate issued by the Karachi Building Control Authority had not been filed by the petitioners with the plaint, but the same had been relied upon by the respondent at the time of moving applications under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. Plea, raised in the applications, under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. And the respective plaints filed by the petitioners were summarily rejected. The appeals respectively filed by the petitioners before the learned Ex Officio Additional District Judge were also dismissed, and hence this Revision.
5. ' I have heard Mr. Muhammad Junaid Farooqui, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Abdul Maed Khan, learned counsel for the respondent.
6. The main contention of Mr. Junaid Farooqui is that for the purpose of rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., the learned Trial Court could only look into the averments made in the plaint and reliance could not be placed by it on any extraneous material, since admittedly, the documents relied upon by the respondent had not been filed alongwith the plaint. Consequently, according to the counsel, the order passed by the Trial Court clearly suffers from an infirmity.
7. Reliance in this respect has been placed by the counsel on Hakeem Saleem Ahmad v. Government of Sindh 1982 CLC 269, wherein it has been held that for the purpose of the rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. it must be shown to be barred under some law on the basis of the averments contained in the plaint. It has been further held that the Court in such a case is neither entitled to look into the pleas raised by the defendant nor it can examine merits of the allegations made in the plaint. Mr. Abdul Majid Khan on the other hand, has placed reliance on two judgments, first given by the Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Akhtar v. Abdul Hadi 1991 SCM R 878 and the second given by the Lahore High Court is the case of Mian Muhammad Akram v.
8. Muhammad Rafi 1989 CLC 15.
9. ' In both the cases it had been held that Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. Is not exhaustive of all the situations in which a plaint can be rejected or a suit can be dismissed summarily. In the case decided by the Lahore High Court it was further held that apart from the contents of the plaint, the material produced in defence could also be kept in mind for rejecting a plaint. Mr. Abdul Majeed Khan has also relied upon the case of Alavi Sons Ltd. v. Government of East Pakistan PLD 1968 Kar. 222 in support of his argument that the declaratory relief sought by the petitioners before the learned Civil 'Judge could not he granted under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1887.
10. I find lot of force in Mr. Abdul Majeed Khan's argument. No doubt, the plaint was rejected by the learned Trial Court after taking into consideration the lease agreement and the certificate issued by the Karachi Building Control Authority, which were relied upon by the respondent, but the Lease Agreement being the main document on the basis of which the respective rights and liabilities of the parties could be determined, the learned B Trial Court was quite justified in placing reliance on the case. The intention behind Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. Clearly appears to be, that no proceedings should be allowed to continue, which manifestly, appear to be meritless. It may also be pointed out, that as has been held in the two cases reported in PLD 1981 SC 878 and 1985 CLC 15, the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. Are not exhaustive.It is pertinent to point out that although the learned District Judge did not agree with the view taken by the Trial Court that the material placed before it by the defendant could be looked into for the purpose of the rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C., but the learned Judge was of the view that the possession order (Annexure A), which had been filed with the respective plaints, clearly entitled the respondent to resume possession of the plot, in case of failure on the part of the allottees to pay dues in respect of the plot.
11. Consequently, the order passed by the learned Trial Court was maintained by the learned District Judge, although not for the same reasons.
12. ' Mr. Junaid Farooqui has pointed out that the copies of the possession order (Annexure A) have been filed by the petitioners only in two cases. Be that as it may, but since in all cases, the defendant was the same and the nature of the suit was also similar, the learned Judge did not act improperly by looking into documents, which had been filed by the petitioners in two of the suits. I, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment.
13. ' Mr. Abdul Majeed Khan has also pointed out that the declaration sought by the petitioners could not be granted to them under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. In this respect, reliance has been placed by him on PLD 1968 Kar. 222 reference to . Which has already been made above. Although, prima facie, Mr. Abdul Majeed Khan appears to be correct, but I would not like to go into this question, as the same, in my opinion, is not necessary.
14. ' The upshot of the discussion is that these petitions have no merit and, therefore, they are dismissed, but with no order as to costs.